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Abstract
“Arrovian Social Choice Theory on Economic Domains”
by
Michel Le Breton and John A. Weymark
This article surveys the literature that investigates the consistency of
Arrow’s social choice axioms when his unrestricted domain assumptions are
replaced by domain conditions that incorporate the restrictions on agendas
and preferences encountered in economic environments. Both social welfare
functions and social choice correspondences are considered.
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1. Introduction
A social welfare function specifies a social ordering of a set of alternatives for
each profile of individual preferences in some domain of preference profiles.
Arrow’s Theorem [see Arrow (1963)] demonstrates that it is impossible for
a social welfare function to satisfy Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
(the social ranking of a pair of alternatives only depends on the individ-
ual rankings of these alternatives), Weak Pareto (if everyone strictly prefers
one alternative to a second, then so does society), and Nondictatorship (no-
body’s strict preferences are always respected) if the preference domain is
unrestricted and there are at least three alternatives being ranked.
This theorem is not directly applicable to economic problems. In eco-
nomic models, both the social alternatives and the individual preferences
exhibit considerable structure. For example, (i) alternatives could be alloca-
tions of private goods with individuals restricted to having selfish, continuous,
monotonic, and convex preferences, (ii) alternatives could be vectors of public
goods with individual preferences required to be continuous, monotonic, and
convex, or (iii) alternatives could be lotteries with preferences required to
satisfy the axioms of expected utility theory. In each of these examples, the
domain of admissible preference profiles is restricted, in contrast to Arrow’s
Theorem in which it is assumed that the preference domain is unrestricted.
Arrow’s Theorem can also be formulated in terms of a social choice cor-
respondence. In this case, the objective is to choose a set of socially optimal
alternatives from a feasible subset of the alternatives called an agenda. A
social choice correspondence specifies a nonempty subset of the agenda for
each admissible preference profile and each admissible agenda. In its choice-
theoretic formulation, Arrow’s Theorem shows that Arrow’s Choice Axiom
(for a fixed preference profile, if agenda A is a subset of agenda B and some
alternative from A is chosen when the agenda is B, then the set of alternatives
chosen from A consists of the restriction to A of the set of alternatives cho-
sen from B), Independence of Infeasible Alternatives (the social choice only
depends on the preferences for feasible alternatives), and the choice corre-
spondence versions of Weak Pareto (only weakly Pareto optimal alternatives
are chosen) and Nondictatorship (the chosen alternatives are not always a
subset of one individual’s best feasible alternatives) are inconsistent if the
preference domain is unrestricted and the agenda domain includes all the
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two and three element subsets of the universal set.1
The requirement that some of the agendas are finite is unnatural in many
economic problems. For example, an agenda could be an Edgeworth box in
an exchange economy or, alternatively, all of the allocations that are feasible
for a production economy with given production technologies and resource
endowment. By varying the technologies and/or the endowment, new agen-
das are obtained.
In this chapter, we survey the literature that investigates the consistency
of Arrow’s axioms when natural economic restrictions are placed on the uni-
versal set of alternatives, on preferences, and on agendas. We consider social
welfare functions in Part I and social choice correspondences in Part II.
Prior to Arrow (1951), social choice theory focused on the properties of
particular social decision procedures, such as majority rule. One of the inno-
vative features of Arrow’s work is that it shifted attention from the analysis
of a given social decision rule to the question of whether any social decision
procedure can satisfy a prespecified list of appealing properties. The answer
to this question depends on the domain for which the social choice rule is
meant to apply. Domains for which the Arrow axioms can be jointly satisfied
are called Arrow-consistent.
The literature on the Arrow-consistency of the preference domain of a so-
cial welfare function has two main branches. In one branch of this literature,
the objective is to find necessary and sufficient conditions for the domain
to be Arrow-consistent when little or no a priori structure is placed on the
set of alternatives. Not much is known about the implications of this line of
research for economic domains, so it will not be considered in this survey.2
In the other branch of this literature, the objective is more modest. In-
stead of attempting to completely characterize the preference domains that
are Arrow-consistent, the objective is to determine whether the preference
domain in a specific economic problem is Arrow-consistent and, if so, to
identify social welfare functions that satisfy all of the Arrow axioms on this
domain. This research programme has been aided by the development of var-
ious sufficient conditions for a preference domain to be Arrow-inconsistent
1For some agenda domains, Arrow’s Choice Axiom is the choice-theoretic analogue of
Arrow’s assumption that social preferences are orderings.
2See Gaertner (2001; 2002) for discussions of this literature. Some of of the contribu-
tions to this literature assume that every individual exhibits a strict preference between
any pair of alternatives or assume that the set of alternatives is finite, neither of which is
a natural assumption in economic problems when the alternatives include divisible goods.
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that can be applied in a wide range of economic applications.
While, in retrospect, the work of Black (1948) on single-peaked prefer-
ences when the set of alternatives is one-dimensional and of Arrow (1951,
Chapter VI) and Blau (1957) on the allocation of multiple private goods can
be seen as contributing to this research programme, it was the pathbreaking
contribution of Kalai, Muller, and Satterthwaite (1979) that set the stage for
most of the subsequent developments on the Arrow-consistency of domains
of economic preferences.3 They introduced the concept of a saturating do-
main and showed that it is a sufficient condition for the preference domain
of a social welfare function to be Arrow-inconsistent when individuals are re-
quired to have the same set of admissible preferences. The method of proof
used to establish this theorem is now known as the local approach. Some
version of this methodology is used to prove most of the results we survey
in Part I. As we shall see, except when alternatives are one-dimensional and
preferences are single-peaked, it is typically the case that some version of
Arrow’s impossibility theorem holds for economic domains of interest.
The research on the consistency of Arrow’s axioms on economic domains
when the social choice correspondence framework is used originates with Bai-
ley (1979), who questioned the relevance of Arrow’s Theorem for exchange
economies. Here, the results are more mixed. While the choice-theoretic
versions of Arrow’s axioms are inconsistent on many economic domains, a
number of domains have been identified for which they are consistent. In
contrast to the research on social welfare functions, the strategies used to de-
termine whether various economic domains for social choice correspondences
are Arrow-consistent or not have largely been domain-specific. As a con-
sequence, the literature surveyed in Part II is less well-developed than the
literature surveyed in Part I.
We begin Part I with a review of Arrow’s Theorem for social welfare
functions. Single-peaked preferences on a one-dimensional set of alternatives
are considered in Section 3. In Section 4, we discuss saturating domains and
the local approach. We illustrate the application of the local approach in
Section 5 by showing that a number of economic domains for public alter-
natives are saturating. In Section 6, we discuss a topological approach to
3Also influential is the earlier unpublished work of Maskin (1976). Maskin showed
that when there are at least two private goods, Weak Pareto and Nondictatorship are
inconsistent with a nonnegative responsiveness condition (a strengthening of Independence
of Irrelevant Alternatives) on the domain of selfish, continuous, monotonic, and convex
preferences if each individual consumption set is a positive orthant.
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identifying Arrow-consistent domains due to Redekop (1991). Private goods
are considered in Sections 7, 8, and 9. In Section 10, we discuss problems
in which the set of alternatives does not have a Cartesian structure. This
situation arises when feasibility constraints place restrictions on the set of
alternatives, as is the case, for example, in exchange economies. In Section
11, we consider some implications of requiring a social welfare function to
generate socially-best alternatives on some subsets of alternatives.
Part II begins by describing a choice-theoretic version of Arrow’s Theo-
rem. This is followed in Section 13 by a discussion of a number of problems
in which the agenda domain is restricted, but the preference domain is not.
This structure is exhibited by some voting models. In Section 14, we present
a possibility theorem for a one-dimensional set of alternatives when prefer-
ences are single-peaked and agendas are compact intervals. In Section 15, we
discuss some possibility theorems for multidimensional sets of alternatives
when preferences are representable by analytic utility functions. Euclidean
spatial preferences have this property. In Section 16, we consider some classi-
cal domains of spatial and economic preferences when agendas satisfy natural
feasibility restrictions. In Section 17, the implications of a stronger indepen-
dence condition are discussed for models similar to the ones considered in
Section 16. Some concluding remarks are presented in Section 18.
Any survey of the literature on Arrovian social choice theory on economic
domains would be incomplete without some discussion of the proof strategies
that have been employed. Accordingly, for most of the results we discuss,
we either present a proof or we provide heuristic arguments that convey the
main intuition of a formal proof. By proceeding in this way, we hope that
the reader will gain some appreciation for why significant progress has been
in understanding when the domain of a social welfare function is Arrow-
inconsistent and why less progress has been made in understanding when
Arrow’s axioms for social choice correspondences are consistent.
Part I: Social welfare functions
2. Arrow’s theorem
Almost all of the research that we survey builds on Arrow’s [Arrow (1951;
1963)] classic work. In this section, we provide a brief introduction to Ar-
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row’s impossibility theorem for social welfare functions. For more complete
discussions, see, for example, Sen (1970) or Campbell and Kelly (2002).
We consider a finite set of individuals N = {1, . . . , n} with n ≥ 2 and a
universal set of alternatives X. R is the set of all orderings of X; i.e., R is
the set of all reflexive, complete, and transitive binary relations on X. For
each ordering R in R, strict preference P and indifference I are defined in
the usual way: (a) xPy if and only if xRy and ¬(yRx) and (b) xIy if and
only if xRy and yRx. Each person has a preference ordering Ri ∈ R on X.
A preference profile R = (R1, . . . , Rn) is an n-tuple of individual preference
orderings on X. Two preferences R1, R2 ∈ R coincide on A ⊆ X if for all
x, y ∈ A, xR1y ↔ xR2y.4 Two profiles R1,R2 ∈ Rn coincide on A ⊆ X if
R1i and R
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i coincide on A for all i ∈ N .
The collection of admissible profiles D, a nonempty subset of Rn, is called
the preference domain. Collective decisions are only required for profiles
in the preference domain. A social welfare function on D is a mapping
F : D → R that assigns a social preference ordering F (R) of X to each
admissible profile R. To simplify the notation, henceforth F (R) is denoted
as R.
Arrow (1951) supposed that the social welfare function must be deter-
mined before the individual preferences are known. If no structure is as-
sumed about what form these preferences might take (other than that they
are orderings), the social welfare function needs to be able to determine a
social ordering of the alternatives for any conceivable preference profile.
Unrestricted Preference Domain. D = Rn.
In addition to his domain assumption, Arrow proposed three properties
for a social welfare function to satisfy. The first of these axioms requires the
social ranking of any pair of alternatives to depend only on the individual
rankings of these alternatives.
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). For all x, y ∈ X and all
R1,R2 ∈ D, if R1 and R2 coincide on {x, y}, then R1 and R2 coincide
on {x, y}.
Arrow’s Weak Pareto axiom requires the social welfare function to respect
unanimous strict rankings on pairs of alternatives.
4We distinguish between ⊆ (weak set inclusion) and ⊂ (strict set inclusion).
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Weak Pareto (WP). For all x, y ∈ X and all R ∈ D, if xPiy for all i ∈ N ,
then xPy.
An individual d ∈ N is a dictator on the ordered pair (x, y) ∈ X2 if xPy
for all R ∈ D such that xPdy. An individual d ∈ N is a dictator on the
subset A ⊆ X if d is a dictator on the ordered pair (x, y) for all x, y ∈ A. An
individual d ∈ N is a dictator if d is a dictator on X. A social welfare function
is dictatorial if there exists a dictator. Note that a dictatorial social welfare
function only needs to respect the dictator’s strict preferences. Arrow’s final
axiom requires the social welfare function to be nondictatorial.
Nondictatorship (ND). There is no dictator.
Detailed discussions of these axioms may be found in Sen (1970). As noted
in Section 1, an Arrow-consistent domain for a social welfare function is a
preference domain for which there exists a social welfare function satisfying
IIA, WP, and ND.5 If no social welfare function exists for which these three
axioms are satisfied, then the preference domain is Arrow-inconsistent.
If a preference domain is Arrow-consistent, one may want to see if it is
possible for a social welfare function to satisfy further desirable properties.
For example, Weak Pareto could be strengthened to Strong Pareto, the re-
quirement that if nobody prefers y to x and somebody prefers x to y, then
x should be socially preferred to y.
Strong Pareto (SP). For all x, y ∈ X and all R ∈ D, if xRiy for all i ∈ N
and xPjy for some j ∈ N , then xPy.
Nondictatorship could be strengthened by requiring the social welfare
function to treat individuals symmetrically in the sense that if we permute
the individual preferences, then the social ordering is unchanged.
Anonymity (ANON). For all R1,R2 ∈ D, if R1 is a permutation of R2, then
F (R1) = F (R2).
Arrow’s Theorem shows that it is impossible for a social welfare function
to satisfy his three axioms when the preference domain is unrestricted. In
other words, the domain Rn is Arrow-inconsistent.
5This terminology is due to Redekop (1991). This definition does not explicitly mention
the set of alternatives X being considered. However, X can always be inferred from
knowledge of the preference domain.
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Theorem 1. If |X| ≥ 3, there is no social welfare function with an unre-
stricted preference domain that satisfies IIA, WP, and ND.6
Standard proofs of the social welfare function version of Arrow’s Theorem,
such as the one found in Sen (1970), show that a social welfare function
must be dictatorial if it satisfies the other assumptions of Arrow’s Theorem.
Before describing the main steps in the proof of Arrow’s Theorem, we need
to introduce some further definitions. A nonempty group G ⊆ N is almost
decisive for the ordered pair (x, y) ∈ X2 if x is socially strictly preferred to y
when everyone in G strictly prefers x to y and everyone else has the opposite
strict ranking. G is decisive for the ordered pair (x, y) ∈ X2 if x is socially
strictly preferred to y when everyone in G strictly prefers x to y, regardless
of the preferences of the other individuals. The proof of Arrow’s Theorem
proceeds by first showing that if a group G is almost decisive for some pair of
distinct alternatives, then it is decisive for all pairs of alternatives, in which
case G is said to be decisive. Next, it is shown that if any group of two or
more individuals is decisive, then it contains a smaller decisive group. WP
ensures that the set of all individuals is decisive. Hence, by the previous
step in this argument, some individual is decisive; i.e., there is a dictator.
At various steps in this argument, it is necessary to construct profiles with
particular configurations of preferences on pairs or triples of alternatives. On
economic domains, these profiles may not exist.
A linear ordering on X is an ordering in which no distinct alternatives
are indifferent to each other. The set of linear orderings of X is L.
Unrestricted Linear Preference Domain. D = Ln.
Straightforward modifications to the standard proofs of Arrow’s Theorem
show that Ln is also an Arrow-inconsistent domain.
3. Single-peaked preferences
In this section, we suppose that the set of alternatives is one-dimensional
and that preferences are single-peaked. The analysis of social choice with
6This version of Arrow’s Theorem may be found in Chapter VIII of Arrow (1963). The
original statement of the theorem in Arrow (1951) contains a minor error, a fact discovered
by Blau (1957). Blau provided a correct statement of the impossibility theorem, but, as
noted by Arrow (1963), Blau’s version of the theorem contains a redundant axiom.
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single-peaked preferences was first considered by Black (1948) in his pioneer-
ing work on majority rule. Black’s research predates that of Arrow and is
non-axiomatic. Subsequently, Moulin (1980) initiated the axiomatic study
of strategy-proof social choice for this preference domain. We show how
Moulin’s generalized median voting schemes can be used to establish the
Arrow-consistency of the domain of single-peaked preference profiles. We
also discuss the recent characterization by Ehlers and Storcken (2002) of all
the social welfare functions that satisfy IIA and WP on this domain.
For concreteness, we assume that X is a nondegenerate interval of R.
X can be given a variety of interpretations. For example, if X = R+, an
alternative can be interpreted as being the quantity of a public good. Alter-
natively, an alternative can be a political candidate’s ideology, as measured
on a left-right spectrum. In either case, it is natural to suppose that pref-
erences are single-peaked. A preference R ∈ R is single-peaked on X ⊆ R
if there exists a β ∈ X such that xPy whenever β ≤ x < y or β ≥ x > y.
The alternative β is the peak of R. Let SP denote the set of all single-peaked
preferences and SnP denote the set of all profiles of single-peaked preferences
on X.7 In this section, we consider the preference domain SnP .
Unrestricted Single-Peaked Preference Domain. D = SnP .
Let B denote the set of all binary relations on X. The method of majority
rule on D is a mapping M : D → B that weakly ranks one alternative above
another if and only if the former is weakly preferred to the latter by a majority
of individuals. Formally, for all x, y ∈ X and all R ∈ D,
xM(R)y ↔ |{i ∈ N | xRiy}| ≥ |{i ∈ N | yRix}|.
In general, the method of majority rule is not a social welfare function
because it does not always result in a social ordering of the alternatives. How-
ever, Black (1948) has shown that if preferences are single-peaked and there
are an odd number of individuals, then the majority-rule social preference
relation is, in fact, an ordering.8
7In the absence of a natural order on the set of alternatives, single-peakedness is best
thought of as a restriction on preference profiles. See Arrow (1951) and Austen-Smith and
Banks (1999).
8See Gaertner (2001; 2002) for a discussion of other domain restrictions that ensure
that majority rule yields transitive social preferences.
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Theorem 2. If X is a nondegenerate interval of R and |N | is odd, then
the method of majority rule is a social welfare function on an unrestricted
single-peaked preference domain.9
Theorem 2 can be used to help establish Black’s median-voter theorem.
Black’s Theorem shows that, for any profile R ∈ SnP , the median of the
individual preference peaks is equal to the alternative in X that is top-ranked
according to the majority-rule preference relation M(R) if n is odd.
The binary relation ≤ (resp. ≥) on X declares x to be weakly preferred
to y if and only if x ≤ y (resp. x ≥ y). If the infimum (resp. supremum)
of X is not in X, ≤ (resp. ≥) is not single-peaked on X. However, the
extensions of these relations to the closure X¯ of X are single-peaked.10 It is
sometimes useful to augment the set of single-peaked preferences with these
binary relations. Let S∗P = SP ∪ {≤,≥}. Theorem 2 also holds for the
preference domain (S∗P )n.
Example 1 shows that it is possible to satisfy all of the Arrow axioms,
with ND strengthened to ANON, on the domain of single-peaked preference
profiles. Thus, this preference domain is Arrow-consistent.11
Example 1. Let X be a nondegenerate interval of R. A social welfare func-
tion F : SnP → R is a generalized median social welfare function if there
exists a profile RP ∈ (S∗P )n−1 such that for all R ∈ SnP , F (R) = M(R,RP ).
That is, we apply the method of majority rule to a profile consisting of the
preferences of the n real individuals and the preferences of n − 1 phantom
voters.12 The preferences of these phantom voters are fixed. Because there
are an odd number of real and phantom individuals, Theorem 2 implies that
F is a social welfare function. Generalized median social welfare functions
are the social welfare function analogues of a class of social choice functions
introduced by Moulin (1980).
The method of majority rule is based on pairwise comparisons, so F sat-
isfies IIA. Because there are more real individuals than phantoms, if all of the
9See Arrow (1951) for a proof of this theorem. When the number of individuals is even,
the social binary relation resulting from majority rule when preferences are single-peaked
is reflexive and complete and the corresponding strict preference relation is transitive, but
the social indifference relation may be intransitive.
10If X = R, its closure is R ∪ {−∞,∞}.
11Arrow (1951) has used Theorem 2 to show that the method of majority rule satisfies
all of the axioms used in the original version of his theorem on the domain of single-peaked
preference profiles when the number of individuals is odd.
12This terminology is due to Border and Jordan (1983).
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real individuals strictly prefer x to y, then a majority of all the individuals,
both real and phantom, prefer x to y. Hence, F satisfies WP. Permuting
preferences has no effect on the number of individuals who rank x above y,
so F also satisfies ANON.
In Example 1, if n is odd, there are an even number of phantom voters.
By choosing RP so that half of the phantoms have the preference ≤ and
the other half have the preference ≥, the phantom voters just cancel each
other out, and so have no influence on the social ranking. With this profile
of phantom preferences, the corresponding generalized median social welfare
function is simply the ordinary method of majority rule considered by Black.
A nonempty group G ⊆ N is semidecisive for the ordered pair (x, y) ∈ X2
if x is socially weakly preferred to y when everyone in G strictly prefers x to
y and everyone else has the opposite strict preference. Suppose that X is a
nondegenerate interval of R, x, y, z ∈ X with x < y < z or z < y < x, and
∅ = G ⊆ N . Ehlers and Storcken (2002) have shown that the decisiveness
properties described in our sketch of the proof of Arrow’s Theorem only hold
in a weaker form when preferences are single-peaked. Specifically, they have
shown that if a social welfare function with an unrestricted single-peaked
preference domain satisfies IIA and WP, then (i) if G is semidecisive for
(x, y), then it is decisive for (x, z) and (ii) if G is semidecisive for (x, z), then
it is decisive for (y, z). These decisiveness properties are compatible with
nondictatorial rules.
As in Example 1, the social welfare functions in the Ehlers–Storcken
(2002) characterization theorem use a set of fixed preferences to augment
the actual profile of preferences. However, these supplementary preferences
are drawn from a slightly more general class of preferences than the class of
single-peaked preferences. A preference R ∈ R is strictly quasiconcave on an
interval X of R if for any x, y, z ∈ X with x < y < z, either yPx or yPz; i.e.,
there is a single-peaked preference on X that coincides with R on {x, y, z}.
With a strictly quasiconcave preference, there exists a quasi-peak β ∈ X¯ such
that (i) xPy if either y < x < β or β > x > y and (ii) if β ∈ X, then either
βPx for all x < β or βPx for all x > β. Note that the quasi-peak can be
worse than some of the alternatives on one, but not both, sides of it. If both
of the conditions in (ii) hold, R is a single-peaked preference.
In the Ehlers–Storcken construction, there is a fixed strictly quasiconcave
preference assigned to each possible subset of N , including the empty set.
For all S ⊆ N , let RS denote the preference assigned to the set S and βS
10
denote its quasi-peak. Let RV denote the profile of these preferences. The
profile RV is monotone if for all S, T ⊆ N for which S ⊆ T and for all
w, x, y, z ∈ X for which w < x < y < z, (i) xRSy → xP T z, (ii) xRSz →
yP T z, (iii) yRTx → yP Sw, and (iv) yRTw → xP Sw. The profile RV is
strongly monotone if for all S, T ⊆ N for which S ⊆ T and for all x, y ∈ X
for which x < y, (i) xRSy → xRTy and (ii) xP Sy → xP Ty. It is readily
verified that RV is monotone if it is strongly monotone. The profile RV is
symmetric if RS = RT when |S| = |T |.
For any pair of distinct alternatives x, y ∈ X, let τ{x,y} be a social welfare
function with an unrestricted preference domain for the set of alternatives
{x, y}. A pairwise assignment rule τ is a family of such functions, one for
each pair of distinct alternatives in X. The family τ is symmetric if τ{x,y} is
an anonymous social welfare function for all distinct x, y ∈ X. If each τ{x,y}
is the method of majority rule for {x, y}, then τ is the majority-rule pairwise
assignment rule.
Ehlers–Storcken Social Welfare Functions. Given a monotone profile RV
of strictly quasiconcave preferences on X for which R∅ = ≥ and RN = ≤
and given a pairwise assignment rule τ , the Ehlers–Storcken social welfare
function FR
V
τ : SnP → R associated with RV and τ is defined as follows. For
all R ∈ SnP , FRVτ (R) is reflexive. Let R ∈ SnP and consider x, y ∈ X with
x < y. Let S = {i ∈ N | xPiy} and T = {i ∈ N | xIiy}.
(i) If there exists a z ∈ (x, y) such that xRSz or there exists a z ∈ X with
z < x such that zRSy, then xFR
V
τ (R)y and ¬(yFRVτ (R)x).
(ii) If there exist a z ∈ (x, y) such that yRS∪T z or there exists a z ∈ X
with z > y such that zRS∪Tx, then yFR
V
τ (R)x and ¬(xFRVτ (R)y).
(iii) Otherwise, FR
V
τ coincides with τ{x,y} on {x, y}.13
The social preference assigned to any profile in SnP by FRVτ is constructed
using the family of fixed preferences {RS}S⊆N and the pairwise assignment
rule τ . A striking feature of the social preference FR
V
τ (R) is that it is strictly
quasiconcave. See Ehlers and Storcken (2002). It is fairly easy to show that
if (i) holds, then xP Sy, and if (ii) holds, then yP S∪Tx. For example, if
x < z < y and xRSz, because RS is strictly quasiconcave, βS ≤ z, which
implies that zP Sy. Hence, by transitivity, xP Sy. As a consequence, FR
V
τ (R)
coincides with RS on {x, y} in case (i) and it coincides with RS∪T on {x, y} in
13The monotonicity of RV ensures that it is not possible to satisfy the hypotheses of
both (i) and (ii) in the definition of FR
V
τ for a given profile and pair of alternatives.
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case (ii). Ehlers and Storcken have shown that when case (iii) holds, (a) z is
socially preferred to both x and y for all z ∈ (x, y) and (b) x and y are both
socially preferred to all of the other alternatives. If FR
V
τ (R) is continuous at
both x and y, this would imply that x and y are socially indifferent. However,
discontinuities are permitted, and it is in fact possible to arbitrarily rank x
and y in case (iii) while preserving the strict quasiconcavity of FR
V
τ (R). This
is why any pairwise assignment rule τ can be used to order x and y in this
case. Note that in order to satisfy IIA, τ can only depend on the individual
rankings of x and y.
Theorem 3 is the Ehlers–Storcken characterization theorem for the do-
main of single-peaked preferences.
Theorem 3. If X is a nondegenerate interval of R, then a social welfare
function with an unrestricted single-peaked preference domain satisfies IIA
and WP if and only if it is an Ehlers–Storcken social welfare function.
By construction, FR
V
τ satisfies IIA. To see why WP is satisfied, suppose
that x < y and consider a profile in SnP in which everyone’s peak is at x.
Thus, the set S in the definition of FR
V
τ is N . For any z ∈ (x, y), we have
xPNz because RN = ≤, so x is socially preferred to y by (i). By IIA,
this is the social ranking whenever everyone prefers x to y. An analogous
argument using (ii) applies when everyone prefers y to x. To complete the
necessity part of the proof, it must be shown that FR
V
τ (R) is an ordering for
all R ∈ SnP . The proof that FRVτ (R) is transitive is quite lengthy, as is the
proof of the sufficiency part of this theorem. See Ehlers and Storcken (2002)
for the details.
An Ehlers–Storcken social welfare function satisfies ANON if and only
if the profile RV and the pairwise assignment rule τ are both symmetric.
This observation is used in Theorem 4 to provide sufficient conditions for
an Ehlers–Storcken social welfare function to be a generalized median social
welfare function.
Theorem 4. If X is a nondegenerate interval of R, RS ∈ S∗P for all S ⊆ N
with R∅ = ≥ and RN = ≤, RV is symmetric and strongly monotone, and
τ is the majority-rule pairwise assignment rule, then FR
V
τ : SnP → R is a
generalized median social welfare function.14
14Theorem 4 is a special case of a theorem in Ehlers and Storcken (2002).
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Proof. The symmetry of RV allows us to identify RV with a profile of n+ 1
single-peaked preferences (Rn+1, . . . , R2n+1), where Rn+t = R
S if |S| = t−1.
Consider any R ∈ SnP and any x, y ∈ X with x < y. Note that the majority
relations M(R, Rn+1, . . . , R2n+1) and M(R, Rn+2, . . . , R2n) are equivalent
because Rn+1 = ≥ and R2n+1 = ≤, which cancel each other out. Thus,
it is sufficient to show that M(R, Rn+1, . . . , R2n+1) coincides with F
RV
τ (R)
on {x, y}. As above, let S = {i ∈ N | xPiy} and T = {i ∈ N | xIiy}.
First, suppose that x is strictly preferred to y according to FR
V
τ (R).
This preference is only compatible with cases (i) and (iii) in the definition of
FR
V
τ . In the latter case, the conclusion follows directly from the assumption
that τ is the majority-rule pairwise assignment rule. In the former case, we
must have xP Sy; i.e., xPn+|S|+1y. Strong monotonicity then implies that
xPn+|T |+1y for all T ⊇ S. Thus, in the profile (R, Rn+1, . . . , R2n+1), the
individuals in S and the phantom individuals in {n + |S| + 1, . . . , 2n + 1}
all strictly prefer x to y. Hence, x is strictly preferred to y by at least n+ 1
individuals, which is a strict majority.
Second, suppose that y is strictly preferred to x according to FR
V
τ (R),
which is only consistent with cases (ii) and (iii). As above, case (iii) is
trivial, so suppose that (ii) applies, which implies that yPn+|S∪T |+1x. It then
follows from strong monotonicity that yPn+|U |+1x for all U ⊆ S ∪ T . Thus,
in the profile (R, Rn+1, . . . , R2n+1), the individuals in N\{S ∪ T} and in
{n+ 1, . . . , n+ |S ∪ T |+ 1} strictly prefer y to x, which is a strict majority.
If x is indifferent to y according to FR
V
τ (R), case (iii) must apply, and
the conclusion is trivial.
4. Saturating preference domains
Kalai, Muller, and Satterthwaite (1979) have identified a sufficient condition
for a preference domain to be Arrow-inconsistent when everyone has the same
set of admissible preferences. Domains satisfying their sufficient condition
are called saturating. This structural property of a preference domain is
satisfied in many economic and political applications. The methodology used
to show that a saturating domain is Arrow-inconsistent is known as the local
approach. In this section, we describe the local approach and present some
general results about saturating preference domains.
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4.1. Preliminaries
As a maintained assumption, we assume throughout this section that the set
of admissible preference orderings for any one individual is independent of
the preferences of the other individuals. Thus, the preference domain can be
expressed as the product of individual preference domains Di ⊆ R, i ∈ N .
Cartesian Preference Domain. D = ∏ni=1Di, where Di ⊆ R for all i ∈ N .
If each person has the same set of admissible preferences, the preference
domain is common.
Common Preference Domain. D is a Cartesian preference domain with Di =
Dj for all i, j ∈ N .
When the preference domain is common, we let D∗ denote the common
individual preference domain. For a social welfare function F on a common
preference domain, although each person’s preferences are required to be in
D∗, the social preferences are merely required to be in R.
Before considering further restrictions on the preference domain, we need
to introduce some additional notation. For any subset A of X, R|A denotes
the restriction of R to A, D|A denotes the restriction of D to A, and F |A
denotes the restriction of F to A. More precisely, F |A is the social welfare
function with domain D and range R|A defined by F |A(R) = F (R)|A.
In the theorems and examples we consider, it is necessary to determine
how rich the preference domain is when restricted to certain subsets of X.
The following kinds of sets of alternatives are used extensively.
Trivial Subset. A subset A of X is trivial with respect to Di if |Di|A| = 1.
The set A is trivial with respect to D if there is some i ∈ N such that A is
trivial with respect to Di.
A subset is trivial (with respect to D) if there is some individual who
has only one admissible preference ordering over this set of alternatives. A
trivial pair is a trivial subset containing only two alternatives. Sets which
are not trivial are called nontrivial. Note that a nontrivial set with respect
to D must be nontrivial for all individuals.
Free Subset. A subset A of X is free with respect to Di if Di|A = R|A. The
set A is free with respect to D if it is free with respect to Di for all i ∈ N .
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A subset is free (with respect to D) if everyone’s preferences are unre-
stricted on this set of alternatives. A free triple is a free subset containing
three alternatives. A free subset (containing more than one alternative) is
obviously nontrivial. However, a nontrivial set need not be free.
Strong Connection. Two pairs A and B contained in X are strongly con-
nected with respect to Di (resp. D) if A ∪ B is a free triple with respect to
Di (resp. D).
Connection. Two pairs A and B contained in X are connected with respect
to Di (resp. D) if there exists a finite sequence of pairs contained in X,
A1, . . . , Ar, with A1 = A and Ar = B such that Aj and Aj+1 are strongly
connected with respect to Di (resp. D) for all j = 1, . . . , r − 1.
In the subsequent discussion, when we refer to two pairs as being strongly
connected or connected, we are implicitly assuming that this is relative to D.
Two pairs that are strongly connected have exactly one alternative in com-
mon and the preference domain is unrestricted on their union. If two pairs of
alternatives are connected, the preference domain need not be unrestricted
on their union; it is only necessary that there exist a way to link the pairs
together so that each adjacent pair in the chain is strongly connected. In gen-
eral, two pairs A and B may be connected with respect to Di for all i ∈ N
without being connected because there is not a single sequence of pairs that
connects the pairs A and B in all of the individual preference domains Di.
That is, it may only be possible to connect A and B in i and j’s preference
domains using different intermediate pairs of alternatives. However, if there
is a common preference domain, because the preference domain is Carte-
sian, any pairs that are connected (strongly connected) for any individual
are obviously connected (strongly connected) for D.
For any A of X, F |A is a function of D|A if IIA is satisfied. This insight
plays a central role in the results discussed in Part I. It implies that the
structure of a social welfare function on A just depends on the restriction of
the preference domain to A. In particular, if F satisfies IIA and WP and if
D|A = Rn|A and |A| ≥ 3, then Theorem 1 (Arrow’s Theorem) implies that
F |A is dictatorial; i.e., there exists a dictator on A. Naturally, (when IIA
and WP are satisfied) we may use the same line of reasoning for any other
set of alternatives B to conclude that there is a dictator on B if D|B = Rn|B
and |B| ≥ 3. However, in general, the dictator on B need not be the same as
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the dictator on A. The following example, which appears in Fishburn (1976)
and in Kalai, Muller, and Satterthwaite (1979), illustrates this point.
Example 2. Let N = {1, 2} and X = {x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6}. Let D be a
common preference domain with D∗ = {R ∈ R | xiPxj for all i = 1, 2, 3 and
all j = 4, 5, 6}. In this example, {x1, x2, x3} and {x4, x5, x6} are free triples.
Hence, if F is a social welfare function on D satisfying IIA and WP, there
must exist a dictator on each of these free triples. Define the social welfare
function F by setting, for all R ∈ D,
(i) xRy ↔ xR1y for x, y ∈ {x1, x2, x3},
(ii) xRy ↔ xR2y for x, y ∈ {x4, x5, x6},
(iii) xPy if x ∈ {x1, x2, x3} and y ∈ {x4, x5, x6}.
This is a well-defined social welfare function because, for all profiles in the
domain, the social preference is an ordering. For example, if x ∈ {x1, x2, x3}
and y, z ∈ {x4, x5, x6}, by (iii) we must have both xPy and xPz, which
ensures that restricted to {x, y, z}, R is an ordering regardless of how y and
z are ranked. F satisfies IIA and WP, but it is not dictatorial.
The following example demonstrates that an Arrow-consistent domain
can be both a superset and subset of Arrow-inconsistent domains.
Example 3. Suppose that |X| ≥ 3. Let R∗ denote the ordering on X in
which all alternatives are indifferent to each other. Bordes and Le Bre-
ton (1990b) have shown that the preference domain (L ∪ {R∗})n is Arrow-
consistent. This domain contains no free triples. Note that (L ∪ {R∗})n
contains Ln and is contained in Rn, both of which are Arrow-inconsistent.15
An example of a social welfare function F that satisfies all of the Arrow
axioms on this domain can be constructed as follows. For all R ∈ D for which
Ri = R∗ for all i ∈ N , let F (R) = R1. For any other R ∈ D, let F (R) = R2.
F clearly satisfies WP and ND. If R1 and R2 coincide on {x, y}, then either
both profiles are in Ln or someone has the preference R∗ in both profiles.
Hence, F satisfies IIA.
15Kelly (1994) has characterized all the Arrow-inconsistent Cartesian preference domains
D for which Ln ⊆ D ⊆ Rn. A domain of linear preference profiles D is super-Arrovian if D
is Arrow-inconsistent and every domain D′ with D ⊆ D′ ⊆ Ln is also Arrow-inconsistent.
Fishburn and Kelly (1997) have provided a characterization of the Arrow-inconsistent
domains that are also super-Arrovian.
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4.2. The Kalai–Muller–Satterthwaite theorem
There is no dictator in Example 2 because no pair of alternatives from either
of the free triples is connected to any of the pairs contained in the other free
triple. Connectedness is a common feature of the preference domains found
in a number of economic and political models. In this section, we present the
Kalai–Muller–Satterthwaite Theorem, which shows that if all the nontrivial
pairs are connected, then the preference domain is Arrow-inconsistent.
A preference domain is saturating when all nontrivial pairs are connected
and there are at least two nontrivial pairs.
Saturating Preference Domain. An individual preference domain Di (resp.
a preference domain D) is saturating if (a) there exist at least two nontriv-
ial pairs with respect to Di (resp. D) and (b) any two nontrivial pairs are
connected with respect to Di (resp. D).
For any saturating preference domain, any nontrivial pair must belong to
a free triple. Hence, it is a free pair. The definition of a saturating preference
domain introduced by Kalai, Muller, and Satterthwaite (1979) assumes that
the preference domain is common. The more general definition presented
here first appeared in Le Breton and Weymark (1996). In generalizing the
Kalai–Muller–Satterthwaite definition to an arbitrary Cartesian preference
domain, all nontrivial pairs are required to be connected, rather than merely
requiring each individual preference domain to be saturating. In general,
the Le Breton–Weymark definition of a saturating preference domain is not
equivalent to the requirement that each of the individual preference domains
is saturating; as noted earlier, in the latter case, nontrivial pairs for different
individuals may be connected using different sequences of pairs of alterna-
tives. However, if there is a common preference domain, then the definition of
a saturating preference domain given here is obviously equivalent to requiring
the common individual preference domain D∗ to be saturating.
A preference domain satisfies the free triple property if every triple of
distinct alternatives is free. If every triple is free, then every pair is nontrivial.
Further, any two pairs are connected. For example, {x, y} and {u, v} are
connected by the pair {y, u} if u ∈ {x, y}. Hence, any preference domain that
satisfies the free triple property is saturating. In particular, an unrestricted
preference domain has the free triple property, and so must be saturating.
However, a preference domain can be saturating without satisfying the free
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triple property, as Example 4 demonstrates.16
Example 4. Let N = {1, 2} and X = {x1, x2, x3, x4}. Let D be a common
preference domain with D∗ = {R ∈ R | xiPx4 for all i = 1, 2, 3}. In this
example, {x1, x2, x3} is a free triple. Any pair containing x4 is trivial.
Kalai, Muller, and Satterthwaite (1979) have established the following
generalization of Arrow’s Theorem.
Theorem 5. If a social welfare function with a common saturating prefer-
ence domain satisfies IIA and WP, then it is dictatorial.
Proof. By the definition of a saturating preference domain, there are at
least two nontrivial pairs. Let {x, y} and {u, v} be any two such pairs of
alternatives. By the definition of a saturating preference domain, these
pairs are connected; i.e., there exists a finite sequence of pairs of alter-
natives, say {x1, x2}, {x2, x3}, . . . , {xr−1, xr} such that {x, y, x1}, {y, x1, x2},
{x1, x2, x3}, . . . , {xr−1, xr, u}, and {xr, u, v} are free triples.
By Arrow’s Theorem (Theorem 1), there is a dictator on each of these
free triples. Consider the first two free triples in this sequence. They have
the pair {y, x1} in common. As a consequence, the dictator must be the same
for both of these two free triples. By a similar reasoning, we can conclude
that each adjacent pair of free triples in the sequence has a common dictator.
Thus, there is a dictator on the set {x, y, x1, . . . , xr, u, v}. Any other pair of
nontrivial alternatives must be connected to {x, y} (and to {u, v}). It then
follows from the preceding argument that there is a single dictator, say d, on
the set of all nontrivial pairs. Because there is a common preference domain,
everyone has the same preferences on any trivial pair. WP implies that d is
a dictator on the trivial pairs. Thus, d dictates on all of X.
Variants of this proof have been used extensively to establish Arrovian
impossibility theorems on economic and political domains. This method of
proof originated with Kalai, Muller, and Satterthwaite (1979) and is now
known as the local approach. The reason for this terminology is that the
proof consists of first showing that there is a local dictator on a free triple
of alternatives and then showing that this local dictator can be transformed
into a global dictator (on the nontrivial pairs) by the connectedness implied
by the assumptions on the preference domain.
16The statements in this paragraph are also valid for individual preference domains.
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An implication of the Kalai–Muller–Satterthwaite Theorem is that a com-
mon preference domain must not be saturating if it is Arrow-consistent. This
is the case for the domain of single-peaked preference profiles SnP considered
in Section 3. Consider any three points x, y, z ∈ R with x < y < z. With
a single-peaked preference, it is not possible to rank x first, z second, and y
third. Hence, there are no free triples and, therefore, SnP is not saturating.
4.3. Further properties of saturating preference domains
The Kalai–Muller–Satterthwaite Theorem shows that a sufficient condition
for a preference domain to be Arrow-inconsistent is that it is common and
saturating. In this section, we investigate the robustness of this result.
Example 5 demonstrates that a common preference domain need not be
saturating in order for it to be Arrow-inconsistent.
Example 5. Let N = {1, 2} and X = {x1, x2, x3, x4}. Let D be a common
preference domain with D∗ = {R ∈ R | x1Ix4 or x1Px2Px4}. All of the pairs
are nontrivial, but the pair {x1, x4} is not connected to any other pair, so
the preference domain is not saturating. Suppose that F is a social welfare
function on D satisfying IIA and WP. It follows from the fact that {x1, x2, x3}
and {x2, x3, x4} are free triples with the two elements {x2, x3} in common
that there is a dictator d on every pair with the possible exception of {x1, x4}.
On this preference domain, for any profile R with x1Pdx4, it is also the case
that x1Pdx2 and x2Pdx4. We have already established that we must have
x1Px2 and x2Px4 for such a profile. By the transitivity of social preference,
it follows that x1Px4; i.e., d is a dictator. Hence, D is Arrow-inconsistent.
Both Arrow’s Theorem (Theorem 1) and the Kalai–Muller–Satterthwaite
Theorem (Theorem 5) assume that the preference domain is not only sat-
urating, but also that it is common. Example 6 shows that the common
preference domain assumption is essential for these results; i.e., there exist
saturating preference domains that are Arrow-consistent.
Example 6. Let N = {1, 2}, X = {x1, x2, x3, x4}, D1 = {R1 ∈ R | x4P1xi
for i = 1, 2, 3}, and D2 = {R2 ∈ R | xiP2x4 for i = 1, 2, 3}. The social welfare
function defined by setting xRy if and only if xR1y when x, y ∈ {x1, x2, x3}
and xPx4 when x ∈ {x1, x2, x3} satisfies IIA, WP, and ND. The preference
domain D is saturating, but it is not common.
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In this example, preferences are unrestricted on the set A = {x1, x2, x3},
and any pair of alternatives in this set is nontrivial. All other pairs, i.e.,
pairs formed with x4 as one of the alternatives, are trivial. On the trivial
pairs, the two individuals have opposite strict preferences. The social welfare
function makes person one a dictator on A and person two a dictator on all
of the trivial pairs. For example, person two is a dictator on B = {x3, x4}.
Although there are “local” dictators on A and B and these two sets overlap,
because the intersection of these sets only contains a single alternative, there
does not have to be a single dictator on their union. For the local approach
to apply, the two sets must have at least two elements in common.17
Although the preference domain in Example 6 is Arrow-consistent, the
social welfare function used to show the consistency is not very appealing
because on every pair of alternatives, someone is a dictator. Furthermore, the
same person is the dictator on every nontrivial pair. Theorem 6 demonstrates
that the latter property is a general feature of saturating preference domains.
Theorem 6. If a social welfare function with a saturating preference domain
satisfies IIA and WP, then there is an individual d ∈ N who is a dictator
on every nontrivial pair.
Proof. Inspection of the proof of Theorem 5 reveals that the part of that
proof dealing with nontrivial pairs makes no use of the assumption that the
preference domain is common.18
As we shall see in the next section, many of the commonly used economic
and political preference domains are saturating when alternatives are purely
public. Unfortunately, Theorem 5 shows that all common saturating prefer-
ence domains are Arrow-inconsistent. Furthermore, if the preference domain
is both saturating and Arrow-consistent, Theorem 6 informs us that the so-
cial welfare function is dictatorial on every nontrivial pair of alternatives.
17Example 6 is similar to the example used by Blau (1957) to show that the statement
of Arrow’s Theorem in Arrow (1951) is incorrect.
18Note that the assumption in Theorem 6 that the preference domain is saturating
cannot be replaced with the assumption that each person’s individual preference domain
is saturating, as we need to have nontrivial pairs connected by a common sequence of
intermediate alternatives for our proof to be valid.
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5. Examples of saturating preference domains
For a common preference domain, the Kalai–Muller–Satterthwaite Theorem
(Theorem 5) tells us that the domain is Arrow-inconsistent if it is saturating.
There are three main steps involved in showing that a preference domain is
saturating. First, the nontrivial pairs are identified. Second, the free triples
are identified. Finally, it must be determined how to connect the nontrivial
pairs with free triples.19 In practice, this last step is often the hardest, but
in many interesting applications it is still relatively simple. In this section,
we illustrate this procedure with some examples of common saturating pref-
erence domains. In these examples, the universal set of alternatives X is a
subset of the m-dimensional Euclidean space Rm.20
Example 7. In this example, we consider the domain of continuous prefer-
ences on any connected subset X of Rm. A preference ordering R ∈ R is
continuous if for all x ∈ X, the sets {y ∈ X | yRx} and {y ∈ X | xRy} are
both closed. The preference domain consisting of all profiles of continuous
preference orderings has the free triple property and, hence, is saturating
because continuity places no restriction on how a triple of alternatives can
be ordered. For example, suppose that we want to find a continuous pref-
erence R for which xPyPz. We can find a neighbourhood N(x) of x in X
such that y, z ∈ N(x). By Urysohn’s Theorem [see Munkres (1975)], there
exists a continuous function V 1 : X → R for which (i) V 1(x) = 2 ≥ V 1(w)
for all w ∈ X and (ii) V 1(w) = 0 for all w ∈ N(x). Similarly, there exists
a neighbourhood N(y) of y in X such that x, z ∈ N(y) and a continuous
function V 2 : X → R for which (i) V 2(y) = 1 ≥ V 2(w) for all w ∈ X and (ii)
V 2(w) = 0 for all w ∈ N(y). The function U = V 1 + V 2 is a utility function
representing a continuous preference R on X for which xPyPz.21
Example 8. We now consider the domain of classic economic preferences
when there are two or more divisible public goods. Before presenting the
details of this example, we need a few more definitions. Suppose X is a
connected subset of Rm. A preference ordering R ∈ R is monotone (resp.
19This is the procedure used earlier to show that a preference domain is saturating if
every triple is free.
20We let Rm+ denote the nonnegative orthant, R
m
++ denote the positive orthant, and 0m
denote the origin in Rm.
21For a rigorous proof that this domain has the free triple property, see Campbell (1992b,
Chapter 8).
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strictly monotone) if xPy for all x, y ∈ X such that x y (resp. x > y).22 A
preference ordering R ∈ R is convex (resp. strictly convex ) if for all distinct
x, y ∈ X and all λ ∈ (0, 1), xRy implies that [λx + (1 − λ)y]Ry (resp.
[λx+ (1− λ)y]Py).
In our example, X = Rm+ with m ≥ 2 and individuals can have any
continuous, strictly monotonic, convex preference ordering on X.23
Classical Public Goods Preference Domain. D is the set of all profiles of
continuous, strictly monotonic, convex preference orderings on X.
For future reference, let Cpu denote the preference domain for this example.
An alternative can be interpreted as being a vector of m public goods, with
the individual preferences assumed to satisfy the usual regularity conditions
found in microeconomic theory. Kalai, Muller, and Satterthwaite (1979) have
shown that this preference domain is saturating. We sketch a proof for the
case of m = 2.24
Step 1. We first identify the nontrivial pairs. Strict monotonicity of the
preferences implies that any pair of alternatives {x, y} with x > y must be
a trivial pair. It is easy to verify that if neither x > y nor y > x holds, then
{x, y} is nontrivial. Simple geometry can be used to confirm this fact. For
example, the pair {x, y} shown in Figure 1 is nontrivial.25
Step 2. We now identify the free triples. Consider the nontrivial pair
{x, y} shown in Figure 1. It is easy to check that {x, y, z} is a free triple
if and only if z is in one of the open regions marked III, VI, and IX. (If
x is on the vertical axis, there is no region III. Analogously, if y is on the
horizontal axis, there is no region IX.) For example, consider the free triple
A = {x, y, z} shown in Figure 2. There are thirteen (weak) orderings of A.
Suppose, for concreteness, we want to confirm that there is an admissible
preference ordering with xPy and yPz. In this case, using a preference
ordering with indifference curves similar to those shown in Figure 2 will do.
22We use the following vector notation: (a) x ≥ y means xi ≥ yi for all i = 1, . . . ,m,
(b) x > y means xi ≥ yi for all i = 1, . . . ,m with strict inequality for some i, and (c)
x y means xi > yi for all i = 1, . . . ,m.
23If m = 1, there is only one possible individual preference ordering. WP then makes
everyone a dictator. ND is clearly not appropriate on such a degenerate preference domain.
24The basic structure of the the proof when m ≥ 2 is similar.
25Note that if the individual preference domains include all the continuous, monotone,
and convex preference orderings (i.e., strict monotonicity is relaxed to monotonicity), a
pair such as {v, x} in Figure 1 is no longer trivial.
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It is straightforward to check that for any of the other twelve orderings of A,
there is an ordering R in the domain with R|A coinciding with the prespecified
ordering of {x, y, z}. Strict monotonicity prevents any alternative in the
regions marked I, II, V, VIII, XI, and XII in Figure 1 from being part of a
free triple with x and y. Also requiring preferences to be convex precludes
any alternative in the regions marked IV, VII, and X from being part of a free
triple with x and y. For example, consider the alternative w shown in Figure
1 and suppose we want to have xIy and yPw. This is obviously impossible
with strictly monotonic, convex preferences, so {w, x, y} is not a free triple.
Step 3. We now show how to connect nontrivial pairs. Consider the
two nontrivial pairs {x, y} and {u, v} shown in Figure 3. All four of these
alternatives have been chosen to be in the positive orthant. We introduce
two new alternatives w and z, with w lying on the vertical axis and z lying
on the horizontal axis. By choosing these points to be sufficiently far from
the origin, the preceding argument shows that {u, v, z}, {v, z, w}, {z, w, x},
and {w, x, y} are free triples. Thus, by simply considering the two additional
alternatives w and z, we are able to connect {u, v} with {x, y} using the
sequence of nontrivial pairs {u, v}, {v, z}, {z, w}, {w, x}, and {x, y}. When
either of the nontrivial pairs {x, y} or {u, v} has an element on one of the
axes, the connection argument is not quite as easy. First, such a nontrivial
pair must be connected to a nontrivial pair in the interior of X and then the
argument proceeds as above.
In a series of articles summarized in Campbell (1992b; 1996), Campbell
has developed an interesting variation of the local approach that can be used
to show that economic domains like the one considered in Example 8 are
Arrow-inconsistent. His approach may be illustrated using the preference
domain of Example 8 with m = 2, but with X = R2++. A strictly convex
downward-sloping curve is the graph of a function h : R++ → R++ that is
continuous, unbounded above, strictly convex, and decreasing. Let I be the
set of all such curves. Each of the curves in I can be thought of as being
a subset of the set of alternatives X. It is not difficult to see that for any
C ∈ I, any triple of distinct alternatives in C is a free triple. For example,
if the curve C contains the alternatives x and y shown in Figure 1, then any
third alternative z in C must lie either in region III, VI, or IX, which makes
{x, y, z} a free triple. If a social welfare function with this domain satisfies
IIA and WP, Arrow’s Theorem implies that there is a “local” dictator, say
i(C), on C. We claim that there exists an i ∈ N such that i(C) = i for all
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C ∈ I. Consider two strictly convex downward-sloping curves C1 and C2
defined by the functions h1 and h2, respectively. If these curves intersect,
then the curve C3 defined by taking the supremum of h1(s) and h2(s) for
all s ∈ R++ is also in I. Because the curves C1 and C3 have more than
one alternative in common (in fact, they have a continuum of alternatives in
common), i(C1) = i(C3). Similarly, i(C2) = i(C3) and, hence, the dictators
on C1 and C2 are the same. If C1 and C2 do not intersect, it is possible to
find a third curve that intersects them both, and this curve can be used to
connect the first two.26
Example 9. In this example, a preference ordering R ∈ R on a subset X
of Rm is linear if there exists a π ∈ Rm such that for all x, y ∈ X, xRy if
and only if πx ≥ πy.27 A linear preference ordering is continuous and has
hyperplanes (linear surfaces) for indifference contours.
The set of alternatives is X = Rm+ with m ≥ 3 and the preference domain
is the set of all profiles of continuous, strictly monotonic, and linear preference
orderings on X. Kalai, Muller, and Satterthwaite (1979) have shown that this
preference domain is saturating. We refer the reader to their article for the
details. In fact, Kalai, Muller, and Satterthwaite used linear preferences to
perform the connection operations in their proof that the preference domain
in Example 8 is saturating when m ≥ 3.
The assumption that m ≥ 3 is essential for this domain of preferences
to be saturating. Kalai, Muller, and Satterthwaite have shown that the
preference domain considered in this example is Arrow-consistent when m =
2 and, hence, it is not saturating.28 A social welfare function satisfying all
of the Arrow axioms on this domain when m = 2 can be constructed as
follows. For each profile of preferences in the domain, the social preference is
set equal to the preference of the individual whose indifference curves have
the median slope, with ties broken in favour of the smallest median slope if
26If X = R2+ instead of R
2
++, the preceding argument does not show that the dictator on
the interior of X is a dictator on all of X. To extend his argument to all of the nonnegative
orthant, Campbell assumed that social preferences are continuous.
27These linear preferences should not be confused with the linear preference orderings
introduced earlier. Unfortunately, the same name is used for both kinds of preference.
Except in this and the following example, a linear preference refers to an ordering for
which no two distinct alternatives are indifferent.
28With a (strictly) monotone, linear preference ordering, the triple {x, y, z} shown in
Figure 2 is not free, because it is not possible to have all three elements of the triple
indifferent to each other.
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there are two medians.29
Example 10. In this example, X is the (m − 1)-dimensional unit simplex
Sm−1 = {x ∈ Rm+ |
∑m
i=1 xi = 1}. The preference domain is the set of all
profiles of linear preference orderings on X, where a linear preference is as
defined in Example 9. X can be interpreted as being the set of lotteries
over m outcomes or prizes; i.e., an alternative x is a probability vector with
xj being the probability of obtaining the jth prize. The common individ-
ual preference domain can then be interpreted as being the set of expected
utility preferences axiomatized by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947).
The vector π that characterizes a linear preference ordering is the vector of
von Neumann–Morgenstern utilities for the m prizes, where πj is the von
Neumann–Morgenstern utility of the jth prize. With this interpretation, x
is weakly preferred to y if and only if the expected utility of the lottery x is
at least as large as the expected utility of the lottery y.
For m ≥ 3, Le Breton (1986) has shown that this preference domain is
saturating. We outline the proof for the m = 3 case.30
Step 1. It is obvious that every pair is nontrivial.
Step 2. A triple {x, y, z} is free if and only if its three elements are not
colinear. For example, {x, y, z} in Figure 4 is a free triple. If, for example,
we want to find a linear preference ordering that has zPx and xIy, all of
the indifference curves must be parallel to the dashed line through x and y
with (0, 1, 0) being the most preferred alternative in X. It is easy to verify
that each of the other possible configurations of preference on {x, y, z} can
be obtained with a linear preference.31 A colinear triple such as {u, x, y} in
Figure 4 is not free; with linear preferences, if xIy, we must also have uIy.
Step 3. We now show how to connect nontrivial pairs. Consider the two
pairs {x, y} and {u, v} shown in Figure 4. To make things interesting, we
have chosen u so that it is colinear with x and y. It is clear that we can always
choose two alternatives w and z in X so that each of the following triples
29Kalai, Muller, and Satterthwaite do not include the tie-breaking rule, so their social
welfare function is not well-defined if there are an even number of individuals. Tie-breaking
rules other than the one considered above may not satisfy IIA. See Bossert and Weymark
(1993) for a detailed discussion of this two-dimensional problem. Kalai, Muller, and Sat-
terthwaite’s analysis of this example is based, in part, on Nitzan (1976).
30Again, the argument is easily extended to higher dimensions. When m = 2, each
person has only three possible preference orderings.
31If we want to have all three elements of the triple {x, y, z} in Figure 4 indifferent to
each other, then there must be universal indifference over all lotteries in X.
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consists of alternatives that are not colinear: {x, y, z}, {y, z, w}, {z, w, u},
and {w, u, v}. Figure 4 illustrates this construction. We connect {u, v} with
{x, y} using the sequence of nontrivial pairs {x, y}, {y, z}, {z, w}, {w, u},
and {u, v}. Thus, we are able to connect the two nontrivial pairs {x, y} and
{u, v} using only two additional alternatives, and this is the case even if any
of the original alternatives lie on the boundary of X.32
Example 11. In this example, we further restrict the domain of classical
public goods preferences considered in Example 8 by also assuming that
preferences are analytic with no critical points. Recall that X = Rm+ with
m ≥ 2 and Cpu is the common individual preference domain in Example 8. A
preference R on a connected subset of Rm is analytic if it can be represented
by an analytic utility function; i.e., by a utility function that has the property
that at any point x in the domain, there is a neighbourhood of x on which
the function can be expressed exactly as a Taylor series. A preference R on
a connected subset of Rm has no critical point if it can be represented by a
utility function whose gradient never vanishes. Let Mc denote the set of all
strictly monotone, convex, analytic preferences with no critical points on Rm+ .
Mc is a subset of Cpu. Many of the functional forms used for utility functions,
such as Cobb–Douglas and CES, are analytic with no critical points, at least
on the positive orthant.
Le Breton and Weymark (2002) have shown that the domain Mnc is
Arrow-inconsistent.33 In fact, this domain is saturating, as we now show.
Kannai (1974) has demonstrated that Mc is a dense subset of Cpu.34 It fol-
lows from this fact that the nontrivial pairs and free triples of Mc and Cpu
are exactly the same. To see why, let {x, y, z} be a free triple with respect
to Cpu. Let R ∈ Cpu be such that xPyPz. From Kannai’s result, we then
deduce that there exists a preference R′ ∈ Mc such that xP ′yP ′z. This
argument shows that any of six strict orderings on {x, y, z} can be obtained
32Note that preferences are trivially strictly monotonic on a simplex. Thus, the prefer-
ence domain in this example can be thought of as the restriction of the preference domain
in the preceding example (where X is the nonnegative orthant) to a simplex. On the
nonnegative orthant, strict monotonicity places considerable structure on the preferences,
which helps account for the fact that the set of strictly monotone, linear preferences is sat-
urating when the set of alternatives is the two-dimensional simplex, but it is not saturating
when the set of alternatives is the two-dimensional nonnegative orthant.
33Le Breton and Weymark assumed that all admissible preferences are strictly convex,
not just convex, but this is not essential for their argument.
34A is a dense subset of B if B is contained in the closure of A.
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with a preference in Mc. To show that we can also obtain the other seven
possible weak orderings, we use the preceding argument in conjunction with
the fact that analyticity is preserved by convex combinations. For example,
to obtain a preference R ∈ Mc with xIyPz, we first consider R′, R′′ ∈ Mc
for which xP ′yP ′z and yP ′xP ′z. Next, let U ′ and U ′′ be two analytic utility
functions with no critical points representing R′ and R′′, respectively, and
having values in R+. By choosing λ ∈ [0, 1] appropriately, the utility func-
tion λU ′ + (1 − λ)U ′′ represents a preference Rλ ∈ Mc for which xIλyPλz.
Thus, the free triples of Mc and Cpu coincide. Similar arguments show that
the nontrivial pairs coincide as well. Therefore, we can use the connection
argument in Example 8 to show that Mc and, hence, Mnc is saturating.
Example 12. In this example, we consider Euclidean spatial preferences. A
preference R ∈ R on a subset X of Rm is a Euclidean spatial preference if
there exists a point β ∈ X such that for all x, y ∈ X, xRy if and only if
‖x− β‖ ≤ ‖y − β‖, where ‖ · ‖ denotes the Euclidean norm on Rm.35 With
a Euclidean spatial preference, alternatives are ranked by their Euclidean
distance from a point of global satiation β known as an bliss or ideal point.
A Euclidean spatial preference is analytic because it can be represented by
a quadratic function with a critical point at the bliss point. When m = 1, a
Euclidean spatial preference is a continuous single-peaked preference that is
symmetric with respect to the bliss point.
Spatial preferences are used extensively by political scientists in formal
voting models. In these applications, X is referred to as an issue space. The
coordinates of X might, for example, measure the budgets for different cat-
egories of public expenditure (police, garbage collection, etc.), with voters
assumed to have spatial preferences. Spatial preferences are also found in
some economic models of public good provision. In these applications, the
presence of a satiation point arises because attention is restricted to alloca-
tions satisfying a budget constraint. For an introduction to spatial models,
see Austen-Smith and Banks (1999).
For the case in which X = Rm with m ≥ 2, Border (1984) has shown that
Arrow’s axioms are inconsistent on the domain of all profiles of Euclidean
spatial preferences. Border’s proof of this result is long and complicated.36
35More generally, spatial preferences are convex preferences with a point of global sati-
ation. We consider general spatial preferences in Section 16.3.
36Redekop (1993c) has established a version of Border’s Theorem that does not require
the domain to include all profiles of Euclidean spatial preferences.
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An alternative way of establishing Border’s theorem is to first show that this
preference domain is saturating and then use Theorem 5 to conclude that the
domain is Arrow-inconsistent. A proof along these lines, due to Le Breton,
may be found in Le Breton and Weymark (1996). Both methods of proof take
advantage of the fact that X has no boundary points. However, in spatial
models, it is more natural to suppose that alternatives have nonnegative
components. Accordingly, here we suppose that X = Rm+ .
Let E denote the set of all spatial preferences orderings on Rm+ . Le Breton
and Weymark (2002) have shown that the domain En is saturating when
m ≥ 2.37 We provide an alternative proof that En is saturating for the case
of m = 2.38
Step 1. It is obvious that every pair is nontrivial.
Step 2. Campbell (1993) has shown that if a triple {x, y, z} is cocircular
with a bliss point in the interior of X, then {x, y, z} is a free triple. We
illustrate the argument by showing that there exists an R ∈ E such that
xPyPz. Consider the line segment [x, y] joining x and y. Let Hxy be the
line (hyperplane in higher dimensions) containing the midpoint of [x, y] that
is orthogonal to [x, y]. In spatial voting models, Hxy is referred to as the
median line for the alternatives x and y. By assumption, x, y, and z are
equidistant from a point β in the interior of X. Hence, by construction, β
is in Hxy. Let A
1 and A2 be, respectively, the short and the long arcs with
extremities x and y on the circle with center β and radius ‖x − β‖.39 It is
transparent from Figure 5 that if z ∈ A1, then by moving β slightly farther
from (x+y)
2
, say to β′, then we obtain a preference R′ ∈ E for which xI ′yP ′z.
Note that this might not be possible if β is on the boundary of X. To obtain
an R ∈ E for which xPyPz, one merely has to move β′ slightly closer to x
than to y. On the other hand, if z ∈ A2, the preference R′ in this argument
is obtained by moving the bliss point β closer to (x+y)
2
.
Step 3. We now show that any pair of alternatives is connected to a pair
of alternatives whose corresponding median line is parallel to the 45◦ line.
Let {x, y} be an arbitrary pair in X and let C be a circle containing x and y
whose bliss point β is in the interior of X. Let {Lδ}δ≥0 be the family of lines
that are orthogonal to the 45◦ line, parametrized by the point of intersection
(δ, δ) with the 45◦ line. As illustrated in Figure 6, there exists a δ > 0 and
37Campbell (1993) has established a related result with the additional assumption that
social preferences are continuous.
38This method of proof is easily generalized to higher dimensions.
39If the two arcs are the same length, they can be labelled arbitrarily.
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distinct u, z ∈ R2+\{x, y} such that u, z ∈ C ∩ Lδ. Because u, x, y, and z
are cocircular and β is in the interior of X, it now follows from Step 2 that
{x, y, z} and {y, z, u} are free triples. Hence, {x, y} is connected to {z, u}.
By construction the median line for {z, u} is parallel to the 45◦ line.
Step 4. Next, we show that if u, x, y, and z are in Lδ ∩ X for some
δ > 0, then {x, y} and {z, u} are connected. Let {x, y} be a pair in Lδ ∩X
with δ > 0. Let L+δ = {c = (c1, c2) ∈ X | c1 + c2 > 2δ}. We claim
that there exists an ε > 0 such that {x, y, c} is a free triple for all c in
[B((0, 2δ), ε) ∪ B((2δ, 0), ε)] ∩ L+δ , where B(x¯, ε) is an open ball of radius
ε centered at x¯. The argument is illustrated in Figure 7. For concreteness,
consider any c ∈ B((0, 2δ), ε)∩L+δ . By moving sufficiently far from the origin
on Hxy, we can find a β such that x, y, and c are equidistant from β. It then
follows from Step 2 that {x, y, c} is a free triple.
To conclude the proof of this step, let ε be small enough for the claim to
apply to each of the pairs {x, y}, {y, z}, and {z, u}. Again, for concreteness,
consider any c ∈ B((0, 2δ), ε)∩L+δ . The pairs {x, y} and {z, u} are connected
through the sequence of triples {x, y, c}, {y, c, z}, and {c, z, u}.
Step 5. Suppose that 0 < δ < δ′. To complete the proof, we show that
any pair in Lδ is connected to any pair in Lδ′ . Let β be the midpoint of
the line segment [(δ, δ), (δ′, δ′)], as illustrated in Figure 8. Choose ε > 0
sufficiently small that the circle centered at β with radius ‖β − (δ, δ)‖ + ε
intersects both Lδ∩X and Lδ′ ∩X twice. Let {x, y} and {z, u} be the points
of intersection with Lδ and Lδ′ , respectively. By Step 2, {x, y, z} and {y, z, u}
are free triples. Hence, {x, y} is connected to {z, u}. It then follows from
Step 4 that any pair in Lδ is connected to any pair in Lδ′ .
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Example 13. In this example, we consider continuous separable and con-
tinuous, additively separable preferences. Let m ≥ 2 and suppose that X
is a product set X1 ×X2 × · · · ×Xm, where each Xk is a subset of R with
|Xk| ≥ 2.41 A preference ordering R ∈ R is separable if for all nonempty M˜ ⊂
M = {1, . . . ,m}, all zM˜ , uM˜ ∈ Πk∈M˜Xk, and all xM\M˜ , yM\M˜ ∈ Πk∈M\M˜Xk,
(xM\M˜ , zM˜)R(yM\M˜ , zM˜) if and only if (xM\M˜ , uM˜)R(yM\M˜ , uM˜). With a sep-
40This proof makes use of the fact that the set of alternatives is unbounded from above.
Ehlers and Storcken (2002) have shown that the domain of Euclidean spatial preferences
is Arrow-inconsistent when X is contained in the closure of its interior and the interior
of X is nonempty and connected. (As in Example 12, X is a subset of Rm with m ≥ 2.)
These assumptions are satisfied if X is a compact subset of Rm+ with a nonempty interior.
41The following analysis can be easily generalized to the product of m metric spaces.
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arable preference, there are orderings on each of the components of X that
are independent of the values of the other components. A preference ordering
R is additively separable if for all k ∈M , there exists a function V k : Xk → R
such that for all x, y ∈ X, xRy if and only if ∑mk=1 V k(xk) ≥
∑m
k=1 V
k(yk).
In what follows, we denote by RCS and RCAS, respectively, the set of con-
tinuous separable and continuous, additively separable preference orderings
on X. Clearly, RCAS is a subset of RCS.
The joint assumption that the set of alternatives is a product set and pref-
erences are separable or additively separable has been considered by many
authors from a strategic perspective. See, for example, Le Breton and Wey-
mark (1999). Le Breton and Weymark have considered an example in which
proportional taxes can be levied at different rates on the individual endow-
ments of two private goods in order to finance the production of public goods.
In their example, X = [0, 1]2 is the set of possible pairs of tax rates and the
individual preference domain is the subset of preferences in RCAS that can
be represented by continuously differentiable utility functions.
We show that RnCAS is saturating by demonstrating that RCAS has the
free triple property. A fortiori, RnCS is saturating as well.
For any x, y ∈ X, let M(x, y) = {k ∈ M | xk = yk} be the set of
components on which x and y differ. Let {x, y, z} be a triple of distinct
alternatives in X. For concreteness, we show that there exists an R in RCAS
such that xPyPz. We consider three cases.
Case 1. M(x, y) ∩ M(x, z) ∩ M(y, z) = ∅. Consider k¯ ∈ M(x, y) ∩
M(x, z)∩M(y, z). As in Example 7, we can construct a continuous function
V k¯ : X k¯ → R for which V k¯(xk¯) = 2, V k¯(yk¯) = 1, and V k¯(zk¯) = 0. For all
other k ∈M , let V k(wk) = 0 for all wk ∈ Xk. The function U = ∑k∈M V k is
a utility function representing a preference R ∈ RCAS for which xPyPz.
Case 2. M(x, y) ∩ M(x, z) = ∅. Consider k¯ ∈ M(x, z). By assump-
tion, xk¯ = yk¯. By Urysohn’s Theorem, there exists a continuous function
V k¯ : X k¯ → R for which V k¯(xk¯) = V k¯(yk¯) = 2 and V k¯(zk¯) = 0. Next, con-
sider k˜ ∈ M(x, y). By assumption, xk˜ = zk˜. By Urysohn’s Theorem, there
exists a continuous function V k˜ : X k˜ → R for which V k˜(xk˜) = V k˜(zk˜) = 1
and V k˜(yk˜) = 0. For all other k ∈ M , let V k(wk) = 0 for all wk ∈ Xk. As
in Case 1, the function U =
∑
k∈M V k is a utility function representing a
preference R ∈ RCAS for which xPyPz.
Case 3. M(x, y) ∩M(x, z) ∩M(y, z) = ∅ and M(x, y) ∩M(x, z) = ∅.
For k¯ ∈ M(x, y) ∩ M(x, z), Urysohn’s Theorem implies that there exists
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a continuous function V k¯ : X k¯ → R for which V k¯(xk¯) = 2 and V k¯(yk¯) =
V k¯(zk¯) = 0. For k˜ ∈ M(y, z), Urysohn’s Theorem implies that there exists
a continuous function V k˜ : X k˜ → R for which V k˜(xk˜) ∈ {0, 1} (this value is
0 if xk˜ = zk˜ and it is 1 if xk˜ = yk˜), V
k˜(yk˜) = 1, and V
k˜(zk˜) = 0. For all
other k ∈ M , let V k(wk) = 0 for all wk ∈ Xk. As in the previous cases,
the function U =
∑
k∈M V k is a utility function representing a preference
R ∈ RCAS for which xPyPz.
Similar constructions can be used to generate any of the other orderings
of {x, y, z}.
Example 14. In this example, we consider a domain of preferences encoun-
tered in the study of income inequality. Let X = Sm−1 with m ≥ 3 and
suppose that the preference domain consists of all profiles of continuous and
strictly Schur-convex orderings of X. An ordering R of Sm−1 is strictly Schur-
convex if for all x, y ∈ X, (a) xRy whenever x = By for some bistochastic
matrix B and (b) xPy whenever x = By for some bistochastic matrix B that
is not a permutation matrix.42 The set X can be interpreted as being the set
of all possible distributions of a unit of income, with the preference domain
interpreted as being the set of all profiles of inequality orderings of X.43 For
symmetric orderings on a simplex, strict Schur-convexity is equivalent to the
Pigou–Dalton condition, which requires that an equalizing transfer from a
richer to a poorer person results in a preferred distribution.44
Le Breton and Trannoy (1987) have shown that this preference domain
is saturating. To show that all nontrivial pairs are connected involves intro-
ducing a rather large number of intermediate pairs, so we refer the reader to
their article for the details of the argument.
In all the examples considered so far in this section, the preference do-
mains are common and saturating. Hence, they are Arrow-inconsistent. We
conclude this section with an example of a common preference domain that
is Arrow-consistent and, therefore, not saturating. Nevertheless, in this ex-
ample, there are subsets of alternatives on which the preference domain is
42A square matrix B is bistochastic if it is nonnegative and all of its row and column
sums are equal to one. A bistochastic matrix whose entries are all zeroes or ones is a
permutation matrix.
43The details of this example are unchanged if there is any fixed amount of income c > 0
to distribute. Note that if m = 2, each person has only one possible preference ordering.
44In this application, a preference order R on Sm−1 is symmetric if for all x, y ∈ X, xIy
whenever x = By for some permutation matrix B.
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saturating, so the local approach can be used to infer quite a bit about the
structure of a social welfare function that satisfies the three Arrow axioms.
Example 15. In this example, individuals have probability relations on a
finite set of events. We assume that there are m ≥ 4 states of nature. Each
state of nature corresponds to the possible realization of a random variable.
An event is a subset of M = {1, . . . ,m}. The set of alternatives X is the set
of all possible events. An ordinal probability is an ordering R on X that can
be represented by a probability measure, i..e, by a function p : M → [0, 1]
for which for all x, y ∈ X, xRy if and only if ∑k∈x pk ≥
∑
k∈y pk, where
pk = p(k). The preference domain is the set of all ordinal probabilities on
X. This preference domain has been considered by Laine´, Le Breton, and
Trannoy (1986) and Weymark (1997).
This example can be restated using the framework of Example 13. Let
X∗ =
∏
k∈M X∗k, where X∗k = {0, 1} for all k ∈ M . The event x ∈ X can
be reinterpreted as being the point x∗ ∈ X∗ for which x∗k = 1 if k ∈ x and
x∗k = 0 if k ∈ x. With this reinterpretation, the set of ordinal probabilities
on X∗ is a strict subset of RCAS, the set of continuous, additively separable
preferences on X∗.45 The set inclusion is strict because an ordinal probability
satisfies monotonicity, among other properties.
In terms of our initial formulation of this example, any triple of events in
which no event is a subset of any other event in the triple is free. To see why,
let {x, y, z} be such a triple of events. Let w = x ∩ y ∩ z. By assumption,
x¯ = x\w, y¯ = y\w, and z¯ = z\w are all nonempty. By construction,
x¯ ∩ y¯ ∩ z¯ = ∅. Suppose, for example, that we want to find an ordinal
probability R for which xPyPz. We consider two cases.
Case 1. x¯ ∩ y¯ = ∅. In this case, we choose a probability measure p on
X such that
∑
k∈x¯∩y¯ pk = 1 − ε and
∑
k∈x¯\y¯ pk = ε, where ε > 0. Note that
pi = 0 for all i ∈ w. Because x¯ ∩ y¯ ∩ z¯ = ∅, for sufficiently small ε, this p
represents an ordinal probability for which xPyPz.
Case 2. x¯ ∩ y¯ = ∅. By construction, x¯\z¯ = ∅ and y¯\z¯ = ∅. In this case,
we choose p such that
∑
k∈x¯\z¯ pk = 1− ε and
∑
k∈y¯\z¯ pk = ε, where ε > 0. As
in Case 1, when ε is sufficiently small, p represents an ordinal probability for
which xPyPz.
All of the other orderings of {x, y, z} can be obtained in a similar fashion.
It follows from the preceding discussion that if neither x ⊆ y nor y ⊆ x,
then {x, y} is a free pair. A pair of events {x, y} for which x ⊂ y is neither
45Continuity is vacuous in this finite setting.
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trivial nor free if x = ∅ or y = M . The reason is that an ordinal probability
can rank these events in only one of two ways: xIy or yPx. Hence, this
preference domain is not saturating. Because M is always more likely than
∅, {∅,M} is a trivial pair. In fact, this is the only trivial pair.
Let X(k) denote the set of all events containing exactly k states. For
k ∈ {0,m}, because no two events in X(k) can be ordered by set inclusion,
the restriction of the preference domain to X(k) has the free triple property.
Thus, restricted to X(k) for k ∈ {0,m}, the preference domain is saturating.
More generally, Laine´, Le Breton, and Trannoy (1986) have shown that any
nontrivial pair of events can be connected to any other pair of nontrivial
events provided that neither of the event pairs is a single-state event and its
complement.46 The problem with a pair such as {{1}, {2, 3, . . . ,m}} is that
any other event must be a subset or superset of one of these two events, so
the pair cannot be embedded in a free triple.
Now consider a social welfare function defined on the domain of profiles of
ordinal probabilities satisfying IIA and WP. Laine´, Le Breton, and Trannoy
(1986) have shown that there is an individual d who is a dictator on any
ordered pair of events (x, y) for which (i) |x| > 1 or (ii) |x| = 1 and y is not
the complement of x.47 We sketch the proof.
In view of the preceding discussion, the argument used to establish the
Kalai–Muller–Satterthwaite Theorem shows that there is an individual d who
is a dictator on any nontrivial pair except a single-set event and its comple-
ment. If x ⊆ y, no ordinal probability R can have xPy, so d is trivially a
dictator on the ordered pair (x, y) when x ⊆ y. Because everyone ranks M
above ∅, WP implies that d dictates on the ordered pair (M, ∅).
To show that d dictates on the ordered pair ({1, 2}, {1}), consider a profile
R in which {1, 2}Pd{1}. Because {{1, 2}, {1, 3}} is a free pair, there exists a
profile R′ of ordinal probabilities with the properties that (i) {1, 2}P ′d{1, 3},
(ii) {1, 3}P ′i{1} for all i ∈ N , and (iii) for all i ∈ N , {1, 2}P ′i{1} if and
only if {1, 2}Pi{1}. Because d is a dictator on {{1, 2}, {1, 3}}, we have
{1, 2}P ′{1, 3}. By WP, we have {1, 3}P ′{1}. Transitivity of P ′ then implies
that {1, 2}P ′{1}. Hence, by IIA, {1, 2}P{1} and, therefore, d is a dictator
on ({1, 2}, {1}).
46This is not true if there are only three states. For example, it is not possible to connect
{{1}, {2}} with {{1, 2}, {2, 3}} when m = 3 because there are no free triples containing
two events with different cardinalities.
47The same conclusion holds when m = 3 if the social preference relation is also required
to be an ordinal probability.
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Similar arguments can be used to show that d is a dictator on any
of the other ordered pairs not yet considered except a pair of the form
{{k},M\{k}}. We cannot utilize a third event, as above, to show that d
dictates on this pair because this third event, say x, must be a superset of
{k}, and no ordinal probability can rank {k} above x, as would be required
to appeal to WP.48
6. Topological domain restrictions for public goods
In the preceding two sections, we have shown that saturating preference do-
mains are Arrow-inconsistent and that many domains of economic preferences
are saturating. In a series of articles, Redekop (1991; 1993a; 1993c; 1996) has
identified topological restrictions on the preference domain that imply that
the domain is Arrow-inconsistent. Redekop begins by first restricting the set
of admissible preference profiles to a domain of economic preferences that is
Arrow-inconsistent. He then shows that in order for a subset of this domain
to be Arrow-consistent, it must be topologically small. Redekop has consid-
ered two different ways of formalizing the idea that a preference domain is
topologically small. They both capture the idea that topologically small pref-
erence domains do not exhibit much diversity in preference. Thus, Redekop’s
theorems demonstrate that if the domain exhibits much preference diversity,
then it is Arrow-inconsistent. More precisely, if the basic structure of the
preference domain is not altered by small perturbations in the preferences,
then it is Arrow-inconsistent.
In this section, we provide an introduction to Redekop’s work by consid-
ering one of his theorems and its proof in some detail. The strategy used
in this proof has been adapted by Redekop to show the Arrow-inconsistency
of a wide variety of economic preference domains. While we briefly describe
some of these results in this section, it is not possible to consider them in any
detail. More detail may be found in Redekop (1995), which is a relatively
nontechnical survey of the theorems established in Redekop (1991; 1993a;
1993c; 1996). We also comment on how Redekop’s domain restrictions and
proof strategy are related to saturating domains and the local approach.
In the theorem we consider in this section, X = Rm+ with m ≥ 2. An
alternative in X is interpreted as being a vector of m public goods. Individual
48For further discussion of Arrovian aggregation of ordinal probabiliies, see Laine´,
Le Breton, and Trannoy (1986) and Weymark (1997).
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preferences are a priori restricted to be continuous and monotonic. Let Ccm
denote the set of all such preference orderings on X. The universal domain
of preference profiles is thus Cncm.
A topology on a set S is a collection of subsets T of S that includes (i)
both S and ∅, (ii) all finite intersections of sets in T , and (iii) all unions
of sets in T . The sets in T are the open subsets of S. A basis for T is a
collection of sets contained in T with the property that any nonempty set in
T is the union of sets in the basis. Thus, a topology is characterized by a
basis. The sets in a basis are called basic open sets. For a topology on Ccm,
we use the questionnaire topology TQ introduced in Redekop (1993b).49 A
basis for TQ is the collection of sets of the form:
Q((x1, y1), . . . , (xr, yr)) =
r⋂
i=1
{R ∈ Ccm | xiPyi},
where the xi and yi are alternatives in X. A basic open set is constructed by
specifying strict rankings for a finite number of paired comparisons and then
identifying all of the continuous monotonic preferences that exhibit these
rankings. A subset of a topological space is somewhere dense if its closure
contains an open set; otherwise, it is nowhere dense. It is natural to regard
an individual preference domain as being topologically small if it is nowhere
dense with respect to the questionnaire topology.
Suppose that the preference domain is common and that the individual
preference domain D∗ is a subset of Ccm. Redekop (1991) has shown that a
necessary condition for D = Dn∗ to be Arrow-consistent is that D∗ be nowhere
dense. Equivalently, a sufficient condition for Dn∗ to be Arrow-inconsistent is
that D∗ be somewhere dense.
Theorem 7. If X = Rm+ with m ≥ 2 and D∗ ⊆ Ccm is somewhere dense,
then there is no social welfare function F : Dn∗ → R that satisfies IIA, WP,
and ND.
Thus, a preference domain Dn∗ ⊆ Cncm is Arrow-inconsistent if the closure
of the individual preference domain contains at least one basic open set of
preferences. A basic open set of preferences exhibits sufficient preference
diversity for Arrow’s axioms to be incompatible because, in addition to the
49More familiar topologies for a space of preferences are the Kannai (1970) topology and
the topology of closed convergence. Redekop (1993b) has shown that these two topologies
coincide with the questionnaire topology on Ccm.
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restrictions imposed by continuity and monotonicity, the pairwise rankings
are only restricted on a finite number of pairs of alternatives.
Theorem 7 is established by showing that there is a dictator if the indi-
vidual preference domain is somewhere dense and the social welfare function
F satisfies IIA and WP. The proof has three main parts. First, it is shown
that for every x ∈ X, there is an open set O(x) ⊆ X containing x and an
individual d(x) ∈ N such that d(x) is a dictator on O(x). Such an individual
is called a local dictator. Second, it is shown that the same individual, say
d, is a local dictator for all x ∈ X. These results only establish that d is a
dictator on pairs of alternatives that are close together in the sense that they
are in the same open set O(x) for some x ∈ X. The final part of the proof
shows that, in fact, d is a dictator on all of X.
To show that there is a local dictator for each x ∈ X, Redekop used an
innovative version of the local approach. To describe it, we need to introduce
some further definitions. A subset A of X is strictly free with respect to D∗
if L|A ⊆ D∗|A; i.e., every linear ordering of the alternatives in A is feasible.
Two pairs A,B ⊆ X are strictly connected with respect to D∗ if there exists
a sequence of pairs in X, A1, . . . , Ar, with A1 = A and Ar = B such that
Aj ∪ Aj+1 is a strict free triple with respect to D∗ for all j = 1, . . . , r − 1.
An individual d ∈ N is a strict dictator on {x, y} ⊆ X if xPy for all R ∈ D
for which xPdy and ¬(xIiy) for all i = d. A set A ⊆ X is coordinatewise
undominated if x ≥ y and y ≥ x for all distinct x, y ∈ A.
Redekop’s proof begins by identifying an open set O′(x) containing x in
which every triple that is coordinatewise undominated is a strict free triple.
By the linear preference version of Arrow’s theorem, there is a strict dictator
on these triples. Next, it is shown that there is an open subset O(x) of
O′(x) containing x in which coordinatewise undominated pairs are strictly
connected, from which it follows that there is a strict dictator on all such
pairs. To complete the first part of the proof, it remains to show that this
implies that there is a dictator on O(x). As Redekop (1991, p. 408) has
noted, his approach is doubly local because he uses a version of the Kalai–
Muller–Satterthwaite local approach on a small open set. We now turn to
the details of this argument.
Lemma 1. If X = Rm+ with m ≥ 2, D∗ ⊆ Ccm is somewhere dense, and
F : Dn∗ → R is a social welfare function that satisfies IIA and WP, then, for
all x ∈ X, there is a local dictator.
Proof. The proof proceeds in a series of steps. The first five steps only assume
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that D∗ is a somewhere dense subset of Ccm.
Step 1. Let O be an open subset of Ccm and UR be a continuous utility
representation of R ∈ O. We first show that there exists an ε¯ > 0 such
that whenever 0 < ε < ε¯ and g : X → [0, 1] is a continuous nondecreasing
function, then Rε ∈ O, where Rε is defined by
xRεy ↔ UR(x) + εg(x) ≥ UR(y) + εg(y)
for all x, y ∈ X.50 Because O is open, it contains a basic open set B =
Q((x1, y1), . . . , (xr, yr)), where xjPyj for all j = 1, . . . , r. Let
ε¯ =
1
2
min
1≤j≤r
[UR(xj)− UR(yj)].
It is straightforward to verify that UR(xj) + εg(xj) > UR(yj) + εg(yj) for all
j = 1, . . . , r when 0 < ε < ε¯. Hence, Rε ∈ B ⊆ O.
Step 2. Consider any coordinatewise undominated subset {a, b, c} of X.
For all y ∈ {a, b, c}, let Ay = {z ∈ X | z ≥ y}. Define the function
ρy : X → R by setting
ρy(x) = min
z∈Ay
‖x− z‖
for all x ∈ X. Let
m = min
x =y
ρy(x),
where the minimum is taken over pairs {x, y} ⊆ {a, b, c} for which x = y.
Because x /∈ Ay for all such pairs and the Ay are closed, m > 0. Now define
the functions ha : X → [0, 1] and hb : X → [0, 1] by setting, for all x ∈ X,
ha(x) = 1− min(m, ρa(x))
m
and
hb(x) = 1− min(m, ρb(x))
m
.
50A function g : Rm+ → R is nondecreasing if g(x) ≥ g(y) for all x, y ∈ Rm+ for which
x y. Note that because the inequality in this definition is weak, g may not represent a
monotone preference. However, because R is monotone, so is Rε when g is nondecreasing.
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The function hα, α = a, b, assigns a value of 1 to all x ∈ Aα, a value of 0
to all x that are at least distance m from Aα, and a value of 1 − ‖z − Aα‖
to all other x. Hence, ha and hb are both continuous and nondecreasing.
Further, because of the way m has been chosen, ha(a) = hb(b) = 1 and
ha(b) = ha(c) = hb(a) = hb(c) = 0.
Step 3. We now show that for all x ∈ X, there exists an open subset
O′(x) of X containing x such that any coordinatewise undominated triple in
O′(x) is a strict free triple with respect to the closure D¯∗ of D∗.
Because D∗ is somewhere dense in Ccm, there exists a basic open set
B contained in D¯∗. Consider any R ∈ B. Let U be a continuous utility
representation of R. Define ε¯ as in Step 1. For 0 < ε < ε¯, by the continuity
of U at x, we can choose δ sufficiently small so that
sup
‖z−x‖<δ
|U(x)− U(z)| < ε
9
.
Let
O′(x) = {z ∈ X | ‖z − x‖ < δ}.
To complete the proof of this step, we consider any coordinatewise undomi-
nated subset {a, b, c} of O′(x) and, without loss of generality, show that we
can find an R′ ∈ B such that aP ′bP ′c.
For the set {a, b, c}, define the functions ha and hb as in Step 2. Let
g : X → [0, 1] be the function defined by setting, for all z ∈ X,
g(z) =
2
3
ha(z) +
1
3
hb(z).
Because ha and hb are continuous and nondecreasing, so is g. Hence, using
g to define Rε as in Step 1, we conclude that Rε ∈ B when 0 < ε < ε¯.
By construction, g(a) = 2
3
, g(b) = 1
3
, and g(c) = 0. Therefore,
[U(a) + εg(a)]− [U(b) + εg(b)] = 1
3
ε+ [U(a)− U(b)]
≥ 1
3
ε− |U(a)− U(b)|
≥ 1
3
ε− |U(a)− U(x)| − |U(b)− U(x)]
>
ε
9
,
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where the last inequality follows from the choice of the δ used to construct
O′(x). Hence, aPεb. We can similarly show that bPεc. Setting R′ = Rε for
any 0 < ε < ε¯ completes the proof of this step.
Step 4. Suppose that R ∈ D¯∗ is such that x¯P y¯P z¯. Because sets of the
form {R¯ ∈ Ccm | aP¯ b} are open, there must exist an R′ ∈ D∗ such that
x¯P ′y¯P ′z¯. Hence, if {x, y, z} is a strict free triple with respect to D¯∗, it is also
a strict free triple with respect to D∗. By Step 3, we therefore conclude that
any coordinatewise undominated triple in O′(x) is a strict free triple with
respect to D∗.
Step 5. Next, we show that there exists an open set O(x) ⊆ O′(x) con-
taining x with the property that if {v, w, y, z} ⊂ O(x) and both {v, w} and
{y, z} are coordinatewise undominated, then {v, w} and {y, z} are strictly
connected with respect to D∗.
We first consider the case in which x has at least two positive components.
Without loss of generality, we assume that x1 > 0 and x2 > 0. The proof
is similar to the one used to establish Step 3 in Example 8 (and illustrated
in Figure 3). However, in order to use Step 4 to identify strict free triples,
now the two alternatives, say s and t, that are used to form the intermediate
pairs in the connection argument must be chosen from O′(x). Further, in
order for s and t to form a strict free triple with either {v, w} or {y, z},
v, w, y, and z must be sufficiently close together. This will be the case if
{v, w, y, z} ⊂ O(x), where
O(x) = {z ∈ X | ‖z − x‖ < ∆}
for ∆ > 0 sufficiently small that (i) ‖z − x‖ < 3∆ implies z ∈ O′(x) and
(ii) ∆ < min(x1/3, x2/3). If we now let s = x + 2∆(1,−1, 0, . . . , 0) and
t = x + 2∆(−1, 1, 0, . . . , 0), we have {s, t} ⊂ O′(x)\O(x). In addition, s
and t either singly or jointly form a coordinatewise undominated set when
combined with any coordinatewise undominated subset of O(x). Suppose
that {v, w} and {y, z} are coordinatewise undominated subsets of O(x). It
then follows from Step 4 that {v, w, s}, {w, s, t}, {s, t, y}, and {t, y, z} are
strict free triples. Hence, {v, w} and {y, z} are strictly connected with respect
to D∗.
If x has at most one positive component, the connection argument is
somewhat more complex. See Redekop (1991, pp. 416–417) for the details.
Step 6. Henceforth, we assume that F : Dn∗ → R is a social welfare
function that satisfies IIA and WP. We now show that some individual is a
strict dictator for all distinct {y, z} ⊂ O(x).
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If {y, z} is coordinatewise undominated, we can find a third alternative
w ∈ O(x) such that {w, y, z} is coordinatewise undominated. By Step 4,
this is a strict free triple. Hence, by the linear preference version of Arrow’s
Theorem, there is a strict dictator, say d(x), on this triple. By Step 5, {y, z}
can be strictly connected to any other coordinatewise undominated pair in
O(x). Hence, by the argument used in the proof of Theorem 5, d(x) is a
strict dictator on all coordinatewise undominated pairs in O(x).
Now consider the case in which y > z, yPd(x)z, and ¬(yIjz) for all j =
d(x). Because preferences are monotone, this is only possible if yPiz for all
i ∈ N . Hence, by WP, we have yPz. Thus, d(x) is a strict dictator for all
distinct {y, z} ⊂ O(x).
Step 7. Finally, we show that d(x) is a dictator on O(x). Consider any
distinct y, z ∈ O(x) and suppose that yPd(x)z. Let J1 = {j ∈ N | yPjz}
and J2 = {j ∈ N | zPjy}. Because preferences are continuous, (i) for all
j ∈ J1, we can find an open set Oj(z) containing z such that yPjw for all
w ∈ Oj(z) and (ii) for all j ∈ J2, we can find an open set Oj(z) containing z
such that wPjz for all w ∈ Oj(z). Because O˜ = O(x) ∩j∈(J1∪J2) Oj(z) is an
open set containing z, we can find a v ∈ O˜ with v  z. Everybody has a
strict preference on {v, y}. In particular, yPd(x)v. Hence, by Step 6, we have
yPv. WP and the monotonicity of preferences imply that vPz. Transitivity
of P then implies that yPz, so d(x) is a dictator on O(x).
The use of the linear preference version of Arrow’s Theorem in the proof
of Lemma 1 is essential. To see why, suppose that D∗ = {R ∈ Ccm | ¬(xIy)}
for some coordinatewise undominated pair of alternatives {x, y}. It is clear
from the definition of the questionnaire topology that D∗ is itself an open
set, so D∗ is somewhere dense. However, {x, y} is not part of any free triple.
The next part of the proof of Theorem 7 establishes that the same person
is the local dictator for all x ∈ X.
Lemma 2. If X = Rm+ with m ≥ 2, D∗ ⊆ Ccm is somewhere dense, and for
all x ∈ X, there is a local dictator d(x), then there is a d ∈ N such that
d = d(x) for all x ∈ X.
Proof. For all x ∈ X, let O(x) be an open set containing x on which d(x)
is a local dictator. By Step 4 of the preceding proof, we can choose O(x)
sufficiently small so that every coordinatewise undominated pair in O(x) is
strictly free. For all i ∈ N , let Xi = {∪x∈XO(x) | i = d(x)}. These are open
sets that cover X. If Xi = ∅ for all i = d, then d is a local dictator for all
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x ∈ X. Because X is connected, the only other possibility is that there exist
distinct i, j ∈ N such that Xi ∩Xj contains a coordinatewise undominated
pair {y, z}. But then there exists a profile R ∈ D in which yPiz and zPjy.
Because both i and j dictate on this pair, we have a contradiction. Hence,
this case is not possible.
The proof of Theorem 7 is completed by showing that the local dictator
in Lemma 2 in fact dictates on all of X. The proof makes use of a property
of preferences that Redekop (1991) calls the continuous climb property. A
preference ordering R on X (i) satisfies the continuous climb property for the
ordered pair (x, y) if xPy and there exists a continuous function γ : [0, 1] → X
such that γ(0) = y, γ(1) = x, and γ(s)Pγ(t) whenever s > t and (ii) it
satisfies the continuous climb property if it satisfies the continuous climb
property for all ordered pairs (x, y) for which xPy. It is quite easy to show
that if R is strictly monotonic, then R has the continuous climb property.
Unfortunately, if a preference is monotonic, but not strictly monotonic, such
a path may not exist if x or y is on the boundary of X. The following
example, due to Redekop (1991), illustrates the problem.
Example 16. Let X = R2+ and suppose that R is represented by a utility
function U for which (i) U(x) = x1 if x1 ≤ 1 and (ii) U(x) = 1 + (x1 − 1)x2
otherwise. Note that R ∈ Ccm. Let x = (2, 0) and y = (0, 1). We have xPy,
but there is no alternative near x that is worse than x according to R and,
hence, no path with the continuous climb property connects x and y.
Proof of Theorem 7. Let d be the local dictator identified in Lemma 2. Con-
sider a profile R ∈ D and a pair of alternatives x, y ∈ X for which xPdy.
First, suppose that Rd satisfies the continuous climb property for (x, y)
and let Γ be a continuous monotonic path (with respect to Rd) from y to
x. For all z ∈ Γ, let O(z) be the open set identified in Lemma 1. Because
these sets cover Γ and Γ is compact, a finite subset of these sets also covers
Γ. Let {O(z1), . . . , O(zr)} be such a finite cover, where zrPdzr−1Pd · · ·Pdz1.
Let {x1, . . . , xr+1} be such that {xk, xk+1} ⊂ O(zk) for all k = 1, . . . , r with
x1 = y and xr = x. Because d dictates on each of the O(zk), we have xk+1Pxk
for all k = 1, . . . , r. Transitivity then implies that xPy.
Now, suppose that Rd does not satisfy the continuous climb property
for (x, y). This can only occur if x is on the boundary of X with x = 0m.
If y = λx for some λ ∈ [0, 1), then for any strictly monotonic preference
R′d ∈ D∗, the profiles R and R′ = (R1, . . . , Rd−1, R′d, Rd+1, . . . , Rn) coincide
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on {x, y}. Because R′d satisfies the continuous climb property, by the first
part of this proof, we have xP ′y. Hence, by IIA, we also have xPy.
The argument when y = λx for some λ ∈ [0, 1) is quite lengthy, so we only
sketch the main idea. A complete proof may be found in Redekop (1991). In
this case, it can be shown that there exist λ¯ ∈ (0, 1), z ∈ Rm++, and Rd ∈ Ccm
such that (i) d dictates on (λ¯x, z) and (ii) xPd(λ¯x)PdzPdy. We have already
established that xP (λ¯x) and zPy. Because d dictates on (λ¯x, z), we therefore
have xPy by the transitivity of R.
The complications that arise in the last step of the proof would not occur
if the domain only included strictly monotonic preferences or if X = Rm++.
With either of these two assumptions, only minor modifications need to be
made to the preceding proof to show that a somewhere dense set of profiles
D ⊆ Cncm is Arrow-inconsistent, even if D is not the Cartesian product of
individual preference domains.51
The profiles that create problems in the proof of Theorem 7 have the
property that individual d has a preference Rd that (i) is monotonic, but not
strictly monotonic, and (ii) is not contained in the closure of any open set in
D∗. Redekop’s alternative definition of a topologically small set rules out this
possibility by requiring that when any profile R is feasible, so is some open set
containing R, as would be the case if the true profile cannot be identified with
precision. Formally, a domain of preferences D∗ (resp. preference profiles D)
is near-open if D¯∗ = O¯ for some open set O of preferences (resp. if D¯ = O¯ for
some open set O of preference profiles). Clearly, if D∗ is near-open, then D∗
is somewhere dense in Ccm. However, the reverse implication need not hold.
For example, if D∗ = {R ∈ Ccm | xPy} ∪ R¯, where {x, y} is coordinatewise
undominated, R¯ ∈ Ccm, and yP¯x, then D∗ is somewhere dense, but not near-
open. Without requiring that D ⊆ Cncm be a Cartesian product, Redekop
(1991) has shown that near-openness of D is sufficient for D to be Arrow-
inconsistent when X = Rn+.
In view of Redekop’s impossibility theorems for somewhere dense and
near-open domains and the impossibility results for saturating domains pre-
sented in Sections 4 and 5, it is natural to enquire if there is any logical rela-
tionship between these domain restrictions. Using the definition of the ques-
tionnaire topology, it is easy to verify that the domain of continuous, strictly
monotonic, convex preferences Cpu in Example 8 is nowhere dense, although
51The product topology is used for the domain of preference profiles Cncm. A basis for
this topology is T nQ , the n-fold Cartesian product of TQ.
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we know that it is saturating. Suppose that {x, y} is coordinatewise undomi-
nated and R¯ ∈ Ccm is such that xI¯y. Let D = [{R ∈ Ccm | xPy or yPx}∪R¯]n.
Because {x, y} is a free pair that is not part of any free triple, this domain is
not saturating. However, D¯ = Cncm, so the domain is near-open and, hence,
somewhere dense. Thus, the concept of a saturating domain and Redekop’s
domain restrictions are logically independent.52
Redekop (1991) has noted that there is a sense in which somewhere dense
domains are unreasonably large. For the public goods problem considered in
this section, we have seen that this domain condition ensures that there is
sufficient preference diversity so that each alternative is contained in some
open set whose coordinatewise undominated triples are strictly free. How-
ever, because a basic open set B is constructed by specifying strict rankings
for only a finite number of paired comparisons and then identifying all of the
continuous monotonic preferences that exhibit these rankings, no restrictions
other than continuity and monotonicity are placed on preferences in B if we
remove a neighbourhood of the origin from X that is large enough to contain
all the alternatives that are used to generate B. Hence, requiring a domain
to be somewhere dense also implies that any basic open set of preferences
coincides with Ccm on sets of alternatives that are sufficiently far from the
origin. Thus, it could be argued, open sets of preferences permit too much
preference diversity when comparing alternatives far from the origin. Re-
dekop (1991) has identified a finer topology on the space of preferences that
restricts the preference diversity on such sets without limiting the diversity
that is present in the neighbourhood of each alternative and has shown that
his public good impossibility theorems remain valid when this topology is
used to define open sets of preferences.
In Theorem 7, preferences have been a priori restricted to be continuous
and monotonic. As we have seen, the domain of continuous, strictly mono-
tonic, convex preferences Cpu in Example 8 is nowhere dense relative to Ccm,
so Theorem 7 does not apply to the domain of classical public goods prefer-
ences. If we are confident that everyone’s preferences lie in Cpu, this is the
“universal” set of preferences that should be used when identifying a domain
of preferences as being topologically small. Similarly, if there are other re-
strictions on preferences that we are confident are satisfied, then the universal
52A domain is strictly saturating if there are at least two strictly free pairs and every pair
of strictly free pairs is strictly connected. Redekop (1991) has shown that if X = Rm++,
D is a common preference domain, and D is a near-open subset of Cncm, then D is strictly
saturating.
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set of preferences should be restricted even further. Remarkably, Redekop
has shown that his public goods impossibility theorems are quite robust to
the specification of the underlying class of preferences. For example, Redekop
(1993a) has shown that Dn∗ is Arrow-inconsistent if D∗ is a near-open subset
of Cpu or if it is a near-open subset of the homothetic preferences in Cpu.53
Similarly, we may know that preferences lie in some parametric class, say the
set of Cobb–Douglas preferences, the set of linear preferences considered in
Example 9, or the set of Euclidean spatial preferences considered in Example
12. Provided that this parametric class is sufficiently rich, as in these three
examples, Redekop (1993c) has shown that the incompatibility of Arrow’s
axioms can only be avoided on topologically small subsets of these domains
when there are at least three goods.54
In addition to the public goods economies discussed here, Redekop (1993a;
1996) has considered private goods economies (see Section 9), economies with
both public and private goods, economies with stochastic alternatives, de-
terministic intertemporal economies with an infinite number of time peri-
ods, and infinite-horizon economies with uncertain consumption streams. In
each case, the basic message conveyed by Theorem 7 is unchanged—Arrow-
consistent domains are topologically small.55 These results are surveyed in
Redekop (1995).
7. Supersaturating preference domains
So far, we have restricted attention to problems in which the social alterna-
tives are purely public. As a consequence, the analysis is not immediately
applicable to problems with private goods. As we shall see, the techniques
used to study public alternatives in Sections 4 and 5 can be readily adapted
to study private alternatives as well. However, to fully exploit the structure
imposed on the problem by the private goods assumption, it is necessary to
consider refinements of the concept of a saturating preference domain. In this
section, we consider a restriction on the individual preference domains that
53It is an open question if these results can be extended to preference domains that are
not common.
54The restriction that m ≥ 3 is essential in some cases, as we know from our discussion
of the set of linear preferences in Example 9.
55When there are private goods, Redekop deletes the origin from each person’s con-
sumption set. As we shall see in the next two sections, standard domains of economic
preferences for private goods are Arrow-consistent if this is not done.
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ensures that the domain of preference profiles is saturating when individuals
only care about their own private consumption.
For the private domains we consider in this and the following two sections,
X is a Cartesian set of alternatives.
Cartesian Set of Alternatives. X =
∏n
i=1 Xi.
Thus, a social alternative is a vector (x1, . . . , xn), where xi ∈ Xi is the
component of the social alternative relevant to person i. We refer to xi
as i’s consumption bundle and to Xi as i’s consumption set. In adopting
this terminology, we are not requiring consumption bundles to be vectors
in a Euclidean space, although that is in fact the case in the applications
we consider. We let (yi;x−i) denote (x1, . . . , xi−1, yi, xi+1, . . . , xn), where
x−i = (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn).56
As in the previous sections, we maintain the assumption that D is a
Cartesian preference domain. When the alternatives are private, we assume
that individuals are selfish; i.e., in comparing two social alternatives, each
individual is only concerned with his or her own consumption. Formally, for
each i ∈ N , a preference ordering Ri ∈ Di is selfish if there exists an ordering
Qi on Xi such that for all x, y ∈ X, xRiy if and only if xiQiyi, where xi and
yi are i’s consumption bundles in the alternatives x and y, respectively. We
refer to Qi as i’s induced private preference.
Selfish Preference Domain. For each i ∈ N , an individual preference domain
Di on a Cartesian set of alternatives X is selfish if Ri is selfish for all Ri ∈ Di.
A preference domain D on a Cartesian set of alternatives X is selfish if the
individual preference domain Di on X is selfish for each i ∈ N .
For a selfish individual preference domain Di, the set of induced private
orderings of Xi corresponding to Di is denoted by Qi and is called i’s induced
private preference domain. Note that a pair of social alternatives x and y is
nontrivial for person i with respect to Di if and only if the corresponding pair
of private consumption bundles xi and yi is nontrivial with respect to Qi.
Similarly, a triple of social alternatives {w, x, y} is a free triple with respect
56The assumption that the set of alternatives has a Cartesian structure is not satisfied
in all private goods problems. For example, if the set of social alternatives is the set
of allocations in an Edgeworth box, the consumption bundles of the two individuals are
restricted by an overall resource constraint. We consider non-Cartesian sets of alternatives
in Section 10.
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to Di if and only if the corresponding triple of private consumption bundles
{wi, xi, yi} is free with respect to Qi.
A selfish preference domain (provided each person is not indifferent be-
tween all alternatives) is clearly not common. Consequently, Theorem 5,
which establishes that a common saturating preference domain is Arrow-
inconsistent, is not relevant when individuals have selfish preferences. How-
ever, Theorem 6, which shows that there is a dictator on every nontrivial
pair when the social welfare function satisfies IIA and WP and the prefer-
ence domain is saturating, does apply to selfish preference domains.
In order to help identify saturating preference domains when there are
private alternatives, it is useful to consider the concept of a supersaturating
preference domain, which is a domain restriction introduced by Bordes and
Le Breton (1989).
Supersaturating Preference Domain. An individual preference domain Di is
supersaturating if (a) Di is saturating and (b) for all nontrivial pairs {x, y}
with respect to Di in X, there exist u, v ∈ X such that u, v ∈ {x, y} and
{x, y, u}, {x, y, v}, {x, u, v}, and {y, u, v} are free triples with respect to
Di.57 A preference domain D is supersaturating if Di is supersaturating for
all i ∈ N .
Although Bordes and Le Breton (1989) introduced the concept of a su-
persaturating preference domain to study selfish preferences for private al-
ternatives, preference domains for public alternatives can be supersaturating
as well. For example, the domain of classical economic preferences for public
goods considered in Example 8 is a supersaturating preference domain. Re-
call that in this example, X is Rm+ with m ≥ 2 and the common individual
preference domain D∗ is the set of continuous, strictly monotonic, and convex
preferences Cpu. We have already seen that this individual preference domain
is saturating, so to establish that it is supersaturating it is sufficient to check
that condition (b) is satisfied. We do this for the two-good case. Suppose that
x and y are a nontrivial pair; i.e., neither x > y nor y > x. These alternatives
are illustrated in Figure 9. We do not rule out the possibility that either x
or y (or both) are on one of the axes. Let w = (min{x1, y1},min{x2, y2}).
Choose u so that it is in the interior of the triangle formed by the points
w, x, and y, as shown in the diagram. Our discussion of Example 8 shows
that {x, y, u} is a free triple. Choose v so that it lies below the line through
57Bordes and Le Breton (1989) have shown that (a) and (b) are logically independent.
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u and y, but above the lines through u and x and through w and y. By
again appealing to our discussion of Example 8, we conclude that {x, y, v},
{x, u, v}, and {y, u, v} are free triples with respect to D∗, which completes
the demonstration that D∗ is supersaturating (when m = 2).
To help understand condition (b) in the definition of an individual super-
saturating preference domain, we introduce the concept of a self-cycle.
Self-Cycle. A sequence of pairs A1, . . . , Ar in X is a self-cycle with respect
to Di (resp. D) if A1 = Ar and Aj and Aj+1 are strongly connected with
respect to Di (resp. D) for all j = 1, . . . , r − 1.
A self-cycle is a sequence of pairs connecting a pair of alternatives to itself.
If condition (b) in the definition of an individual supersaturating preference
domain is satisfied, then for each nontrivial pair of alternatives {x, y}, we can
construct a self-cycle containing three distinct pairs and we can construct a
self-cycle containing four distinct pairs. The first of these self-cycles is given
by the sequence {x, y}, {y, u}, {u, x}, and {x, y}. The second of these self-
cycles is given by the sequence {x, y}, {y, u}, {u, v}, {v, x}, and {x, y}. In
both of these sequences, any two adjacent pairs form a free triple. For the
domain of economic preferences for public goods considered in Example 8,
Figure 9 illustrates these self-cycles. By combining an appropriate number
of these two self-cycles, {x, y} can be connected to itself with a self-cycle
containing r pairs for any positive integer r except 2, 3, and 6.
For private alternatives, because preferences are selfish, the induced pri-
vate preference domain Qi inherits many of the structural properties of the
individual preference domain Di.
Lemma 3. If X is a Cartesian set of alternatives and D is a selfish pref-
erence domain, then for each i ∈ N , the individual preference domain Di
is saturating (resp. supersaturating) on X if and only if the induced private
preference domain Qi is saturating (resp. supersaturating) on Xi.
The intuition for Lemma 3 is quite simple. Because preferences are selfish,
an individual’s ranking of a pair of alternatives is completely determined
by the individual’s preference for the corresponding consumption bundles.
Hence, all of the richness in the individual preference domain Di is embodied
in the induced individual preference domain Qi.58
58A formal proof of Lemma 3 may be found in Le Breton and Weymark (1996).
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Example 17 shows that the private goods counterpart to the public pref-
erence domain considered in Example 8 is supersaturating.
Example 17. In this example, we consider the classical domain of economic
preferences for private goods. Before describing our example, we first need
one more definition. Suppose that X is both a Cartesian set of alternatives
and a subset of a Euclidean space. For each i ∈ N , a selfish preference order-
ing Ri ∈ R is strictly monotonic in own consumption if the corresponding
induced private preference Qi is strictly monotonic on Xi.
The set of alternatives is X =
∏n
i=1 Xi, where Xi = R
m
+ for all i ∈ N ,
where m ≥ 2. The preference domain is the domain of classical private goods
preferences, which we denote by Cpr.
Classical Private Goods Preference Domain. For all i ∈ N , Di is the set of all
selfish, continuous, strictly monotonic in own consumption, convex preference
orderings on X.
Because the set of alternatives is Cartesian and individual preferences are
selfish, by Lemma 3, Di is supersaturating on X if and only if the induced
private preference domain Qi is supersaturating on Xi. The induced private
preference domain Qi is formally the same as the public preference domain
considered in Example 8. As we have already seen, this domain is supersatu-
rating, from which it follows that Di is supersaturating as well. Because Di is
supersaturating for all i ∈ N , the preference domain D is supersaturating.59
By definition, an individual preference domain Di is saturating if it is
supersaturating. In general, it does not follow that a preference domain D
is saturating if it is supersaturating. However, if a preference domain D is
both selfish and supersaturating, then it must also be saturating.
Theorem 8. For a Cartesian set of alternatives X, if the preference domain
D is both selfish and supersaturating, then it is also saturating.60
Proof. Because the individual preference domains are saturating, for each
i ∈ N , we can find alternatives w(i), x(i), y(i), and z(i) in X such that
{x(i), y(i)} = {w(i), z(i)} and such that both pairs of alternatives are non-
trivial with respect toDi. Let w = (w1(1), . . . , wn(n)), x = (x1(1), . . . , xn(n)),
59The assumption that each person consumes the same number of private goods is not
essential in this example.
60This theorem is based on Lemma 2 in Bordes and Le Breton (1989).
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y = (y1(1), . . . , yn(n)), and z = (z1(1), . . . , zn(n)). Because X is Cartesian,
each of these four alternatives is in X. Because preferences are selfish, the
pairs {x, y} and {w, z} are nontrivial with respect to D. Thus, there exist
at least two nontrivial pairs with respect to D.
Now let {x, y} and {w, z} be any two nontrivial pairs with respect to
D. From Lemma 3, we know that for all i ∈ N , the induced private pref-
erence domains Qi are supersaturating on Xi and the pairs of consumption
bundles {xi, yi} and {wi, zi} are nontrivial with respect to Qi. Because Qi
is saturating, we can connect {xi, yi} and {wi, zi} using a sequence Si of
pairs of consumption bundles starting with {xi, yi} and ending with {wi, zi}.
Because Qi is supersaturating, we can find consumption bundles ui and vi
in Xi such that {xi, yi, ui}, {xi, yi, vi}, {xi, ui, vi}, and {yi, ui, vi} are free
triples with respect to Qi. Furthermore, {xi, yi} is connected to itself using
either the sequence of pairs (I): {xi, yi}, {yi, ui}, {ui, xi}, and {xi, yi} or the
sequence of pairs (II): {xi, yi}, {yi, ui}, {ui, vi}, {vi, xi}, and {xi, yi}.
Consider the sequences S1 and S2. Without loss of generality, we can
suppose that S1 is no longer than S2. Suppose S2 has k more pairs than
S1. If k is positive, we add self-cycles to the beginning of S1 and S2 until
the two sequences are the same length. If k = 1, this is accomplished by
adding one type-II self-cycle to the beginning of S1 and by adding one type-I
self-cycle to the beginning of S2. If k = 2, we add two type-I self-cycles to
the beginning of S1 and add one type-II self-cycle to the beginning of S2. If
k = 3, we simply add one type-I self-cycle to the beginning of S1. If k > 3,
by first adding an appropriate number of type-I self-cycles to the beginning
of S1, the difference in the lengths of the two sequences can be made not to
exceed three, and one of the preceding procedures can be used to equate the
length of the sequences.
Now that the sequences for the first two individuals are the same length,
we use similar operations to equalize the length of the sequences connecting
{xi, yi} and {wi, zi} for i = 1, 2, 3. Continuing in like fashion, we equalize
the lengths of the connection paths joining {xi, yi} and {wi, zi} for all i ∈
N . For each individual, we now have a sequence of consumption bundles
(xi, yi, si1, . . . , sit, wi, zi) containing t + 4 elements, with each adjacent pair
in the sequence forming the intermediate pairs used to connect {xi, yi} and
{wi, zi} with respect to Qi. Next, we form a sequence of alternatives in X
by combining these individual consumption bundles. That is, we construct
the sequence x = (x1, . . . , xn), y = (y1, . . . , yn), s1 = (s11, . . . , sn1), . . . ,
st = (s1t, . . . , snt), w = (w1, . . . , wn), z = (z1, . . . , zn). Each adjacent pair
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in this sequence is strongly connected, which establishes that the pairs {x, y}
and {w, z} are connected in D. Hence, D is saturating.
An immediate implication of Theorems 6 and 8 is that if a private pref-
erence domain is supersaturating, then there must be a dictator on every
nontrivial pair if the social welfare function satisfies IIA and WP.
Theorem 9. For a Cartesian set of alternatives X, if a social welfare func-
tion on a preference domain that is both selfish and supersaturating satisfies
IIA and WP, then there is an individual d ∈ N who is a dictator on every
nontrivial pair of social alternatives.
The usefulness of Theorem 9 is limited by the fact that a pair of social
alternatives is nontrivial if and only if the corresponding pairs of private
consumption bundles are nontrivial for each individual. For example, with
the classical economic preferences for private goods considered in Example
17, the social alternatives x and y are a nontrivial pair if and only if for
all individuals neither xi > yi nor yi > xi. Because this domain satisfies
the assumptions of Theorem 9, there is a dictator on the nontrivial pairs.
However, if we want to compare a pair of social alternatives in which even
a single individual’s consumption bundle is the same in both alternatives
or in which some individual receives more of all goods in one of the two
alternatives, then Theorem 9 tells us nothing about the social ranking.
Using the essential idea underlying an example in Blau (1957), Border
(1983) has shown that the domain Cpr of classical economic preferences for
private goods considered in Example 17 is Arrow-consistent. In Example 18,
we present the social welfare function Border used to demonstrate this result.
Example 18. In this example, the set of alternatives X and the preference
domain D are the same as in Example 17 but with n = 2.61 By construction,
the set of alternatives is Cartesian and the preference domain is selfish. We
have already established that the preference domain is also supersaturating.
Consider the following four subsets of X: A1 = {x ∈ X | x1 = 0m and x2 =
0m}, A2 = {x ∈ X | x1 = 0m and x2 = 0m}, A3 = {x ∈ X | x1 = 0m and x2 =
0m}, and A4 = {(0m, 0m)}. These four sets form a partition of X. In A1 both
individuals consume some of at least one good. In each of the other sets, at
least one person receives nothing. The social welfare function is defined by
setting, for all R ∈ D,
61It is a straightforward matter to extend this example to larger populations.
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(i) ∀x, y ∈ A1, xRy ↔ xR2y,
(ii) ∀x, y ∈ A2, xRy ↔ xR1y,
(iii) ∀x, y ∈ A3, xRy ↔ xR2y,
(iv) ∀i < j,∀x ∈ Ai,∀y ∈ Aj, xPy.
This social welfare function is nondictatorial. Person two dictates on
alternatives in A1. However, person two is not an overall dictator. If x ∈ A3
and y ∈ A2, then xP2y because two’s consumption is nonzero in A3 and is
zero in A2. But, by (iv), the social preference is yPx.
This social welfare function satisfies WP because the social preference
always agrees with the individual preference of at least one person. This fact
is obvious if we compare two alternatives from the same cell in the partition.
It is not difficult to verify this claim when the alternatives come from different
cells. For example, if x ∈ A3 and y ∈ A2, the social preference coincides with
person one’s preference.
We leave it to the reader to confirm that IIA is satisfied and that the
social preferences are orderings.62
8. Hypersaturating preference domains
With public alternatives, the Kalai–Muller–Satterthwaite Theorem tells us
that if the preference domain is common and saturating, then it is Arrow-
inconsistent. In the preceding section, we learned that with a Cartesian set of
private alternatives, the preference domain is saturating if the individual pref-
erence domains are selfish and supersaturating. With selfish preferences, it is
not possible for individuals to have the same individual preference domains
and, therefore, we cannot use the Kalai–Muller–Satterthwaite Theorem to
establish that a private alternatives preference domain is Arrow-inconsistent
when individuals only care about their own consumption. In this section,
we consider a refinement of the concept of a supersaturating preference do-
main that implies that the domain is Arrow-inconsistent when the set of
alternatives is Cartesian and preferences are selfish.
62Donaldson and Roemer (1987) have considered private goods environments in which
the number of goods is variable. They introduced an axiom that places restrictions on
how the social rankings for different numbers of goods are related to each other. When
combined with Pareto Indifference (the requirement that two alternatives are socially
indifferent when everyone is indifferent between them), this consistency condition implies
IIA. Donaldson and Roemer have noted that their consistency axiom is violated if, for
each fixed number of goods, alternatives are socially ranked as in Example 18.
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To help understand why a domain like the classical domain of private
goods preferences considered in Examples 17 and 18 is Arrow-consistent, we
introduce the concept of a trivial pair being separable for an individual.
Separable Trivial Pair. A pair of alternatives {x, y} in X that is trivial for
i is separable with respect to Di if there exists a z ∈ X such that the pairs
{x, z} and {y, z} are nontrivial for i and either (a) xPiy for all Ri ∈ Di and
there exists an R′i ∈ Di such that xP ′izP ′iy or (b) yPix for all Ri ∈ Di and
there exists an R′i ∈ Di such that yP ′izP ′ix.
The concept of a separable trivial pair is implicit in Bordes and Le Breton
(1989).63 Informally, a trivial pair {x, y} is separable for person i if i is not
indifferent between x and y and there is an admissible preference ordering
for i and an alternative z such that z is intermediate in preference between
x and y and such that {x, z} and {y, z} are nontrivial pairs for i.
Bordes and Le Breton (1989) used the notion of a separable trivial pair
to define a hypersaturating preference domain.
Hypersaturating Preference Domain. An individual preference domain Di is
hypersaturating if (a) Di is supersaturating and (b) all trivial pairs {x, y}
with respect to Di in X for which ¬(xIiy) for all Ri ∈ Di are separable for
i. A preference domain D is hypersaturating if Di is hypersaturating for all
i ∈ N .
With a hypersaturating preference domain, all nonindifferent trivial pairs
are separable for each individual. The preference domain in Examples 17
and 18 is not hypersaturating because for each individual we can find trivial
pairs consisting of two nonindifferent alternatives that are not separable. For
example, if x y = (0m, 0m), {x, y} is a trivial pair for both individuals for
the preference domain considered in Example 18. Both individuals prefer x
to y, but x and y cannot be separated.
Lemma 4 provides the analogue to Lemma 3 for hypersaturating individ-
ual preference domains.
Lemma 4. If X is a Cartesian set of alternatives and D is a selfish pref-
erence domain, then for each i ∈ N , the individual preference domain Di is
hypersaturating on X if and only if the induced private preference domain Qi
is hypersaturating on Xi.
63A closely related idea is used in Kalai and Ritz (1980).
52
Although the preference domain of classical economic preferences for pri-
vate goods is not hypersaturating when each consumption set is a nonnegative
orthant, it is hypersaturating if either the origin is removed from each per-
son’s consumption set or if all goods must be consumed in positive amounts.
Example 19. In this example, the preference domain is the domain of clas-
sical private goods preferences considered in Example 17, but now the origin
is removed from each person’s consumption set so that Xi = R
m
+\{0m} for
all i ∈ N , where m ≥ 2.
By Lemma 4, to show that this preference domain is hypersaturating,
it is sufficient to show that the induced private preference domain Qi is
hypersaturating on Rm+\{0m} for all i ∈ N . The discussion of Example 17
shows that Qi is supersaturating. (Deleting the origin from the consumption
set does not affect this argument.) We illustrate the rest of the proof that
Qi is hypersaturating for the case in which m = 2. On Xi, the pair {xi, yi}
is trivial for i with xi preferred to yi if and only if xi > yi, as illustrated in
Figure 10. The pair {xi, yi} can be separated by any consumption bundle zi
in the shaded regions of the diagram. Note that if yi is on one of the axes,
then there is only one such region (whether or not xi is on this axis as well).
Example 20. This example is identical to Example 19 except that now
Xi = R
m
++ for all i ∈ N . The reasoning used to show that Example 19 is
hypersaturating also shows that this preference domain is hypersaturating.64
Border (1983) has shown that the preference domain in Example 20 is
Arrow-inconsistent. See also the related result in Maskin (1976).65 When
there are two individuals, the universal set of alternatives in Example 19 is
equal to the set A1 in Example 18. Recall that the social welfare function
in Example 18 is dictatorial on A1. Theorem 10 shows that this is no acci-
dent. For a Cartesian set of alternatives and selfish preferences, Theorem 10
demonstrates that a preference domain is Arrow-inconsistent if it is hyper-
saturating. This result, which is due to Bordes and Le Breton (1989), is a
64See Bordes and Le Breton (1989) for other examples of hypersaturating preference
domains with private alternatives.
65Arrow (1951, Chapter VI) showed that free triples exist when there are private goods
and individuals have selfish preferences that are monotone in own consumption. The
original (erroneous) version of Arrow’s impossibility theorem did not utilize Unrestricted
Domain, but instead simply assumed that there exists a free triple. This lead Arrow to
falsely conclude that a private-goods version of his impossibility theorem follows immedi-
ately from his more general theorem.
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private good analogue to the Kalai–Muller–Satterthwaite Theorem (Theorem
5) for public alternatives.
Theorem 10. For a Cartesian set of alternatives X, if a social welfare func-
tion on a preference domain that is both selfish and hypersaturating satisfies
IIA and WP, then it is dictatorial.
Proof. Because a hypersaturating preference domain is supersaturating, it
follows from Theorem 9 that there is an individual d who is a dictator on the
nontrivial pairs. We show that d is also a dictator on the trivial pairs.
Consider any trivial pair {x, y} and let R = (R1, . . . , Rn) be any profile
in D for which xPdy. We now show that there is an alternative z ∈ X such
that for all i ∈ N , (i) {xi, zi} and {yi, zi} are nontrivial pairs of consumption
bundles for the induced private preference domain Qi and (ii) there exists
an induced private preference Q′i ∈ Qi for which i weakly prefers xi to zi
(resp. zi to xi) and weakly prefers zi to yi (resp. yi to zi) if and only if i
weakly prefers xi to yi (resp. yi to xi) according to Qi. Note that the pair
of consumption bundles {xi, yi} need not be trivial for all i. By Lemma 4,
the induced private preference domain Qi is hypersaturating for all i ∈ N .
Because Qi is saturating, if {xi, yi} is nontrivial for i, there must be a free
triple with respect to Qi that includes {xi, yi}. In this case, zi can be chosen
to be the third member of this triple and the requisite preference clearly
exists. If {xi, yi} is trivial for i, it follows immediately from the fact that
Qi is hypersaturating that zi and Q′i exist when i is not indifferent between
xi and yi according to Qi. If i is indifferent, the argument is more involved.
See Bordes and Le Breton (1989) or Le Breton and Weymark (1996) for the
details. Because preferences are selfish, it follows that {x, z} and {y, z} are
nontrivial pairs of social alternatives.
For all i ∈ N , let R′i be the selfish preference on X corresponding to Q′i
and let R′ = (R′1, . . . , R
′
n). By construction, xP
′
dz and zP
′
dy. Because {x, z}
and {y, z} are nontrivial pairs, d is a dictator on these two pairs. Thus, xP ′z
and zP ′y. By the transitivity of social preference, it follows that xP ′y. IIA
then implies that xPdy. Hence, person d is a dictator.
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66The argument we used to show that d is a dictator on the ordered pair ({1, 2}, {1}) in
our discussion of ordinal probabilities (Example 15) is similar. As in the proof of Theorem
10, we introduced a third pair of alternatives {1, 3} to separate {1, 2} from {1}. The pairs
{{1, 2}, {1, 3}} and {{1, 3}, {1}} are both nontrivial, but only the former is free. Because
{{1, 3}, {1}} is not a free pair, we had to use IIA and WP before we could appeal to
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The classical domain of economic preferences for private goods is Arrow-
consistent if the origin is included in the individual consumption sets, as in
Examples 17 and 18. On this domain, the preceding argument does not apply
whenever the pair {x, y} includes the origin, as such a pair cannot be sepa-
rated. However, it follows from Theorem 10 and Example 19 that the only
social welfare functions that satisfy all of the Arrow axioms on such domains
are dictatorial on the subset of alternatives obtained by deleting the origin
from each person’s consumption set. In other words, only if at least one of
the alternatives being compared has someone with zero consumption may
the individual who is “almost dictatorial” have his or her strict preference
overridden. The social welfare function in Example 18 has this property.
It thus seems that with private alternatives, just like with public alterna-
tives, restricting the preference domain does not provide a satisfactory way
of avoiding Arrow’s dilemma.
9. Topological domain restrictions for private goods
Redekop (1993a) has established private goods counterparts to the topolog-
ical public goods results discussed in Section 6. In this section, we describe
a private good analogue to Theorem 7. We also consider a theorem of Re-
dekop’s that shows that a preference domain for private goods can be Arrow-
consistent even if everyone has identical preferences for own consumption.
Throughout this section, the set of alternatives is X =
∏n
i=1 Xi, where
Xi = R
m
+\{0m} for all i ∈ N with m ≥ 2. We also assume that preferences are
selfish. In Redekop’s “identical preferences” theorem, the preference domain
D is not Cartesian. When this is the case, D is selfish if for all R ∈ D and
all i ∈ N , Ri is selfish.
Let Ccsm denote the set of continuous and strictly monotonic preference
orderings on Rm+\{0m}. Redekop (1993a) has shown that a selfish Carte-
sian preference domain is Arrow-inconsistent if each person has an induced
individual preference domain that is a near-open subset of Ccsm.
Theorem 11. If X = (Rm+\{0m})n with m ≥ 2, the Cartesian preference
domain D is selfish, and, for all i ∈ N , the induced individual preference
domain Qi is a near-open subset of Ccsm, then there is no social welfare
function F : D → R that satisfies IIA, WP, and ND.
transitivity, and we could not use our finding that d is a dictator on ({1, 2}, {1}) to also
conclude that d is a dictator on ({1}, {1, 2}).
55
Note that the individual preference domains for own consumption in this
theorem can be person specific. The strategy used to prove Theorem 11 is
similar to the one used to prove Theorem 7, except for the way that the open
sets are constructed on which an individual is a local dictator. See Redekop
(1993a) for the details. By assuming that preferences for own consumption
are strictly monotonic, not just monotonic, and by assuming that each Qi
is a near-open subset of Ccsm, rather than being simply a somewhere dense
subset of Ccsm, the technical problems described in Section 6 can be avoided.
With public goods, if the preference domain is restricted so that every-
one always has identical preferences, then no pair or triple of alternatives
is strictly free. However, with private goods, even if everyone has identi-
cal preferences for own consumption, it is relatively easy to construct strict
free triples, provided that the common induced individual preference domain
exhibits sufficient preference diversity. The reason for this is that each in-
dividual’s consumption bundle can be varied independently. For example,
suppose that Qi = Ccsm for all i ∈ N , but in any admissible preference
profile, everyone has the same induced private preference. Consider three
alternatives x, y, and z for which the 3n vectors of private consumptions
x1, y1, z1, . . . , xn, yn, zn are coordinatewise undominated. It is easy to see
that {x, y, z} is a strict free triple, even though everyone has the same pref-
erences for own consumption.
A selfish preference domain for private goods D has a common private
preference domain if Qi = Qj for all i, j ∈ N . Let Q denote this common
set of preferences for own consumption. A selfish preference domain for
private goods D exhibits identity of preferences for own consumption if for
all R ∈ D, Qi = Qj for all i, j ∈ N . Redekop (1993a) has shown that
a preference domain is Arrow-inconsistent if the domain has both of these
properties and Q is a near-open subset of Ccsm.
Theorem 12. If X = (Rm+\{0m})n with m ≥ 2, the preference domain D
is selfish with a common private preference domain Q, D exhibits identity of
preferences for own consumption, and Q is a near-open subset of Ccsm, then
there is no social welfare function F : D → R that satisfies IIA, WP, and
ND.
The proof of Theorem 12 is similar to the proof of Theorem 11. See Re-
dekop (1993a). An implication of this theorem is that the Cartesian structure
of the alternatives and the selfishness of preferences play significant roles in
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generating the preference diversity needed to show that a domain is Arrow-
inconsistent when there are private goods.
As in Section 6, the theorems presented in this section are quite robust to
the specification of the “universal” set of preferences that is used to identify
when a domain is topologically large. In particular, these theorems also
hold when Ccsm is replaced by the set of continuous, strictly monotonic, and
convex preference orderings on Rm+\{0m}. See Redekop (1993a; 1995). Thus,
Redekop’s topological approach can be used to provide an alternative proof
that the domain of classical private goods preferences Cpr in Example 19 is
Arrow-inconsistent.
10. Non-Cartesian sets of alternatives
So far, our discussion of private alternatives has assumed that the set of
alternatives is a Cartesian product set Πni=1Xi. In this section, the set of
alternatives is a proper subset of a product set. If an alternative is an al-
location of goods, this setting arises naturally when the set of alternatives
X incorporates feasibility constraints—allocation decisions for one individual
limit what can be done for the remaining individuals. There are no general
results when the set of alternatives is not Cartesian. However, Bordes and
Le Breton (1990a) and Bordes, Campbell, and Le Breton (1995) have shown
that a modification of the local approach permits one to establish Arrow-
inconsistency in some important non-Cartesian examples. We consider their
analyses of the assignment problem and of exchange economies.67
10.1. Assignments of indivisible objects
We assume that there is a set G of n indivisible goods. Without loss of gener-
ality, we can assume that G = N = {1, 2, . . . , n}. For example, the elements
of G could be seats in a theater, places to park a car, dorm rooms in a college,
etc. In terms of our earlier notation, for all i ∈ N , i’s consumption set Xi is
G. However, each object can only be assigned to one individual, so the set
of feasible alternatives X is a proper subset of Gn. Thus, an alternative is
an assignment of the n goods to the n individuals, each individual receiving
exactly one good. Formally, an assignment x is a bijection from N onto G.
67Non-Cartesian sets of alternatives that arise because of feasibility constraints are also a
feature of the overlapping generations economies considered by Campbell (1992b; 1992d).
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Because G = N , we can identify X with Σn, the set of permutations of N .
In the subsequent discussion, we single out two kinds of permutations. A
transposition transposes two elements of N . Let Θn denote the set of trans-
positions of N . For all i ∈ N , a circular permutation maps i into i + t for
some t ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}, where addition is modulo n. Let Cn denote the
set of circular permutations of N . For σ ∈ Σn, σCn is the set obtained by
applying the permutation σ to each of the elements in Cn.
It is assumed that an individual only cares about the good allocated to
him or her. In other words, for all i ∈ N , all Ri ∈ Di, and all x, y ∈ X, if
xi = yi, then xIiy. We make no further restrictions on individual preferences
other than that they lie in R (the set of orderings of X). Note that this
implies that all of the objects in G must be different. Let RiA denote i’s set
of admissible individual preferences.
Bordes and Le Breton (1990a) have shown that if n ≥ 4, then the pref-
erence domain Πni=1RiA is Arrow-inconsistent. Before considering their the-
orem, we first show why the n = 3 case is not covered by their result.
Example 21. When n = 3, X contains six alternatives. We group them into
the setsA1 = {(1, 2, 3), (2, 3, 1), (3, 1, 2)} andA2 = {(1, 3, 2), (3, 2, 1), (2, 1, 3)}.
In each of these alternatives, the ith component is the good assigned to per-
son i. Note that A1 is the set of circular permutations C3, (1,3,2) is obtained
by transposing the assignment of goods 2 and 3 in (1,2,3), and A2 is the set of
assignments obtained by applying circular permutations to (1,3,2). Both A1
and A2 are free triples, so any social welfare function with preference domain
Πni=1RiA is dictatorial on each of these triples if IIA and WP are satisfied.
Define the social choice welfare function F : Πni=1RiA → R by setting, for
all R ∈ Πni=1RiA,
(i) xRy ↔ xR1y for x, y ∈ A1,
(ii) xRy ↔ xR2y for x, y ∈ A2,
(iii) xPy if x ∈ A1 and y ∈ A2.
For the same reason as in Example 2, this is a well-defined social welfare
function. F satisfies all the Arrow axioms.68
Theorem 13 is Bordes and Le Breton’s impossibility theorem for the as-
signment problem.
68Note that if x ∈ A1 and y ∈ A2, the weak Pareto principle is vacuous because these
alternatives are not Pareto ranked (someone receives the same good in both assignments).
We also have dictators on the two subsets of alternatives in Example 2, but the two sets
are Pareto ranked in that example.
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Theorem 13. If X = Σn and n ≥ 4, there is no social welfare function with
preference domain Πni=1RiA that satisfies IIA, WP, and ND.
Proof. We present the the proof for the case of n ≥ 5.69 Suppose that
F : Πni=1RiA → R satisfies IIA and WP. The proof proceeds in a series of
steps.
Step 1. We first show that for all σ ∈ Σn, there is a dictator d(σ) on
σCn. Because each person receives a different object in each alternative in
Cn, preferences are unrestricted on Cn. For the same reason, preferences are
unrestricted on any common permutation of the alternatives in Cn. Hence,
the existence of a dictator on σCn follows from Arrow’s Theorem.
Step 2. We next show that for all σ ∈ Σn, all θ ∈ Θn, and all x ∈ Cn,
there exist x′, x′′ ∈ Cn such that {σx, θσx′, θσx′′} is a free triple.70 Suppose
that θ transposes the assignment of goods i and j. We have already seen
that each person receives a different object in each alternative in σCn. If for
all alternatives in σCn except σx, we transpose the assignment of goods i
and j, it will still be the case that everyone receives a different object in each
alternative in θσCn\{θσx}. To complete the proof of this step, we need to
show that there are at least two of these transposed alternatives, say θσx′
and θσx′′, in which everyone receives different objects in {σx, θσx′, θσx′′}.
Let i∗ = (σx)−1(i) and j∗ = (σx)−1(j) be the individuals who receive
objects i and j, respectively, in σx. For any k = i∗, j∗, transposing the
assignment of objects i and j in σx has no effect on what k receives, so
σx(k) = θσx(k). For any circular permutation y distinct from x, x(k) = y(k)
and, hence, σx(k) = θσy(k) for k = i∗, j∗. For each individual and each
object, there is exactly one assignment in Cn in which this individual receives
this object. Hence, there exists exactly one xi∗ ∈ Cn such that i = σx(i∗) =
θσxi∗(i
∗) and exactly one xj∗ ∈ Cn such that j = σx(j∗) = θσxj∗(j∗).
Let E = θσCn\{θσx, θσxi∗ , θσxj∗}. Because n ≥ 5, |E| ≥ 2. Let θσx′
and θσx′′ be any two distinct elements of E. For each k = i∗, j∗, from the
preceding discussion, we know that k receives distinct objects in σx, θσx′, and
θσx′′ because x, x′, and x′′ are distinct. Because these circular permutations
are distinct, individuals i∗ and j∗ receive different objects in θσx, θσx′, and
θσx′′. By the construction of E, neither i∗ nor j∗ receive objects i or j in
either θσx′ or θσx′′. Hence, i∗ and j∗ also receive distinct objects in σx, θσx′,
69The case n = 4 calls for a special treatment. See Bordes and Le Breton (1990a).
70When we compose two permutations, such as σ and x, we write σx instead of σ(x).
Note that a permutation is a mapping from N to N , not a permutation matrix.
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and θσx′′.
Step 3. We now show that for all σ ∈ Σn and all θ ∈ Θn, d(σ) = d(θσ).
Let σ1 be any element of σCn. By Step 2, there exist σ2, σ3 ∈ θσCn such
that {σ1, σ2, σ3} is a free triple. As in Step 2, suppose that θ transposes the
assignment of goods i and j. Let i∗∗ and j∗∗ be the individuals who receive
objects i and j, respectively, in σ2. Because θθ is the identity transform,
θσ2 ∈ σCn. We know that everyone receives a different object in every
assignment in σCn. Thus, for any σ4 ∈ σCn\{σ1, θσ2}, everyone except
possibly i∗∗ or j∗∗ must receive different objects in σ1, σ2, and σ4. Provided
that we choose σ4 so that i
∗∗ does not get object i and j∗∗ does not get
object j, i∗∗ and j∗∗ also receive different objects in σ1, σ2, and σ4. This
is possible because |σCn\{σ1, θσ2}| ≥ 3. Therefore, {σ1, σ2, σ4} is a free
triple. The pairs {σ4, σ1} and {σ2, σ3} are connected using the intermediate
pair {σ1, σ2}. Hence, the dictator d(σ) on {σ4, σ1} must be the same as the
dictator on {σ2, σ3}.
Step 4. Next we show that there exists a d ∈ N such that d(σ) = d for
all σ ∈ Σn. Consider any σ ∈ Σn. Any permutation can be written as the
composition of transpositions, so there exist θ1, θ2, . . . , θq ∈ Θn such that
σ = θ1θ2 · · · θq. By Step 3, d(θq) = d(θq−1θq), d(θq−1θq) = d(θq−2θq−1θq), . . . ,
d(θ1θ2 · · · θq) = d(θ2 · · · θq). Hence, the dictator on σCn is the same as the
dictator on θqCn which, by Step 3, is the same as the dictator on Cn.
Step 5. In this step, we show that for all σ ∈ Σn and all θ ∈ Θn, d is a
dictator on all pairs {σ1, σ2} for which σ1 ∈ σCn and σ2 ∈ θσCn.
First, suppose that {σ1, σ2} is a free pair. If we identify σ1 with σx in
Step 2, it follows that if σ2 ∈ {θσx, θσxi∗ , θσxj∗}, then someone receives the
same object in σ1 and σ2, contradicting the assumption that {σ1, σ2} is a
free pair. Hence, σ2 ∈ E. By choosing σ3 ∈ E distinct from σ2, {σ1, σ2, σ3}
is a free triple with σ3 ∈ θσCn. By Step 4, d is the dictator on {σ2, σ3} and,
therefore, d must also be the dictator on the free triple {σ1, σ2, σ3}.
If {σ1, σ2} is not a free pair, d is trivially a dictator on this pair if σ1(d) =
σ2(d), so we only need to consider the case in which σ1(d) = σ2(d). Consider
an arbitrary profile R ∈ Πni=1RiA for which σ1Pdσ2. By Step 2, there exist
σ3, σ4 ∈ θσCn such that {σ1, σ3, σ4} is a free triple. Because someone receives
the same object in σ1 and σ2, whereas everyone receives different objects in
any two assignments in θσCn, the fact that {σ1, σ3, σ4} is a free triple implies
that {σ2, σ3, σ4} is also a free triple. Because the two free triples have two
alternatives in common, they must have the same dictator. By Step 4, d is
the dictator on {σ2, σ3, σ4}, so d is the common dictator.
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Note that our assumptions imply that d receives a different object in each
of σ1, σ2, σ3, and σ4. Hence, there exists a profile R
′ ∈ Πni=1RiA for which
(i) R′i = Ri for all i = d and (ii) σ1P ′dσ3P ′dσ4P ′dσ2. Because d is a dictator on
each adjacent pair in this sequence of alternatives, we have σ1P
′σ3P ′σ4P ′σ2.
Transitivity of R′ implies that σ1P ′σ2. We then have σ1Pσ2 by IIA. Thus, d
is a dictator on {σ1, σ2}.
Step 6. We now show that for all σ, σ′ ∈ Σn, if d is dictator on all pairs
{σ1, σ2} such that σ1 ∈ σCn and σ2 ∈ σ′Cn, then for all θ ∈ Θn, d is a
dictator on all pairs {σ∗1, σ∗2} such that σ∗1 ∈ σCn and σ∗2 ∈ θσ′Cn.
Suppose that for some admissible profile R, σ∗1Pdσ
∗
2. Consider an assign-
ment σ∗3 ∈ σ′Cn in which d receives a different object than in either σ∗1 or σ∗2.
There then exists another admissible profile R′ such that (i) R′i = Ri for all
i = d and (ii) σ∗1P ′dσ∗3P ′dσ∗2. It follows from the hypothesis of this step and
from Step 5 that σ∗1P
′σ∗3P
′σ∗2. Transitivity of P
′ then implies that σ∗1P
′σ∗2.
Hence, using IIA, we conclude that σ∗1Pσ
∗
2.
Step 7. To complete the proof that Πni=1RiA is Arrow-inconsistent, we
show that d is a dictator on {σ, σ′} for any σ, σ′ ∈ Σn. The proof is trivial
if σ(d) = σ′(d), so suppose that σ(d) = σ′(d). As in Step 4, there exist
θ1, θ2, . . . , θq ∈ Θn such that σ = θ1θ2 · · · θqσ′. From Step 5, d is a dictator
on all pairs with one element in σ′Cn and the other in θqσ′Cn. From Step 6,
d is therefore a dictator on all pairs with one element in σ′Cn and the other
in θq−1θqσ′Cn. A repeated application of Step 6 leads to the conclusion that
d is a dictator on {σ, σ′}.
Because the domain in the assignment problem is non-Cartesian, we could
not analyze individual preference domains separately, as we have done in the
Cartesian case. Nevertheless, we were able to group the alternatives in such
a way that we could use Arrow’s theorem “locally” on each subgroup and
then use connection arguments to show that a single individual dictates on
the complete set of alternatives. In the set obtained by taking all the circular
permutations of an arbitrary assignment, nobody receives the same object
in any of these assignments. Thus, these subgroups of alternatives, which
partition Σn, are free n-tuples. If we take one of these subgroups, say σCn,
and transpose who receives two of the objects, we obtain another one of the
subgroups, say θσCn. A key step in the proof of Theorem 13 is that there
is a free triple that overlaps these two subgroups of alternatives. These free
triples play a fundamental role in the connection arguments.
Bordes and Le Breton (1990a) have used this kind of reasoning to analyze
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matching and pairing problems. In a matching problem, there are two groups
of n individuals and each person from one group is matched with a person
from the other group. The classic example of a matching problem is the
marriage problem in which a group of men and women form married couples.
In a pairing problem, there is a single set of 2n individuals who are grouped
in pairs. For example, if college dorm rooms are designed for two people, we
have a pairing problem. Provided that individuals only care about who they
are matched with, but otherwise have unrestricted preferences, the preference
domain in the matching problem is Arrow-inconsistent if n ≥ 4 and the
preference domain in the pairing problem is Arrow-inconsistent if n ≥ 2. See
Bordes and Le Breton (1990a) for the details.
10.2. Exchange economies
The set of feasible allocations in an exchange economy is another example
of a non-Cartesian set of alternatives. In an exchange economy, there is a
fixed aggregate endowment ω ∈ Rm++ of m goods to be distributed among
n individuals. We assume that m ≥ 2 and n ≥ 2. When there is no free
disposal of goods, the set of feasible allocations for this economy is E(ω) =
{x ∈ Rmn+ |
∑n
i=1 x
i
j = ωj for all j = 1, . . . ,m}. Let E◦(ω) denote the interior
of this set; i.e., E◦(ω) is the set of feasible allocations in which everybody’s
consumption of each good is positive.
Individual preferences are defined over the set of all possible allocations
R
mn
+ , not just the feasible allocations in E(ω). As a preference domain,
we consider the classical private goods preference domain Cpr introduced in
Section 7. Recall that this is the set of all profiles of selfish, continuous,
strictly monotonic in own consumption, convex individual preferences.
We know from Example 18 that a social welfare function F : Cpr → R can
satisfy all three of the Arrow axioms when X = Rmn+ . However, we also know
from Theorem 10 and Examples 19 and 20 that the restriction of F to the
set of allocations in which everybody has a positive consumption of all goods
or to the set of allocations in which everybody has a positive consumption
of some good cannot satisfy all of the Arrow axioms. Bordes, Campbell,
and Le Breton (1995) have shown that this impossibility also holds for the
restriction of F to E◦(ω). Equivalently, if we let X = E◦(ω) and D be the
restriction of Cpr to X, then D is an Arrow-inconsistent preference domain.71
71Using a Border-type example (see Example 18), one can show that the restriction of
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Theorem 14. If X = Rmn+ with m ≥ 2 and if ω ∈ Rm++, there is no so-
cial welfare function with a classical private goods preference domain whose
restriction to E◦(ω) satisfies IIA, WP, and ND.72
To prove this theorem, Bordes, Campbell, and Le Breton used a version
of the local approach, but they had to depart quite significantly from the
conventional arguments described in earlier sections. To see why this is
necessary, we prove Theorem 14 for the case in which m = n = 2; i.e., for an
Edgeworth box economy.
Proof (for m = n = 2). Step 1. Reasoning as in Examples 8 and 17, {x, y}
is a free pair for person i if and only if neither xi > yi nor yi > xi.73 Because
of the resource constraint, if a pair is free for one individual, it is also free for
the other individual. Any pair that is not free is trivial, with person i having
a strict preference for x over y if and only if person j has the reverse strict
preference. It is not possible for anyone to be indifferent on a trivial pair.
Step 2. Consider a triple of alternatives {x, y, z} in E◦(ω). The discussion
in Step 2 of Example 8 shows that for this triple to be free for individual
one, the alternatives must be situated as shown in Figure 11.74 This triple
is not free for person two because y cannot be ranked last in this triple by
this individual. More generally, if {x, y, z} is a free triple for person i, then
there is an alternative a ∈ {x, y, z} with the property that j can have any
preference on this triple in which a is strictly preferred to one of the other
two alternatives. In Figure 11, a = y. If the three alternatives are arranged
in increasing order of the consumption of good one, this implies that j has
a single-peaked preference on this triple. Thus, there are no free triples in
E◦(ω), which is why the local analysis must be modified in order for it to
apply to an Edgeworth box economy.
Step 3. For any free pair {x, y} and any i ∈ {1, 2}, we can find a third
alternative z ∈ E◦(ω) such that {x, y, z} is a free triple for i and the alter-
Cpr to E(ω) is Arrow-consistent. Note that if a preference domain is Arrow-inconsistent,
it does not follow that the restriction of the preference domain to a proper subset of the
alternatives is also Arrow-inconsistent. See Section 1 of Bordes, Campbell, and Le Breton
(1995) for an example of this phenomenon.
72Bordes, Campbell, and Le Breton (1995) assumed that preferences are strictly convex.
Their arguments also apply to convex preferences because the same pairs and triples of
alternatives are strictly free with either convexity assumption.
73In our discussion of the two-person case, we use i to denote an arbitrary member of
{1, 2} and j to denote the other person.
74In Figures 11 and 12, O1 (resp. O2) is person one’s (resp. two’s) origin.
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native a that cannot be ranked last by the other individual is a prespecified
member of the triple. For example, if i = 1, for the x and y depicted in
Figure 1, z would need to be located in region III if a = x, in region IX if
a = y, and in region VI if a = z.
Step 4. Suppose that F is a social welfare function with a classical private
goods preference domain whose restriction to E◦(ω) satisfies IIA and WP.
The next part of the proof is concerned with determining the decisiveness
implications of these assumptions. In this two-person economy, individual i
is almost decisive for (x, y) if x is socially preferred to y when i prefers x to y
and j prefers y to x. Let ADi(x, y) denote that i is almost decisive for (x, y).
Suppose that {x, y, z} is a free triple for i and, without loss of generality,
that y is the alternative in this triple that cannot be ranked last by j. In this
step, we show that either i is almost decisive on all ordered pairs of distinct
alternatives in {x, y, z} or j is almost decisive on all ordered pairs (a, b) of
distinct alternatives in {x, y, z} for which b = y.75
Let R1 be a profile for which xP 1i yP
1
i z and yP
1
j zP
1
j x. By WP, we have
yP 1z. If zR1x and xR1y, R1 would not be an ordering. Therefore, either
xP 1z or yP 1x. We consider each case in turn.
Case 1. If xP 1z, IIA implies ADi(x, z). Suppose now that ADi(a, b)
holds for a, b ∈ {x, y, z} with a = y. Let c be the other alternative in the
triple and consider a profile R2 for which aP 2i bP
2
i c and bP
2
j cP
2
j a. We then
have aP 2b by ADi(a, b) and bP
2c by WP. Transitivity of R2 then implies
that aP 2c and, hence, ADi(a, c). A similar argument can be used to show
that ADi(c, b) holds. Letting a = x and b = z, it then follows from ADi(x, z)
that ADi(x, y) and ADi(y, z). Now letting a = x and b = y, it follows from
ADi(x, y) that ADi(z, y). Similarly, it can be shown that ADi(z, x) and
ADi(y, x) both hold. Therefore, i is almost decisive on all of the distinct
ordered pairs in {x, y, z}.
Case 2. If yP 1x, IIA implies ADj(y, x). Consider a profile R
3 for which
xP 3i zP
3
i y and yP
3
j xP
3
j z. We then have yP
3x by ADj(y, x) and xP
3z by
WP. Thus, yP 3z by the transitivity of R3, which establishes ADj(y, z). We
can similarly show that ADj(z, x) and ADj(x, z) both hold. Therefore, j is
almost decisive on all ordered pairs (a, b) of distinct alternatives in {x, y, z}
for which b = y.76
75A more complete proof of this result may be found in the proof of Lemma 1 in Bordes,
Campbell, and Le Breton (1995).
76Note that none of the profiles used in this demonstration has person j ranking y last
in {x, y, z}.
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Step 5. Suppose that Case 2 of the preceding step holds. By Step 3,
there exists a w ∈ E◦(ω) such that {w, x, y} is a free triple for j with w
never ranked last by i in this triple. If ADi(x, y) holds, we would have a
contradiction with ADj(y, x). Hence, by Step 4, j is almost decisive on all of
the distinct ordered pairs in {w, x, y}. In particular, we have ADj(x, y). A
similar argument can be used to show that ADj(z, y). Thus, Steps 4 and 5
show that if {x, y, z} is a free triple for i, then either i or j is almost decisive
on every ordered pair of distinct alternatives in {x, y, z}.
Step 6. For the triple considered in the previous two steps, suppose that
ADi(x, y) holds. Consider a profile R
4 for which xP 4i yP
4
i z, yP
4
j x, and yP
4
j z,
with x and z ranked arbitrarily by j. We then have xP 4y by ADi(x, y) and
yP 4z by WP. Transitivity of R4 implies that xP 4z, so i is decisive for (x, z).
Similar arguments can be used to show that one of the two individuals is
decisive on all ordered pairs of distinct alternatives in {x, y, z}. In other
words, there is a dictator on this triple.
Step 7. Because there are no free triples, we cannot connect two nontriv-
ial pairs with a sequence of overlapping free triples, as in the local approach.
Nevertheless, it is possible to “connect” these pairs with a sequence of over-
lapping triples, with each triple in the sequence free for one of the two indi-
viduals. As in the local approach, overlapping triples have two alternatives
in common. As a consequence, who is the dictator on each triple must be
the same. Hence, one individual, say d, dictates on all the nontrivial pairs.
We illustrate the connection argument with the nontrivial pairs {u, v} and
{x, y} shown in Figure 12. For the w and z shown in Figure 12, the sequence
of triples {u, v, z}, {v, z, w}, {z, w, x}, and {w, x, y} exhibits the properties
we require. The first two triples in this sequence are free for person two,
while the other two are free for person one.77
Step 8. A separation argument is now used to show that d is also a
dictator on the trivial pairs. Suppose that {x, y} is a trivial pair and that
xPdy. As in our discussion of Example 19, {x, y} is separable for d, so there
77Viewed from person one’s perspective, u, v, x, and y have the same relative positions
as the alternatives used in Figure 3. In that diagram, the alternatives w and z were chosen
to lie on the axes sufficiently far from the origin so that all the triples in the sequence
are free for this individual. That argument is unaffected if w and z are modified slightly
so that the consumption of both goods is positive. However, our earlier argument made
essential use of the assumption that the set of alternatives is unbounded from above. In
Figure 12, if z were instead chosen to lie above the line through u and v, but below the
horizontal line through y (as in Figure 3), z would lie outside the Edgeworth box.
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exists a z ∈ E◦(ω) such that {x, z} and {y, z} are free for d and there exists
a profile R′ in the domain for which xP ′dzP
′
dy. Because d is a dictator on the
two free pairs, we have xP ′z and zP ′y. Hence, xP ′y by transitivity. IIA now
implies that xPy, which completes the proof.
The proof of Theorem 14 is completed by first showing that the theorem
holds for n ≥ 3 and m = 2, and then proving that the two-good impossibility
can be extended to more goods. The proof of the two-good case makes use
of Redekop’s topological version of the local approach discussed in Section
6. Unlike the two-person case we have considered in detail, when there are
at least three individuals, any free pair can be embedded in a free triple. See
Bordes, Campbell, and Le Breton (1995) for the details.
In Example 19, we have seen that when X = (Rm+\{0m})n with m ≥ 2,
the domain of classical private goods preferences Cpr is hypersaturating and,
hence, Arrow-inconsistent. Let C=pr denote the subset of Cpr in which everyone
has the same preference for own consumption in each profile. In Section 9,
we noted that Redekop (1993a) has shown that C=pr is also Arrow-inconsistent
when X = (Rm+\{0m})n. These conclusions also hold if X = Rmn++. In view of
the impossibility result established in Theorem 14 for classical private goods
preferences, one might wonder if the restriction of C=pr to the interior of the
set of feasible allocations for an exchange economy is also Arrow-inconsistent.
Example 22 demonstrates that this is not the case. This example illustrates
the importance of the assumption that the set of alternatives is Cartesian for
Redekop’s impossibility theorem.
Example 22. In this example, the set of alternatives is E◦(ω), where ω ∈
R
m
++ and m ≥ 2. Preferences are defined on Rmn+ . The domain D of the
social welfare function is the restriction of C=pr to E◦(ω). We show that this
domain is Arrow-consistent.
A social welfare function F : D → R satisfying the three Arrow axioms
can be constructed as follows. Let e denote the alternative in which each
person receives an equal share of each good. For each profile R ∈ D, (i) e is
socially preferred to all of the other alternatives in E◦(ω) and (ii) for all pairs
of alternatives that do not include e, the social ranking coincides with R1.
Because R1 is an ordering, F (R) is as well. By construction, F satisfies IIA.
Person 1 never ranks e first in E◦(ω), so F satisfies ND. Because everyone
has the same preferences, e is Pareto optimal for all R ∈ D. This observation
combined with the way social preferences are defined on pairs that do not
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include e implies that F satisfies WP.78
11. Effective social welfare functions
Determining a social preference is often just the first step of a social choice
procedure whose ultimate goal is to choose a set of alternatives. Given a
preference profile, the social welfare function first aggregates the individual
preferences into a social preference and then this social preference is used to
determine the socially-best alternatives in the feasible set of alternatives. In
this section, we consider the implications of requiring socially-best alterna-
tives to exist on some collections of subsets of the universal set of alternatives
when there are private alternatives.
For a nonempty set A ⊆ X and an ordering R ∈ R, the set of best
alternatives in A according to R is
B(A,R) = {x ∈ A | xRy for all y ∈ A}.
Let A be a collection of nonempty subsets of X. A social welfare function
F : D → R is effective on A if for all R ∈ D and all A ∈ A, B(A,F (R)) = ∅.
For the classical domain of private goods preferences used in Example 17,
Campbell (1989a) has shown that there is no social welfare function that is
both effective on all compact subsets of X and satisfies the Arrow axioms.
Theorem 15. If X = Rmn+ with m ≥ 2, there is no social welfare func-
tion with a classical private goods preference domain that is effective on the
nonempty compact subsets of X and satisfies IIA, WP, and ND.
Proof. On the contrary, suppose that there exists a social welfare function
that satisfies all the assumptions of the theorem. From our discussion of
Example 19, we know that there must be a dictator d on (Rm+\{0m})n. Given
the restrictions on individual preferences, in order for d not to be a dictator
on all of X, there must exist i ∈ N , x, y ∈ X with xd = 0m and yi = 0m,
and a profile R ∈ D such that xPdy, but yRx. Consider the alternative z
obtained by adding ε > 0 to each person’s consumption of every good in
y. Because Rd is continuous, for sufficiently small ε, we have xPdzPdy. Let
A = {x, y, z}. Because d is a dictator on {x, z}, z ∈ B(A,R). By WP,
78Note that the construction in this example can be used to show that a preference
domain is Arrow-consistent whenever there is an alternative that is in the Pareto set for
all admissible preference profiles.
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y ∈ B(A,R). Because the social welfare function is effective on compact
sets, we therefore have B(A,R) = {x}, which contradicts the assumption
that yRx.
The requirement that socially-preferred alternatives exist on all compact
subsets of X may be too demanding. For example, we might only need
to choose out of compact, comprehensive subsets of X. A set A ⊆ Rm+ is
comprehensive if for any x, y ∈ Rm+ with x ≥ y, x ∈ A implies y ∈ A. For
any x ∈ Rm+ , the comprehensive set of x is x↓ = {y ∈ Rm+ | x ≥ y}. Following
Duggan (1996), for any x, y ∈ Rm+ , x↓ ∪ y↓ is called the corner set of {x, y}.
By strengthening WP to SP in Theorem 15, we obtain an impossibility
theorem when the social welfare function is only required to be effective on
the compact, comprehensive subsets of X.
Theorem 16. If X = Rmn+ with m ≥ 2, there is no social welfare func-
tion with a classical private goods preference domain that is effective on the
nonempty compact, comprehensive subsets of X and satisfies IIA, SP, and
ND.
Proof. The proof of this theorem is similar to the proof of Theorem 15. In-
stead of letting A = {x, y, z}, we now let A = x↓ ∪ z↓. By SP, B(A,R) ⊆
{x, z}. As in the earlier proof, B(A,R) = {x}, which results in a contradic-
tion with the assumption that yRx.
Donaldson and Weymark (1988) have noted that Border’s social welfare
function in Example 18 is not effective for standard feasible sets of alloca-
tions because there is always a discontinuity in the social preference on the
boundary of the allocation space. For example, consider a two-person, two-
good exchange economy. Because the social welfare function satisfies WP,
we can restrict our search for socially-best alternatives to allocations in the
Edgeworth box for this economy. For the social welfare function in Example
18, all points in the Edgeworth box excluding the two origins are socially
preferred to person two’s origin which, in turn, is socially preferred to person
one’s origin. However, for all points other than the two origins, transferring
some of any good from person one to person two is a social improvement
(provided person one remains with some consumption). Hence, there is no
socially-best alternative.
Bone (2003) has shown that effectiveness has strong implications for an
exchange economy. As in Section 10.2, let E(ω) be the feasible allocations
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in an m-good, n-person exchange economy when there is no free disposal of
goods. Suppose that F is a social welfare function with a classical private
goods preference domain that is effective on E(ω) and that satisfies IIA and
WP. By Theorem 14, there is a dictator d on E◦(ω) (the interior of E(ω)).
Because d has no best alternative in E◦(ω), for any admissible profile, any
socially-best alternative in E(ω) must give someone nothing of at least one
good. Bone has shown that, in fact, someone consumes the whole endowment.
Requiring a social welfare function to be effective on the compact subsets
of X is less demanding than requiring social preferences to be continuous.
Variants of Theorems 15 and 16 can be established quite simply when it is
assumed that social preferences are continuous on X.79 From our discussion
of Example 20, we know that there must be a dictator on the interior of Rmn+
if the social welfare function satisfies IIA and WP. Continuity of the social
preference extends this dictatorial power to all of Rmn+ .
In view of the largely negative results surveyed in Part I, it is natural
to wonder if more satisfactory social choice procedures are possible if we
abandon the objective of constructing a social welfare function and, instead,
directly determine the socially-best alternatives in an agenda as a function
of the individual preferences. This is the subject of Part II.
Part II: Social choice correspondences
12. A choice-theoretic version of Arrow’s theorem
12.1. The Arrow choice axioms
An agenda is a nonempty subset of X. The set of admissible agendas, the
agenda domain, is A, a collection of nonempty subsets of X. Each agenda
in the agenda domain is a potential feasible set.
A social choice correspondence C : A×D → X is a mapping that assigns
a nonempty subset of the agenda to each admissible agenda and admissible
profile.80 That is, for all A ∈ A and all R ∈ D, ∅ = C(A,R) ⊆ A. The
79See, for example, Campbell (1992b; 1996) for discussions of continuity of social pref-
erence.
80The assumption that the domain of C is the Cartesian product of A and D excludes
from consideration the possibility that the feasibility of an agenda may depend on the
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set C(A,R) is called the choice set. If, for all agendas and profiles in the
domain, the choice set only contains a single alternative, then C is a social
choice function.
Choice-theoretic versions of Arrow’s Theorem employ a choice consistency
condition. A choice consistency condition for a social choice correspondence
places restrictions on how the choices from different agendas are related for
a given preference profile. The choice consistency axiom used in Arrow’s
Theorem is Arrow’s Choice Axiom.
Arrow’s Choice Axiom (ACA). For all A1, A2 ∈ A and all R ∈ D, if A1 ⊂ A2
and C(A2,R) ∩ A1 = ∅, then C(A1,R) = C(A2,R) ∩ A1.
In words, for a given profile R, if anything that is chosen in A2 is feasible
when the agenda shrinks to A1, then the choice set for the smaller agenda
consists of that part of the original choice set that is still feasible.
The definition of a social welfare function incorporates the social ratio-
nality condition that all social rankings of the alternatives are orderings. For
the agenda domain used in our version of Arrow’s Theorem for social choice
correspondences, ACA is the choice-theoretic analogue of this social ratio-
nality condition. To see why, we need to take a brief excursion into revealed
preference theory.
A social welfare function F : D → R rationalizes the social choice corre-
spondence C if for all A ∈ A and all R ∈ D, C(A,R) = B(A,F (R)). That
is, for each agenda A and each profile R in the domain of C, the choice set
consists of the best elements in A according to the social preference relation
R assigned to the profile R by the social welfare function F .
For each R ∈ D, the social choice correspondence C defines a choice
correspondence CR : A → X. Revealed preference theory has identified a
number of circumstances in which a choice correspondence can be rationalized
by an ordering. See, for example, Suzumura (1983). These results can be
trivially reformulated as social choice revealed preference theorems.81
In the version of Arrow’s Theorem that we present in the next section,
we assume that the agenda domain is the set of all finite subsets of X.82
preference profile, as in asymmetric information models with self-selection constraints.
81The revealed preference results described below were originally established for choice
correspondences.
82The inclusion of the agendas containing only one alternative is of no consequence
because the choice on one-alternative agendas is completely determined by the requirement
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Complete Finite Agenda Domain. A ∈ A if and only if A is a finite subset
of X.
For this agenda domain, Arrow (1959) has shown that a social choice
correspondence C can be rationalized by a social welfare function if and
only if C satisfies ACA. It is this revealed preference theorem that provides
the link between ACA and the social rationality condition used in his social
welfare function impossibility theorem.
Theorem 17. On a complete finite agenda domain, a social choice corre-
spondence can be rationalized by a social welfare function if and only if it
satisfies ACA.
With this agenda domain, the social welfare function F that rationalizes
a social choice correspondence C satisfying ACA is uniquely determined by
the choices made in the binary agendas. That is, for all x, y ∈ X and all
R ∈ D, xF (R)y if and only if x ∈ C({x, y},R). For a fixed profile, the binary
relation defined in this way is called the base relation.
Arrow’s revealed preference theorem is a special case of a theorem due to
Hansson (1968) that has played an important role in the development of some
of the results described in subsequent sections. In the version of Hansson’s
Theorem that we consider, the agenda domain is closed under finite unions.
An agenda domain A is closed under finite unions if for all A1, A2 ∈ A,
A1 ∪A2 ∈ A. A complete finite agenda domain is closed under finite unions.
Theorem 18. A social choice correspondence whose agenda domain is closed
under finite unions can be rationalized by a social welfare function if and only
if it satisfies ACA.83
If some of the binary agendas are not feasible, the social welfare function
that rationalizes the social choice correspondence need not be unique.84
Arrow’s Choice Axiom is closely related to the Weak Axiom of Revealed
Preference. For a given profile, this axiom requires that if it is ever the case
that the choice sets are nonempty. In all of the agenda domains we consider, it is implicitly
assumed that only nonempty sets are in the domain.
83This theorem is a special case of a more general result established by Hansson.
84Arrow (1951, p. 20) has said that even when no binary agendas are in the agenda
domain, “under certain plausible conditions” it is nevertheless possible to rationalize a
choice correspondence. However, he does not say what these conditions are.
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that x, but not y, is chosen when both x and y are feasible, then y is never
chosen when x is in the agenda.
Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP). For all x, y ∈ X and all R ∈ D,
if there exists an A1 ∈ A such that x ∈ C(A1,R) and y ∈ A1\C(A1,R), then
there does not exist an A2 ∈ A such that y ∈ C(A2,R) and x ∈ A2.
If a social choice correspondence satisfies WARP, then it necessarily sat-
isfies ACA. In general, the reverse implication does not hold. However, if the
agenda domain is closed under finite unions, WARP is equivalent to ACA.
See Suzumura (1983). Because a complete finite agenda domain is closed un-
der finite unions, it does not matter which of these two axioms is used in the
choice-theoretic version of Arrow’s Theorem. However, on most of the agenda
domains we consider in subsequent sections, these axioms are not equivalent.
When this is the case and the domain has an economic interpretation, it has
been customary to use ACA rather than WARP.
Choice consistency conditions link the choices made from different agen-
das for a fixed profile. In contrast, independence conditions link the choices
made from a fixed agenda for different profiles. Independence of Infeasible
Alternatives requires the choice set to be independent of preferences over
alternatives not in the agenda.
Independence of Infeasible Alternatives (IIF). For all A ∈ A and all R1,R2 ∈
D, if R1 and R2 coincide on A, then C(A,R1) = C(A,R2).
It might seem that the natural choice-theoretic analogue to Independence
of Irrelevant Alternatives would only place restrictions on the choices from
agendas containing only two alternatives. However, a binary version of IIF
is vacuous if no binary agendas are in the agenda domain, as is typically the
case in economic problems.
Plott (1976) has argued that almost any reasonable social decision pro-
cedure satisfies IIF. In essence, his argument is that a necessary condition
for a social choice rule to be implementable (using any of the standard coop-
erative or noncooperative solution concepts) is that the alternatives chosen
must only depend on individual preferences for feasible alternatives. In this
view, the independence assumption is not a normative principle of social
choice, but is, rather, a constraint on what is achievable.85 However, not ev-
eryone believes that implementability is a necessary requirement for a social
85See Campbell (1992a; 1992c) for further discussion of the relationship between IIF and
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choice correspondence to be satisfactory. Implementability is a demanding
requirement that is not satisfied by, for example, the standard Walrasian
competitive equilibrium correspondence on standard economic domains.
We consider weak and strong versions of the Pareto principle. For all
A ∈ A and all R ∈ D, the weak Pareto set (the set of weakly Pareto optimal
alternatives) is
Pw(A,R) = {x ∈ A | ∃y ∈ A such that yPix for all i ∈ N}
and the strong Pareto set (the set of strongly Pareto optimal alternatives) is
Ps(A,R) = {x ∈ A | ∃y ∈ A such that yRix for all i ∈ N and
yPjx for some j ∈ N}.
The Weak Pareto (resp. Strong Pareto) axiom requires the choice set to be
a subset of the weak (resp. strong) Pareto set.86
Weak Pareto (WP). For all A ∈ A and all R ∈ D, C(A,R) ⊆ Pw(A,R).
Strong Pareto (SP). For all A ∈ A and all R ∈ D, C(A,R) ⊆ Ps(A,R).
Pareto conditions place no cross-profile or cross-agenda restrictions on a so-
cial choice correspondence.
A social choice correspondence is dictatorial if the choice set is always a
subset of some single individual’s best alternatives in the agenda. Formally,
an individual d ∈ N is a dictator for the social choice correspondence C if
C(A,R) ⊆ B(A,Rd) for all A ∈ A and all R ∈ D. If C(A,R) = B(A,Rd)
for all A ∈ A, then d is a strong dictator for C. Nondictatorship is the
requirement that there be no dictator.
implementability. As in Plott (1976), Campbell argues that IIF is a necessary condition
for the implementabilty of a social choice correspondence. Campbell assumes that the
social choice correspondence C is generated from a social welfare function F by setting
C(A,R) equal to the set of alternatives that are maximal in A for F (R). He has shown
that if the preference domain satisfies a regularity condition and if social preferences are
continuous, then C satisfies IIF if and only if F satisfies IIA when the agenda domain
consists of all m-element subsets of X, where m > 1.
86Some of our axioms (and acronyms) for social choice correspondences have the same
names as the corresponding axioms for social welfare functions. It is always clear from the
context whether a social choice correspondence or a social welfare function axiom is being
used.
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Nondictatorship (ND). There is no dictator.
The Arrow axioms for a social choice correspondence are ACA, IIF, WP,
and ND.
If it is possible to find a social choice correspondence that satisfies all of
the Arrow axioms on the domain A×D, it is natural to enquire if there are
other desirable properties that can be satisfied on this domain. ND precludes
any individual from having complete power to determine the choice set in
all circumstances, but it does not rule out having one individual’s preferred
choices being made in almost all choice situations, nor does it preclude the
decision-making power being concentrated in the hands of as few as two
individuals. It is therefore of interest to see if it is possible to spread the
decision-making power more widely among the population. One way that
has been proposed to do this is to require the social choice correspondence to
satisfy Anonymity, the requirement that the choice set from a given agenda
be invariant to permutations of the individual preferences.
Anonymity (ANON). For all A ∈ A and all R1,R2 ∈ D, if R1 is a permuta-
tion of R2, then C(A,R1) = C(A,R2).
This formulation of an anonymity condition is only appropriate if all of the
individual preference domains are the same. If there are private alternatives
and everyone is selfish, ANON is vacuous because if we, say, permute i’s
and j’s preferences, i would then only care about j’s consumption and vice
versa, which takes us outside the preference domain. For Cartesian sets
of alternatives and selfish individual preference domains, it is the induced
private preferences Qi on the individual consumptions sets Xi that should
be permuted, not the preferences on X.
Private Alternatives Anonymity (PANON). For all A ∈ A and all R1,R2 ∈
D, if Q1 = (Q11, . . . , Q1n) is a permutation of Q2 = (Q21, . . . , Q2n), then
C(A,R1) = C(A,R2).
In the case of public alternatives, provided that the preference domain is
not too degenerate, ANON is a strengthening of ND. Similarly, for private
alternatives, provided that the induced private preference domain is not too
degenerate, PANON is also more demanding than ND.
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12.2. Arrow’s theorem
The version of Arrow’s Theorem that we consider in this section supposes
that the preference domain is unrestricted and that the agenda domain is
the set of all nonempty finite subsets of X. With these domain assumptions,
the choice-theoretic version of Arrow’s Theorem shows that there is no social
choice correspondence that satisfies ACA, IIF, WP, and ND if there are at
least three alternatives. We provide a proof of this theorem because the proof
strategy has proved useful on restricted domains as well.
Theorem 19. If |X| ≥ 3, there is no social choice correspondence with a
complete finite agenda domain and an unrestricted preference domain that
satisfies ACA, IIF, WP, and ND.
Proof. On the contrary, suppose that there exists a social correspondence
C : A×D → X that satisfies all the assumptions of the theorem. By Theorem
17, C can be rationalized by a social welfare function F : D → R. Further,
for each profile R in the preference domain, the rationalizing social ordering
F (R) is uniquely given by the base relation.
Consider any x, y ∈ X and any R1,R2 ∈ D that coincide on {x, y}.
By IIF, C({x, y},R1) = C({x, y},R2) and, hence, because F is constructed
from the base relations, xF (R1)y if and only if xF (R2)y. Thus, F satisfies
IIA.
Next, consider any x, y ∈ X and any R ∈ D for which xPiy for all i ∈ N .
Because C satisfies WP, C({x, y},R) = {x}. Because F (R) rationalizes C,
x is socially preferred to y according to F (R); i.e., F satisfies WP.
By the social welfare function version of Arrow’s Theorem, F is dictato-
rial. Let d ∈ N be this dictator. Because C is nondictatorial, there exists
an agenda A ∈ A, alternatives x, y ∈ A, and a profile R ∈ D such that xPdy
and y ∈ C(A,R). ACA then implies that y ∈ C({x, y},R). Thus, yF (R)x,
contradicting the assumption that d is a dictator for F .
13. Unrestricted preference domains
Before considering simultaneous restrictions on the preference and agenda
domains, it is useful to consider a number of social choice problems in which
the preference domain is unrestricted. Unrestricted preference domains do
not arise naturally in economic problems, but are often natural in voting
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problems. In Section 13.1, we discuss a finite-alternative generalization of the
choice-theoretic version of Arrow’s Theorem due to Grether and Plott (1982).
In Section 13.2, we present a theorem due to Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton
(2001) on the impossibility of constructing a Paretian voting procedure that
is immune to strategic entry decisions on the part of the candidates. As
recently shown by Ehlers and Weymark (2003), the Grether–Plott Theorem
can be used to help prove Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton’s candidate stability
theorem. In Section 13.3, we discuss the work of Gibbard, Hylland, and
Weymark (1987) on agenda domains in which one or more alternatives are
in every agenda. Such agenda domains capture some of the institutional
features of committee and legislative decision-making.
Some of the agenda domains that we consider in this section have the
property that some, or all, of the binary agendas are not admissible. This
is the usual framework employed in the theory of nonbinary social choice
theory. The literature on nonbinary social choice when the preference domain
is unrestricted is quite extensive, but, as noted above, it has limited relevance
for economic problems. See Deb (2004) for a survey of this literature.
13.1. The Grether–Plott Theorem
The proof of Arrow’s Theorem presented in Section 12.2 makes essential
use of the assumption that all binary agendas are in the domain. Grether
and Plott (1982) noted that economic and political problems typically have
agenda domains in which this assumption is violated. To overcome this prob-
lem, they relaxed the complete finite agenda domain assumption. Assuming
that the universal set of alternatives X is finite, their agenda domain is the
set of all agendas containing at least k alternatives, where k < |X|.
k-Set Feasibility (KSF). There exists a finite positive integer k < |X| such
that A ∈ A if and only if |A| ≥ k.
The value of k must be strictly less than the number of alternatives in order
for ACA to play any role. This domain is appropriate if only the “large”
agendas are feasible, with the parameter k being used to identify when an
agenda is “large”.
For a finite universal set of alternatives, the Grether–Plott Theorem shows
that the Arrow axioms are inconsistent when the preference domain is unre-
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stricted and KSF is satisfied.87
Theorem 20. If 3 ≤ |X| <∞, there is no social choice correspondence with
an unrestricted preference domain that satisfies KSF, ACA, IIF, WP, and
ND.
When KSF is satisfied, the agenda domain is closed under finite unions.
Hence, by Hansson’s Theorem (Theorem 18), ACA implies that the social
choice correspondence can be rationalized by a social welfare function. How-
ever, if k > 2, this rationalization is typically not unique. For example, sup-
pose that X = {w, x, y, z}, k = 3, and C(X,R) = {w, x}. For this profile,
the choice set for any of the three-alternative agendas is completely deter-
mined by ACA. However, the ranking of y and z is arbitrary in any ordering
that rationalizes these choices. Because of the possible non-uniqueness of
the rationalizing social welfare function, the strategy used to prove Arrow’s
Theorem in Section 12.2 cannot be used to prove Theorem 20.
Grether and Plott’s proof establishes that if a social choice correspondence
satisfies all of the assumptions of Theorem 20 with k ≥ 3, then it is is possible
to construct another social choice correspondence with the same preference
domain that satisfies (k− 1)-Set Feasibility and all of the Arrow axioms. An
induction argument then shows that the Arrow axioms are consistent when
all nonempty finite feasible sets are feasible, which is impossible. Note that
if k is 1 or 2, Theorem 20 is simply a finite version of Arrow’s Theorem.
It is instructive to consider how Grether and Plott constructed the social
choice correspondence used in their proof. For h = k − 1, k, let Ah = {A ∈
A | |A| ≥ h}. Suppose that 3 ≤ k < |X| and that Ck : Ak×Rn → X satisfies
the Arrow axioms. For all A ∈ Ak−1, z ∈ X\A, and R ∈ Rn, let R¯(A, z,R)
denote the unique profile in Rn for which, for all i ∈ N ,
(i) ∀x, y ∈ A, xRiy ↔ xR¯i(A, z,R)y,
(ii) ∀x ∈ A, xR¯i(A, z,R)z and ¬[zR¯i(A, z,R)x],
(iii) ∀x ∈ A ∪ {z}, zR¯i(A, z,R)x and ¬[xR¯i(A, z,R)z],
(iv) ∀x, y ∈ A ∪ {z}, xRiy ↔ xR¯i(A, z,R)y.
In other words, for each individual i, the alternatives in A have been moved
to the top and the alternatives not in A∪{z} have been moved to the bottom
of i’s preference ordering, preserving the original rankings in each of these
87The assumption that there are only a finite number of alternatives limits the relevance
of the Grether–Plott Theorem for economic problems with divisible goods.
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groups. The alternatives in A are all preferred to z, which in turn is preferred
to all of the remaining alternatives.
The social choice correspondence Ck−1 : Ak−1 × Rn → X is defined by
setting
Ck−1(A,R) = Ck(A,R), ∀A ∈ Ak, ∀R ∈ Rn,
and
Ck−1(A,R) =
⋃
z ∈A
Ck(A ∪ {z}, R¯(A, z,R)), ∀A ∈ Ak−1\Ak, ∀R ∈ Rn.
Because Ck satisfies WP, ∅ = Ck(A∪{z}, z, R¯(A, z,R)) ⊆ A, and thus Ck−1
is a well-defined social choice correspondence.
Because Ck and Ck−1 agree on agendas in Ak and Ck satisfies ND, so does
Ck−1. When R1 and R2 coincide on A ∈ Ak−1, R¯(A, z,R1) and R¯(A, z,R2)
coincide on A as well. It thus follows from the assumption that Ck satisfies
IIF that Ck−1 does too. Because Ck satisfies WP, so does Ck−1. The proof
that Ck−1 satisfies ACA is quite lengthy. See Grether and Plott (1982) for
the details.
In Grether and Plott’s proof, it is necessary to move a set of alternatives to
the top of each person’s preferences, while preserving their relative rankings.
The assumption that the preference domain is unrestricted ensures that this
is possible. However, in economic problems with divisible goods, preferences
are typically assumed to be continuous. With continuous preferences, this
kind of construction is not possible, which suggests that the proof strategy
used by Grether and Plott is not likely to be applicable to problems with
divisible goods and continuous preferences.
13.2. Strategic candidacy
By interpreting X as a finite set of potential candidates in an election and
N as the set of voters, a social choice correspondence can be used to model
elections in which the number of candidates is endogenous. Dutta, Jackson,
and Le Breton (2001) have used this framework to investigate voting proce-
dures in which the outcome of an election is unaffected by the decision not
to stand for office of a candidate who would not win if he or she entered the
election. We consider the case in which no candidate is also a voter.
An agenda is now interpreted as the set of candidates who contest the
election. Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton assumed that there are at least
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three potential candidates and that any subset of potential candidates could
be on the ballot. Thus, the social choice correspondence has a complete
finite agenda domain. Voters submit their rankings of the candidates, with
no ties permitted. The preference domain is the unrestricted linear preference
domain introduced in Section 2.88 Only one candidate can be elected, so the
social choice correspondence is in fact a social choice function.
Single-Valuedness (SV). For all A ∈ A and all R ∈ D, C(A,R) is a singleton.
The voting procedure described by the social choice correspondence is
assumed to be invulnerable to the withdrawal of a candidate who would lose
if all potential candidates stood for office.
Candidate Stability (CS). For all x ∈ X and all R ∈ D, if x ∈ C(X,R), then
C(X,R) = C(X\{x},R).
CS is a relatively weak way of requiring a voting procedure to be immune to
the strategic entry decisions of the candidates because it only applies when
all of the other potential candidates enter the election.89
Unanimity requires a candidate to be elected who is ranked first on the
ballot by all of the voters.
Unanimity (UNAN). For all A ∈ A, x ∈ A, and R ∈ D, if for all i ∈ N , xPiy
for all y ∈ A\{x}, then C(A,R) = {x}.
Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton used a strengthened form of the Arrovian
nondictatorship condition. An individual is a dictator for large elections if
88The voting rules used by Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton (2001) choose a candidate
from an agenda as a function of the preferences of both voters and candidates. A candidate
is assumed to rank him- or herself first, but otherwise can have any linear order. Dutta,
Jackson, and Le Breton assumed that the election outcome only depends on the voters’
preferences, which permits us to simplify the statement of the problem as we have done
here when candidates cannot vote.
89The candidate stability axiom used here is what Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton have
called Strong Candidate Stability. They also considered a second candidate stability axiom
that requires each candidate to prefer the outcome when all candidates are on the ballot
to the outcome that would obtain if he or she withdrew from the election. As Dutta,
Jackson, and Le Breton have shown, when the sets of voters and candidates are disjoint,
these two candidate stability axioms are equivalent, given their other assumptions. When
candidates and voters have individuals in common, this equivalence no longer holds.
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this individual’s most-preferred candidate is elected when at least |X| − 1
candidates run for office. Formally, an individual d ∈ N is a dictator for
large elections for the social choice correspondence C if for all A ∈ A with
|A| ≥ |X| − 1 and all R ∈ D, C(A,R) = {x} whenever x ∈ A and xPdy for
all y ∈ A\{x}.
Strong Nondictatorship (SND). There is no dictator for large elections.
Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton (2001) have shown that no voting proce-
dure can satisfy IIF in addition to the assumptions described above.
Theorem 21. If 3 ≤ |X| < ∞, there is no social choice correspondence
with a complete finite agenda domain and an unrestricted linear preference
domain that satisfies SV, IIF, UNAN, CS, and SND.90
Both Arrow’s Theorem and the Grether–Plott Theorem are valid for the
preference domain Ln. However, because UNAN is, by itself, a much weaker
condition than WP, the Dutta–Jackson–Le Breton Theorem does not follow
directly from either of these results. For this reason, they do not exploit
either of these theorems in proving Theorem 21.
Ehlers and Weymark (2003) have shown that the Grether–Plott Theorem
can be used to help prove Theorem 21. Their proof strategy begins by assum-
ing that the social choice correspondence C satisfies all of the assumptions of
Theorem 21 except SND. By then restricting attention to the agendas with
at least |X| − 1 candidates, the resulting social choice correspondence on
the subdomain inherits all of the assumed properties of C. On this domain,
CS is equivalent to ACA for single-valued social choice correspondences. In
addition, the new agenda domain satisfies k-Set Feasibility for k = |X| − 1.
On the subdomain, the social choice correspondence also satisfies WP, and,
hence, by the Grether–Plott Theorem, it must be dictatorial, which, in terms
of the original domain, is equivalent to the existence of a dictator for large
elections. The proof that C satisfies WP on the subdomain is somewhat
lengthy. See Ehlers and Weymark (2003) for the details.
90When candidates are permitted to vote, Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton (2001) have
shown that if CS is combined with some other reasonable properties of voting procedures,
then the distribution of power among voters must be quite unequal.
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13.3. Fixed feasible alternatives
In Gibbard, Hylland, and Weymark (1987), there is a finite set of alternatives
and it is assumed that there is some alternative or set of alternatives that
is in every feasible agenda. Examples with a single fixed feasible alternative
include (i) allocation problems with fixed endowments in which preserving
the initial distribution is always an option and (ii) bargaining problems in
which there is a prespecified alternative (the threat point) that is chosen if
no agreement is reached on the choice of another alternative. In committee
or legislative decision-making, the rules of order may specify that the motion
and the status quo are always under consideration, with various possible
amendments generating three-alternative agendas. In this example, there
are two fixed alternatives in every admissible agenda.
For a nonempty subset A¯ of X, the agenda domain is A¯-restricted if A¯ is
in every feasible agenda.
A¯-Restricted Agenda Domain. A ∈ A implies A¯ ⊆ A.
This domain restriction does not require that every superset of A¯ is a feasible
agenda. An agenda domain with this property is called complete.
Complete A¯-Restricted Agenda Domain. A ∈ A if and only if A¯ ⊆ A.
Gibbard, Hylland, and Weymark (1987) have shown that for any x¯ ∈ X,
Arrow’s axioms, with WP strengthened to SP, are consistent when the agenda
domain is x¯-restricted and the preference domain is unrestricted.91
Theorem 22. If 2 ≤ |X| < ∞, for any x¯ ∈ X, there exist social choice
correspondences with an {x¯}-restricted agenda domain and an unrestricted
preference domain that satisfy ACA, IIF, SP, and ND.
The proof of this theorem is constructive. The social choice correspon-
dence Gibbard, Hylland, and Weymark used to establish Theorem 22 is pre-
sented in Example 23.
Example 23. Fix x¯ ∈ X and suppose that A is {x¯}-restricted. For all
x ∈ X and R ∈ Rn, let N+(x,R) = |{i ∈ N | xPix¯}|, N−(x,R) = |{i ∈ N |
91The Arrow axioms are also consistent for any A¯-restricted agenda domain when the
preference domain is unrestricted.
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x¯Pix}|, and N(x,R) = N+(x,R)−N−(x,R). If every individual assigns one
point to each alternative preferred to x¯, zero points to each alternative indif-
ferent to x¯, and negative one point to every other alternative, then N(x,R)
is the total number of points assigned to x in the profile R.
For all A ∈ A and R ∈ Rn, let
CR(A,R) = {x ∈ A | ∀y ∈ A,N(x,R) ≥ N(y,R)},
C0(A,R) = {x ∈ CR(A,R) | ∀y ∈ CR(A,R), N−(x,R) ≤ N−(y,R)},
and, for all i ∈ N ,
Ci(A,R) = {x ∈ Ci−1(A,R) | ∀y ∈ Ci−1(A,R), xRiy}.
The social choice correspondence Cn satisfies all of the assumptions of The-
orem 22.
Cn satisfies ACA because it is rationalized by a lexicographic social wel-
fare function. For a given profile, the alternatives are first ranked by the
number of points received. Alternatives that are tied at this stage are then
ranked in reverse order of the number of negative votes received. Finally, a
serial dictatorial ordering is used as a secondary tie-breaking rule.
Richelson (1984) considered the social choice correspondence CR. The use
of CR and the first tie-breaking rule ensure that Cn is nondictatorial.92 CR
violates WP because if everyone prefers x to y to x¯ and the agenda contains
{x, y, x¯}, then x and y receive the same number of points, even though they
are Pareto ranked. The use of a serial dictatorship as a tie-breaking rule
ensures that Cn satisfies SP. Because Cn(A,R) is determined using only
information about the individual preferences on A, Cn satisfies IIF.
Gibbard, Hylland, and Weymark have provided other examples of so-
cial choice correspondences that satisfy the Arrow axioms when the agenda
domain is A¯-restricted. Example 24 requires A¯ to include two alternatives.
Example 24. Fix x¯, y¯ ∈ X and suppose that A is {x¯, y¯}-restricted. There
are 3n possible preference profiles restricted to {x¯, y¯}, which we number ar-
bitrarily from 1 to 3n. Let Dj denote the set of all profiles in Rn that
92If the first tie-breaking rule is not included, person one is a dictator when n = 2 or
|A| ≤ 2 for all A ∈ A.
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coincide with the jth of these restricted preference profiles on {x¯, y¯}. Let
d : {1, . . . , 3n} → N be a surjective function. The social choice correspon-
dence C : A × Rn → X is defined by setting C(A,R) = B(A,Rd(j)) for all
A ∈ A, all j ∈ {1, . . . , 3n}, and all R ∈ Dj. In other words, restricted to
profiles in Dj, individual d(j) is a strong dictator.
Because, for each profile, the choice sets are determined by maximizing
some individual’s preference ordering, both ACA and WP satisfied.93 Be-
cause the agenda domain is {x¯, y¯}-restricted, if two profiles coincide on a
feasible agenda, they coincide on {x¯, y¯}. As a consequence, the same dicta-
tor is used for both profiles, so IIF is satisfied. Each individual is a dictator
for some subset of the profiles, so C is nondictatorial.
Restricted to preference profiles in Ln, the lexicographic social welfare
function used to construct the social choice correspondence in Example 23
is an example of what Campbell and Kelly (2000) have called a three-layer
gateau rule. With a three-layer gateau rule, for each profile R in the domain
D, the alternatives are partitioned into three groups, T (R), M(R), and
B(R), with all the alternatives in T (R) socially ranked above the alternatives
in M(R), which, in turn, are all socially ranked above the alternatives in
B(R) (the three layers of a cake). More precisely, a social welfare function
F : D → R is a three-layer gateau rule if there exists an x¯ ∈ X and two
families N1 and N2 of subsets of N such that,
(i) I ∩ J = ∅ if I ∈ N1 and J ∈ N2,
(ii) I ⊆ N and I ∈ N1 → N\I ∈ N2,
(iii) ∀R ∈ D, T (R) = {x ∈ X | ∃I ∈ N1 such that ∀i ∈ I, xPix¯},
(iv) ∀R ∈ D, B(R) = {x ∈ X | ∃J ∈ N2 such that ∀i ∈ J, x¯Pix},
(v) ∀R ∈ D, M(R) = X\[T (R) ∪B(R)],
where T (R), M(R), and B(R) are socially ranked as described above.
The distinguished alternative x¯ is in M(R). It is easy to show that if
R ∈ Ln, then x¯ is the only alternative in M(R). Any group of individuals
I ∈ N1 forces x to be in the top layer if everyone in this group prefers x
to x¯ and any group of individuals J ∈ N2 forces x to be in the bottom
layer if everyone in this group prefers x¯ to x. Condition (i) ensures that no
alternative is put in more than one layer. Restricted to preference profiles in
Ln, the social welfare function used to construct Example 23 is a three-layer
gateau rule with the following specification of the families N1 and N2: (i)
93If a serial dictatorship is used for each Dj to determine the choice sets, SP is satisfied.
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for odd n, N1 = N2 = {I ⊆ N | |I| > n/2} and (ii) for even n, N1 = {I ⊆
N | |I| > n/2} and N2 = {I ⊆ N | |I| ≥ n/2}.
Three-layer gateau rules are social welfare functions that satisfy a weaker
form of IIA in which the social ranking of a pair of alternatives only depends
on the individual rankings of this pair and some prespecified alternative x¯.
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Relative to x¯ (IIAx¯). For all x, y ∈ X
and all R1,R2 ∈ D, if R1 and R2 coincide on {x, y, x¯}, then R1 and R2
coincide on {x, y}.
Campbell and Kelly (2000) have shown that if there are at least four
alternatives and the preference domain is Ln, then any social welfare function
that satisfies this independence condition and is weakly Paretian must be a
three-layer gateau rule.94
Theorem 23. If |X| ≥ 4, for any x¯ ∈ X, if a social welfare function with
an unrestricted linear preference domain satisfies IIAx¯ and WP, then it is a
three-layer gateau rule.
Consider a social choice correspondence C with a complete x¯-restricted
agenda domain and the preference domain Ln. This agenda domain is closed
under finite unions, so, by Hansson’s Theorem, C can be rationalized by a
social welfare function F whose domain is Ln. Using this observation, it
might seem that the Campbell–Kelly Theorem can be used to characterize
the social choice correspondences that satisfy IIF and WP on such domains.
However, this is not the case. As we have already noted, when not all the
binary agendas are feasible, ACA does not guarantee that there is a unique
social welfare function rationalizing the social choice correspondence. This
is the case here. For example, consider a profile in which everyone prefers x¯
to both x and y. WP implies that x¯ is chosen out of {x, y, x¯}, so the social
ranking of x and y is arbitrary. As a consequence, it does not follow from
the assumption that C satisfies IIF that F satisfies IIAx¯. The nonuniqueness
of the rationalizing social welfare function makes it a challenging problem to
characterize all of the social choice correspondences that satisfy the Arrow
axioms on a complete x¯-restricted agenda domain.
Examples 23 and 24 both exhibit dictatorial features. In Example 23, a
serial dictatorship is used as a tie-breaking rule, while in Example 24, the
94Yanovskaya (1994) has investigated the implications of IIAx¯ in a framework in which
social preferences are merely required to be reflexive and transitive.
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preference domain has been partitioned into subsets on which someone is a
dictator. For any complete A¯-restricted agenda domain, Gibbard, Hylland,
and Weymark (1987) have shown that if the preference domain is unrestricted
and there are at least three alternatives in X not in A¯, then it is not possible
to satisfy the Arrow axioms with ND strengthened to ANON. Thus, it is
inevitable that any social choice correspondence satisfying the assumptions
of Theorem 22 cannot avoid all vestiges of dictatorship on such domains.
Theorem 24. For any nonempty A¯ ⊆ X, if |A¯|+ 3 ≤ |X| <∞, there is no
social choice correspondence with a complete A¯-restricted agenda domain and
an unrestricted preference domain that satisfies ACA, IIF, WP, and ANON.
Proof. Let C : A × Rn → X satisfy all of the assumptions of the theorem
except ANON. Let DA¯ be a subdomain of profiles in which (i) everyone ranks
every alternative not in A¯ above the alternatives in A¯ and (ii) the individual
rankings of the alternatives in A¯ agree with some fixed set of individual
orderings (e.g., have everyone regard these alternatives as being indifferent).
Let Y = X\A¯ and R|Y , DA¯|Y , A|Y , and A|Y denote the restrictions of R,
DA¯, A, and A, respectively, to Y . Define the social choice correspondence
C∗ : A|Y × DA¯|Y → Y by setting C∗(AY ,R|Y ) = C(A,R) for all A ∈ A
and all R ∈ DA¯. Because C satisfies WP, the alternatives in A¯ are never
chosen from any agenda when the profile is in DA¯. Hence, C∗ is well-defined.
Because A is a complete A¯-restricted agenda domain, A|Y is a complete finite
agenda domain for Y . Further, C∗ has an unrestricted preference domain. It
is straightforward to confirm that C∗ satisfies ACA, IIF, and WP. Because
|Y | ≥ 3, it follows from Arrow’s Theorem that C∗ is dictatorial, which implies
that C does not satisfy ANON.
The conclusions to be drawn from the results discussed in this section are
essentially negative—either the axioms are inconsistent or any social choice
correspondence satisfying the axioms necessarily exhibits some dictatorial
features. This suggests that restricting the agenda domain while keeping
the preference domain unrestricted is not a very promising way of avoiding
Arrovian impossibilities.
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14. Single-peaked preferences and interval agenda do-
mains
We now turn to restricted preference domains. In this section, we suppose
that the set of alternatives X is a compact interval [x, x¯] of R with x < x¯.
The agenda domain consists of all the nonempty closed intervals of X, which
we denote by AI . For a preference domain, we consider the unrestricted
single-peaked preference domain SnP introduced in Section 3. With these
domain assumptions, the Arrow axioms with ND strengthened to ANON
are consistent. We describe one class of social choice functions that satisfy
all of these axioms, the class of generalized median social choice functions
introduced in Moulin (1980), and we present an axiomatization of this class
due to Moulin (1984).
We refer to the agenda domain considered in this section as a complete
closed interval agenda domain.
Complete Closed Interval Agenda Domain. A = AI .
Note that AI is the set of all nonempty, compact, convex subsets of X.
For all R ∈ SP , let π(R) denote the peak of R. Consider any A = [a, b] ∈
AI and any R ∈ SP . The restriction of R to A is single-peaked with peak at
PrAπ(R), the projection of π(R) on A. Thus, B(A,R) = π(R) if π(R) ∈ A,
B(A,R) = a if π(R) < a, and B(A,R) = b if π(R) > b.
Following Moulin (1984), we assume that choice is single-valued. One
interpretation of our problem is that we are to locate a public facility on a
street. Each individual has a preferred location, with preference declining
monotonically from this ideal location. Not all locations may be feasible,
but the ones that are form a closed interval.
Moulin (1984) required the alternative chosen to vary continuously with
the endpoints of the feasible set for a given preference profile. This continuity
axiom presupposes that the social choice correspondence C is single-valued.
Interval Continuity (IC). For all R ∈ D, the function C(·,R) is continuous
at [a, b] with respect to a and b for all x ≤ a < b ≤ x¯.
The agenda domain AI is not closed under finite unions, so we cannot ap-
peal to Hansson’s Theorem (Theorem 18) to conclude that ACA is equivalent
to the existence of a social welfare function that rationalizes the social choice
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correspondence C : AI × SnP → X. Nevertheless, Moulin (1984) has shown
that this equivalence holds if C is single-valued and satisfies IC. Further, for
each profile, the social preference that rationalizes the choice in each agenda
can be chosen to be single-peaked.
Lemma 5. If the social choice correspondence C : AI×SnP → X satisfies SV
and IC, then C can be rationalized by a social welfare function F : SnP → SP
if and only if C satisfies ACA.
Proof. Suppose that C satisfies ACA. Consider any R ∈ SnP . Let β =
C(X,R) and let Rβ ∈ SP have peak β. Now consider any [a, b] ∈ AI .
We want to show that B([a, b], Rβ) = C([a, b],R). If β ∈ A, this follows
immediately from ACA. If β ∈ [a, b], we may without loss of generality
assume that β < a, which implies that B([a, b], Rβ) = a. Suppose that
C([a, b],R) = c > a. By ACA, C([x, b],R) = β. Because C([x, b],R) = β
and C([a, b],R) = c, by IC, there must exist an a′ ∈ (x, a) such that
C([a′, b],R) = a. ACA then implies that C([a, b],R) = a, a contradiction.
Hence, B([a, b], Rβ) = C([a, b],R) in this case as well.
The reverse implication is straightforward to verify.95
Moulin (1980) introduced the following class of generalized median social
choice functions for the agenda domain in which X is the only feasible set.
He extended his definition to the domain AI in Moulin (1984).
Generalized Median Social Choice Function. A social choice function C : AI×
SnP → X is a generalized median social welfare function if there exists a profile
RP = (RPn+1, . . . , R
P
2n−1) ∈ Sn−1P such that for all A ∈ AI and all R ∈ SnP ,
C(A,R) = PrA median{π(R1), . . . , π(Rn), π(RPn+1), . . . , π(RP2n−1)}.96
As in the construction of a generalized median social welfare function in
Example 1, fixed single-peaked preferences for n−1 phantom individuals are
specified. For each profile R ∈ SnP , the median of the peaks of the 2n−1 real
and phantom individuals is determined. For any agenda A ∈ AI , the choice
95Our proof of this lemma is based on the proof of Lemma 2.1 in Ehlers (2001). Note
that the assumption that individual preferences are single-peaked is not used in the proof.
96For each j ∈ {n + 1, . . . , 2n − 1}, it is only necessary to specify the peak, and not
the complete preference ordering. Generalized median social choice functions are called
generalized Condorcet-winner social choice functions in Moulin (1984).
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set C(A,R) is the projection of this median peak to A. Equivalently, C(A,R)
is the best alternative in A for the the individual (either real or phantom)
with the median peak. It is straightforward to verify that C(A,R) can also
be determined by first projecting all 2n−1 peaks onto A and then computing
the median of these projected peaks.
Recall from Section 3 that the binary relation ≤ (resp. ≥) on X declares
x to be weakly preferred to y if and only if x ≤ y (resp. x ≥ y). If n is
odd, half of the phantoms have the preference ≤, and the other half have
the preference ≥, then the phantom individuals are irrelevant and C(A,R)
is obtained by maximizing the preference of the (real) individual with the
median peak. If there are n− k phantoms with preference ≤ and k− 1 with
preference ≥, C(A,R) maximizes the preference of the individual with the
kth smallest peak.
Suppose the C is a generalized median social choice function. Because the
number of phantom individuals is less than the number of real individuals,
the median peak in (R,RP ) must lie in the interval defined by the smallest
and largest peaks in R. As a consequence, C satisfies SP.97 For a fixed
profile, the choices from different agendas are determined by maximizing the
same preference, so C satisfies ACA. If the profiles R1 and R2 coincide on
the agenda A, then the projections of the individual peaks coincide as well.
Hence, C satisfies IIF. It is clear that a generalized median social choice
function also satisfies ANON and IC. Moulin (1984) has shown that these five
axioms characterize the class of generalized median social choice functions.
To facilitate the comparison of this result with the other theorems in Part II,
we state Moulin’s theorem as a theorem about social choice correspondences.
Theorem 25. For any X = [x, x¯] ⊂ R with x < x¯, if a social choice corre-
spondence has a complete closed interval agenda domain and an unrestricted
single-peaked preference domain, then it satisfies SV, ACA, IIF, SP, ANON,
and IC if and only if it is a generalized median social choice function.
By Lemma 5, SV, ACA, and IC imply that a social choice correspondence
C : AI × SnP → X can be rationalized by a social welfare function F : SnP →
SP . For k = 1, . . . , n − 1, let Rk be the profile in which Rki = ≤ for i =
1, . . . , k and Rki = ≥ for i = k + 1, . . . , n and let βk = π(F (Rk)). The
sufficiency part of the proof of Theorem 25 involves showing that C is the
generalized median social choice function defined by the profile of phantom
97WP and SP are equivalent for the domain AI × SnP .
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preferences R¯P = (F (R1), . . . , F (Rn−1)). To do this, it is sufficient to show
that for all R ∈ SnP , π(F (R)) = median{π(R1), . . . , π(Rn), β1, . . . , βn−1}.
See Moulin (1984) for the details of the proof.
Moulin (1984) has also considered the domains of single-plateaued and
quasiconcave preferences. A preference R on X = [x, x¯] is single-plateaued if
there exist β1, β2 ∈ X (not necessarily distinct) such that (i) xPy whenever
β1 ≥ x > y or β2 ≤ x < y and (ii) xIy whenever x, y ∈ [β1, β2]. A preference
R on X = [x, x¯] is quasiconcave if there exists a β ∈ X such that (i) xRy
whenever β ≥ x > y or β ≤ x < y.98 A single-peaked preference is single-
plateaued and a single-plateaued preference is quasiconcave. Moulin has
shown that a version of Theorem 25 holds for single-plateaued preferences
and that his axioms are incompatible when the preference domain includes
all profiles of quasiconcave preferences.
For the domain of Theorem 25, Ehlers (2001) has considered the problem
of choosing exactly m alternatives from each agenda, where m < n (so that it
is not possible to always pick everyone’s preferred alternative). Thus, a social
alternative consists of m (not necessarily distinct) points in X. Preferences
need to be extended from X to the set of subsets of X of cardinality at
most m. Ehlers assumes that each individual orders subsets by comparing
his or her most-preferrred alternatives in these sets. For m = 2, he has
shown that the only social choice correspondence satisfying ACA, IIF, SP,
and IC is the extreme peaks social choice correspondence. For each profile,
this solution identifies the individuals with the smallest and largest peaks
and then maximizes their preferences on each agenda. For m > 2, Ehlers has
shown that SP and IC are incompatible.
15. Analytic preference domains
We have seen in Examples 11 and 12 that Arrow’s social welfare function
axioms are inconsistent for the domain of monotone analytic preferences with
no critical points when there are two or more public goods and for the domain
of Euclidean spatial preferences. Le Breton and Weymark (2002) have shown
that if either of these domains of analytic preferences is combined with an
agenda domain consisting of compact sets with nonempty interiors, then IIF
is vacuous on the combined agenda and preference domain, and this permits
98A preference that is strictly quasiconcave according to the definition in Section 3 need
not be quasiconcave.
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the construction of social choice correspondences that satisfy the Arrovian
axioms. We review their results in this section.
15.1. Euclidean spatial preferences
Recall that E denotes the set of all Euclidean spatial preferences on Rm+ . In
the spatial preference domain that we consider in this section, each individual
is assumed to have a Euclidean spatial preference.
Euclidean Spatial Preference Domain. D ⊆ En.
The assumptions on the agenda domain are made precise in the following
definition.
Full-Dimensional Compact Agenda Domain. For all A ∈ A, A is a compact
set with a nonempty interior.
If we think of the preferences as belonging to legislators who must choose the
quantities of various public goods, an agenda can be interpreted as the set of
public goods allocations that are feasible given the resources at the legislators’
disposal. As these resources are varied, we obtain different agendas.
With these domain assumptions, IIF is vacuous.
Lemma 6. If X = Rm+ with m ≥ 2 and a social choice correspondence is
defined on a full-dimensional compact agenda domain and a Euclidean spatial
preference domain, then it satisfies IIF.
The basic idea of the proof is very simple. A Euclidean spatial preference
is completely determined by the location of its ideal point. Further, the ideal
point can be identified from a segment of an indifference contour by taking
the point of intersection of the lines orthogonal to the indifference surface at
two points in the segment. As a consequence, it is not possible to have two
profiles coincide on an agenda unless they are identical.
With this result in hand, Le Breton and Weymark (2002) were able to
establish the following possibility theorem.
Theorem 26. If X = Rm+ with m ≥ 2, on any full-dimensional compact
agenda domain and any Euclidean spatial preference domain, there exist so-
cial choice correspondences that satisfy ACA, IIF, SP, and ANON.
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The following example was used to establish Theorem 26.
Example 25. A Bergson–Samuelson social welfare function is a real-valued
function defined on n-tuples of utilities. Let W : Rn → R be any continuous,
symmetric, Bergson–Samuelson social welfare function, increasing in each of
its arguments. For all R ∈ E , a continuous utility function UR is chosen to
represent R. Using the Bergson–Samuelson social welfare function W and
these representations of the individual preferences, the social welfare function
F : D → R is defined by setting,
xF (R)y ↔ W [UR1(x), . . . , URn(x)] ≥ W [UR1(y), . . . , URn(y)],
for all R ∈ D and all x, y ∈ X. The social choice correspondence C : A×D →
X is defined by letting C(A,R) be the set of best alternatives in A according
to the social preference F (R). Formally, C(A,R) = B(A,F (R)) for all
(A,R) ∈ A × D. Because W and URi , i ∈ N , are continuous functions,
F (R) is a continuous ordering. Thus, C is well-defined because each agenda
is compact.
By Lemma 6, C satisfies IIF. C satisfies SP because W is an increasing
function. Because W is symmetric in its arguments and the same utility
function UR is used no matter who has the preference R, C satisfies ANON.
Because C is rationalized by the social welfare function F , it satisfies ACA.
An attractive feature of Example 25 is that it provides a link between Ar-
rovian social choice theory and traditional Bergson–Samuelson welfare eco-
nomics.99 Because none of the binary agendas are feasible, the social welfare
function used in this example does not satisfy IIA, thereby circumventing
the social welfare function impossibility theorem for Euclidean spatial pref-
erences discussed in Example 12.
15.2. Monotone analytic preferences
Le Breton and Weymark (2002) have also used the construction in Example
25 to establish a possibility theorem for monotone analytic preferences. Let
M denote the set of all monotone analytic preferences preferences with no
critical points on Rm+ . Le Breton and Weymark assumed that the preference
domain is any subset of Mn. Thus, further restrictions, such as convexity of
preferences, can be imposed on the preference domain.
99See also the related discussion in Pazner (1979).
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Monotone Analytic Preference Domain. D ⊆Mn.
As above, each agenda is assumed to be a nonempty compact set with a
nonempty interior. An agenda can be interpreted as being the set of feasible
allocations of public goods obtainable from the economy’s initial resources
given the production possibility sets of the firms. Different agendas are ob-
tained by varying the production technologies and/or the resource endow-
ments. The compactness of an agenda follows from standard assumptions on
firms’ technologies that imply that the aggregate production possibilities set
is closed and that only finite amounts of goods may be produced with the
economy’s resource endowment. Agendas can also be supposed to be convex
and comprehensive, as would be the case if firms’ technologies are convex
and exhibit free disposal. It is important that the agendas are compact.
On a noncompact, comprehensive agenda, the Pareto set is typically empty,
making it impossible for a social choice correspondence to satisfy WP.
Consider two real-valued monotone analytic functions with no critical
points defined on Rm++, with m ≥ 2. Le Breton and Weymark have shown
that if these functions are ordinally equivalent on an open subset of Rm++,
then they are ordinally equivalent on all of Rm++.
100 Because the admissible
agendas have nonempty interiors, it then follows that it is impossible for two
distinct profiles in Mn to coincide on an agenda. Hence, IIF is vacuous.
Lemma 7. If X = Rm+ with m ≥ 2 and a social choice correspondence
is defined on a full-dimensional compact agenda domain and a monotone
analytic preference domain, then it satisfies IIF.
Using Lemma 7, the social choice correspondence in Example 25 is easily
shown to satisfy all the axioms of Theorem 26 on a full-dimensional compact
agenda domain and a monotone analytic preference domain.
Theorem 27. If X = Rm+ with m ≥ 2, on any full-dimensional compact
agenda domain and any monotone analytic preference domain, there exist
social choice correspondences that satisfy ACA, IIF, SP, and ANON.
As noted by Le Breton and Weymark, it is straightforward to construct
a private goods version of Theorem 27. With private goods, this theorem
is modified by (i) assuming that individuals are selfish and have preferences
for own consumption that are monotone and analytic with no critical points
and (ii) replacing ANON with PANON.
100This result is an ordinal version of the Analytic Continuation Principle for monotone
analytic functions with no critical points.
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16. Classical domains of spatial and economic prefer-
ences
The results discussed in the preceding section demonstrate that by com-
bining an Arrow-inconsistent preference domain with natural restrictions on
the admissible agendas, it is sometimes possible to obtain a social choice
correspondence possibility theorem. However, there are spatial preferences
that are not Euclidean and there are classical economic preferences that are
not analytic. In this section, we review a number of results for larger do-
mains of spatial and economic preferences. In Sections 16.1 and 16.2, we
consider classical domains of economic preferences for exchange and produc-
tion economies. In Section 16.3, we consider spatial preferences that are not
limited to being Euclidean.
16.1. Exchange economies
Bailey (1979) questioned the relevance of Arrow’s Theorem for economic
problems on the grounds that economic agendas typically contain an infinite
number of alternatives, whereas Arrow’s proof of his theorem rests on an
implicit assumption that all binary agendas are feasible. Bailey purported
to provide an example of a social choice rule that satisfies all of the Arrow
axioms for a class of exchange economies. Bailey’s discussion of his example
is quite informal and confuses the social welfare function and social choice
correspondence formulations of Arrow’s problem in a rather fundamental
way.101 Below, we argue that Bailey’s example is problematic and, as a
consequence, misidentifies why Arrow’s axioms are consistent for a domain
of exchange economies. Nevertheless, Bailey was correct to question the
relevance of Arrow’s Theorem for exchange economies, as Donaldson and
Weymark (1988) have demonstrated.
Consider an economy with m ≥ 2 private goods. The set of alternatives is
X =
∏n
i=1 Xi, where Xi = R
m
+ for all i ∈ N . We consider two domains of eco-
nomic preferences. The first is the classical private goods preference domain
Cpr considered in Example 17. Recall that Cpr is the set of all profiles of self-
ish, continuous, strictly monotonic in own consumption, convex preference
101In fairness to Bailey, we note that some of this confusion is due to the fact that the
independence condition stated as an axiom in Arrow (1951) is IIF, even though it is IIA
that is used to establish Arrow’s Theorem.
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orderings on Rmn+ . Our second preference domain strengthens the assump-
tions on preferences by ruling out the possibility that an individual’s induced
private preference can have an indifference contour containing a consumption
bundle with strictly positive components that intersects an axis.
Strongly Classical Private Goods Preference Domain. For all i ∈ N , Di is the
set of all selfish, continuous, strictly monotonic in own consumption, convex
preference orderings on Rmn+ for which xPiy for all Ri ∈ Di, all x ∈ Rmn+
with xij > 0 for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, and all y ∈ Rmn+ with yij = 0 for some
j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
For each aggregate endowment ω ∈ Rm++, the generalized Edgeworth box
is A(ω) = {x ∈ X | ∑ni=1 xij ≤ ωj for all j = 1, . . . ,m}. Note that it is
not assumed a priori that all of the endowment is consumed. The agenda
domain is the set of all generalized Edgeworth boxes.
Edgeworth Box Agenda Domain. A = {A(ω) | ω ∈ Rm++}.102
Donaldson and Weymark (1988) claimed that the Walrasian competitive
equilibrium correspondence when the endowment is shared equally satisfies
all of the Arrow axioms with ND strengthened to PANON on an Edgeworth
Box agenda domain and a classical private goods preference domain. In
order for their argument to be valid, we must use the slightly more restrictive
preference domain described above.
Theorem 28. For a private goods economy with X = Rmn+ and m ≥ 2, there
exist social choice correspondences with an Edgeworth box agenda domain and
a strongly classical private goods preference domain that satisfy ACA, IIF,
SP, and PANON.103
Example 26 defines the Walrasian correspondence from equal split and
shows why it satisfies the assumptions of Theorem 28.
Example 26. Suppose that the set of alternatives X, the agenda domain
A, and the preference domain D are defined as in Theorem 28. For each
102Note that in contrast with the exchange economies considered in Section 10.2, free
disposal is permitted and consumption of goods is not required to be strictly positive.
103The weak and strong Pareto sets coincide in economies with classical economic pref-
erences.
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aggregate endowment and admissible preference profile, the Walrasian cor-
respondence from equal split is the social choice correspondence C defined by
setting the choice set equal to the set of all competitive equilibrium alloca-
tions obtainable from an initial equal division of the endowments. That is,
ω/n is each person’s endowment when the agenda is A(ω).
Because competitive equilibria exist in an exchange economy with clas-
sical economic preferences when each person has a positive endowment of
every good, C is well-defined. By the first Fundamental Theorem of Wel-
fare Economics, all competitive equilibria are Pareto optimal. Because each
person has the same endowment, permuting private preferences among indi-
viduals results in an economy that only differs from the original economy in
the labelling of individuals, so PANON is also satisfied.
With preferences that are strictly monotonic in own consumption, Pareto
optimality requires all of the resources be consumed. In order for A(ω1) to
be a strict subset of A(ω2), it must be the case that ω1j ≤ ω2j for all j, with
strict inequality for some j. Hence, for a given preference profile R, the
strong Pareto sets Ps(A(ω1),R) and Ps(A(ω2),R) do not intersect. Thus,
C trivially satisfies ACA.
It remains to show that IIF is satisfied. On the contrary, suppose that
there exists an endowment ω ∈ Rm++, profiles R1,R2 ∈ D that coincide on
A(ω), and an allocation x for which x ∈ C(A(ω),R1) and x ∈ C(A(ω),R2).
Because x is a Walrasian equilibrium from equal split for the profile R1,
there exists a price vector p ∈ Rn++ such that for all i ∈ N , pxi = pω/n and
pyi > pω/n if yPix. The assumptions on preferences imply that x ∈ Rmn++,
so x is in the interior of the generalized Edgeworth box A(ω). Because
x is not a Walrasian equilibrium from equal split for the profile R2, there
exists a k ∈ N and y ∈ Rmn+ such that yP 2kx and pyk ≤ pω/n. To satisfy our
preference domain assumption, we must have yk ∈ Rm++. Because preferences
are convex and monotone in own consumption, [λy + (1 − λ)x]P 2kx for all
λ ∈ (0, 1]. Further, for such λ, p[λyk + (1 − λ)xk] ≤ pω/n. Because x is in
the interior of A(ω), for positive λ sufficiently close to zero, [λy + (1 − λ)x]
is also in the interior of A(ω). On A(ω), R1 and R2 coincide. Hence, for
such λ, we have [λy + (1 − λ)x]P 1kx and p[λyk + (1 − λ)xk] ≤ pω/n, which
contradicts the assumption that x is a Walrasian equilibrium from equal split
for the profile R1. Thus, C satisfies IIF.104
104With the preference domain used by Donaldson and Weymark (1988), it is possible
for an equilibrium allocation to lie on the boundary of a generalized Edgeworth box. For
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As in Section 15, the consistency of the axioms in Theorem 28 turns on
one of the axioms being trivially satisfied. In this case, it is ACA that is
vacuous, at least for Paretian social choice correspondences.
A related Arrovian possibility theorem was established by Grether and
Plott (1982). They noted that when the preference domain is unrestricted
and there are a finite number of alternatives, all of the Arrow axioms can be
satisfied by setting each choice set equal to the weak Pareto set if the feasible
agendas are pairwise disjoint. In their result, it is the pairwise disjointness
of the feasible agendas that renders ACA vacuous. Because the resource
constraints are not assumed to hold with equality, this is not the case in
Example 26.105
There is a fixed aggregate endowment in the main example in Bailey
(1979). A government allocates these resources to individuals, with the fi-
nal allocation of goods determined by the competitive market mechanism.
Bailey clearly regarded each distribution of resources as corresponding to a
different agenda. However, how the aggregate endowment is distributed does
not affect what is feasible for the economy, so it would seem that there is
only one feasible set in his framework. Because the equilibrium allocations
depend on the initial allocation of endowments to individuals, Bailey has not
constructed an Arrovian social choice correspondence.
concreteness, suppose that there are just two goods and two individuals. If, for example,
only person one receives a positive consumption of all goods at the equilibrium allocation
x, person one’s indifference curve containing x consists of two linear segments with a kink
at x, and the slope of this indifference curve outside the Edgeworth box has the same slope
as the budget line, then changing person one’s preferences over non-feasible alternatives
can change the Walrasian equilibrium. This is not possible if the equilibrium allocation is
in the interior of the Edgeworth box.
This problem does not arise with the constrained Walrasian correspondence from equal
split. This correspondence is defined in the same way as the Walrasian correspondence from
equal split except that, for every price vector, each person’s budget set is the intersection
of the Walrasian budget set with the set of consumption bundles that do not exceed the
aggregate endowment ω. This correspondence satisfies all of the axioms of Theorem 28 on
an Edgeworth box agenda domain and a classical private goods preference domain. We
are grateful to Marc Fleurbaey for this observation.
105The finiteness of the set of alternatives ensures that the Pareto sets in Grether and
Plott’s construction are nonempty. Nonemptyness of the Pareto sets in Example 26 fol-
lows from the compactness of the feasible agendas and the continuity of the individual
preferences.
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16.2. Production economies
ACA is not, in general, vacuous in production economies. Nevertheless,
Donaldson and Weymark (1988) have shown that the Arrow axioms are con-
sistent in production economies. They considered both public goods and
private goods economies.
In the case of private goods, the universal set of alternatives is the same
as in the preceding subsection. In the public goods economy, there are m ≥ 2
public goods and the set of alternatives is X = Rm+ .
Donaldson and Weymark’s possibility theorem is not very sensitive to
the choice of preference domain, provided that all preferences are continu-
ous. They assumed that the preference domain is the set of all profiles of
continuous preferences in the public goods case and the set of all profiles of
continuous selfish preferences in the private goods case. They noted that
their theorem also holds with classical restrictions on preferences, and we
state their result in this form. For private goods, we use the classical pri-
vate goods preference domain Cpr. For public goods, we use the classical
public goods preference domain Cpu described in Example 8. Recall that Cpu
is the set of all profiles of continuous, strictly monotonic, convex preference
orderings on X.
In addition to the assumptions made about the agenda domain in Section
15, it is assumed that all agendas are comprehensive.
Full-Dimensional Compact Comprehensive Agenda Domain. For all A ∈ A,
A is a compact comprehensive set with a nonempty interior.
As in Section 15.2, an agenda is interpreted as being the set of feasible alloca-
tions of goods that can be made available to consumers from the economy’s
initial resources using the production possibility sets of the firms. With this
interpretation of an agenda, comprehensiveness corresponds to assuming that
goods can be freely disposed. Theorem 29 is valid with further restrictions
on the agenda, such as convexity.
For both public and private goods economies, Donaldson and Weymark
(1988) have shown that Arrow’s axioms are consistent if the preference do-
main is classical and there is a full-dimensional compact comprehensive agenda
domain. It is an open question whether ANON and PANON can be used
instead of ND in this theorem.
Theorem 29. (a) For a public goods economy with X = Rm+ and m ≥ 2,
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there exist social choice correspondences with a full-dimensional compact
comprehensive agenda domain and a classical public goods preference domain
that satisfy ACA, IIF, WP, and ND. (b) For a private goods economy with
X = Rmn+ and m ≥ 2, there exist social choice correspondences with a full-
dimensional compact comprehensive agenda domain and a classical private
goods preference domain that satisfy ACA, IIF, WP, and ND.
As in Example 23, there is a distinguished alternative in every admissible
agenda. Here, this distinguished alternative is the origin. However, every
admissible preference ranks the origin last and every agenda includes an
infinite number of alternatives, so it is not possible to adapt Example 23 to
show the consistency of Arrow’s axioms in production economies. Although
there do not exist more than one distinguished alternative in every admissible
agenda, the example Donaldson and Weymark used to establish Theorem 29
exploits the fact that profiles can be partitioned in such a way that whenever
two profiles coincide on an agenda, they must be in the same cell of the
partition, as is the case in the construction (Example 24) Gibbard, Hylland,
and Weymark (1987) used to show the consistency of the Arrow axioms when
the agenda domain {x¯, y¯}-restricted. We present Donaldson and Weymark’s
public goods example. A private goods version of this example can be used
to establish the second part of Theorem 29.
Example 27. Consider a public goods economy with X = Rm+ and m ≥ 2
that satisfies the domain restrictions of Theorem 29. Let R∗ be an arbitrary
profile in D. The preference domain is partitioned into the sets D1 and D2
as follows. For any profile R ∈ D, R ∈ D1 if and only if R coincides with
R∗ in some neighbourhood of the origin. The social choice correspondence
C : A×D → X is defined by setting, for all A ∈ A, C(A,R) = B(A,R1) for
all R ∈ D1 and C(A,R) = B(A,R2) for all R ∈ D2. That is, person one is a
strong dictator for the profiles in D1 and person two is a strong dictator for
the profiles in D2.
Using essentially the same reasoning as in Example 24, C satisfies ACA,
WP, and ND. Because any admissible agenda A includes a neighbourhood of
the origin, if two profiles agree on A, they must (i) either both agree with R∗
on some neighbourhood of the origin or (ii) neither of them agrees with R∗
on any neighbourhood of the origin. In either case, the same dictator is used
for both profiles, so IIF is satisfied.106 Note that that C is rationalized by a
106If a serial dictatorship is used for each cell of the partition, SP is also satisfied. Ev-
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social welfare function that satisfies all of the Arrow axioms except IIA.107
Consider a public goods economy with X = Rm+ and m ≥ 2. For all
(p, w) ∈ Rm+1++ , let Y (p, w) = {x ∈ X | px ≤ w}. Y (p, w) can be interpreted
as being the set of feasible allocations for a production economy with a linear
production possibility set.
Complete Linear Comprehensive Agenda Domain. A ∈ A if and only if
A = Y (p, w) for some (p, w) ∈ Rm+1++ .
With this agenda domain, there is little scope for ACA to play a role if
preferences are continuous and monotonic and the social choice correspon-
dence is Paretian. WP implies that all Pareto optimal alternatives are con-
tained in the upper boundary of an agenda. If one “linear” agenda is a strict
subset of another, either their upper boundaries do not intersect or, if they
do, all the alternatives they have in common lie on the boundary of Rm+ .
Thus, if the preference domain is restricted in such a way that weak Pareto
sets only include alternatives with positive consumption of all goods, ACA
is vacuous. The following preference domain has this feature.
Strongly Convex Classical Public Goods Preference Domain. D is the set of all
profiles of continuous preference orderings on Rm+ that are strictly monotonic
on Rm++ and strictly convex relative to R
m.
The requirement that each admissible preference is strictly convex relative
to Rm rules out any indifference contour that contains an alternative with
strictly positive components from intersecting an axis.
Le Breton (1997) has observed that with this kind of preference domain
and a complete linear comprehensive agenda domain, it is possible to con-
struct social choice correspondences that satisfy all of the Arrow axioms,
with ND strengthened to ANON.
Theorem 30. If X = Rm+ with m ≥ 2, there exist social choice correspon-
dences with a complete linear comprehensive agenda domain and a strongly
convex classical public goods preference domain that satisfy ACA, IIF, WP,
and ANON.
eryone can be a dictator on some cell if more reference profiles are used to partition the
preference domain into n or more cells.
107Campbell (1995) has shown that the Arrow axioms are inconsistent if the preference
domain in this example is combined with an agenda domain that includes all finite subsets
of X of cardinalities k and k+ 1 for some k ≥ 2, but no subset with a smaller cardinality.
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Le Breton did not provide an explicit example of such a social choice
correspondence. We provide one in Example 28.
Example 28. Consider a public goods economy with X = Rm+ and m ≥ 2
and a social choice correspondence C that satisfies the domain assumptions of
Theorem 30. Let C be defined by setting C(Y (p, w),R) = Pw(Y (p, w),R)
for all (p, w) ∈ Rm+1++ and all R ∈ D. In other words, the social choice
correspondence always chooses the whole weak Pareto set, as in the Grether–
Plott example discussed in Section 16.1.
16.3. General spatial preferences
The distinguishing features of a spatial preference are that it is convex and
it has a bliss point. Duggan (1996) has shown that the Arrow axioms are
inconsistent when the preference domain includes all profiles of spatial pref-
erences and the agenda domain is the set of compact convex subsets of the
universal set of alternatives X when X is a multidimensional convex subset
of a Euclidean space. We consider Duggan’s theorem in this section.
More precisely, with X as described above, a spatial preference R on X
is a continuous, strictly convex ordering with a bliss point. Let S denote the
set of all spatial preferences.108 Clearly, E ⊂ S. Duggan assumed that all
profiles of spatial preferences are admissible.
Unrestricted Spatial Preference Domain. D = Sn.
Duggan’s agenda domain is the set of all compact convex subsets of X.
Complete Compact Convex Agenda Domain. A is the set of compact convex
subsets of X.
Note that any spatial preference in S has a unique maximum on any compact
convex agenda.
Aside from the trivial agendas that contain only one alternative, each
admissible agenda contains an infinite number of alternatives. Duggan noted
that the proof of his theorem only requires the agenda domain to include the
agendas formed by taking the convex hulls of any pair or triple of alternatives.
However, it is essential that the domain includes the convex hull of any
108Because a spatial preference is required to be continuous, if X is an interval of the
real line, S is a strict subset of the set of single-peaked preferences SP .
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pair of alternatives, and such sets do not have an interior. In contrast, the
possibility theorem for Euclidean spatial preferences presented in Section
15.1 and the possibility theorems for economic preference domains discussed
above all assume that every agenda has a nonempty interior. This assumption
plays an important role in the proofs of these results.
Theorem 31 is Duggan’s impossibility theorem for spatial preferences.
Theorem 31. If X is a convex subset of a Euclidean space and the dimen-
sion of X is at least two, there is no social choice correspondence with a
complete compact convex agenda domain and an unrestricted spatial prefer-
ence domain that satisfies ACA, IIF, WP, and ND.
The proof we presented in Section 12.2 of the choice-theoretic version of
Arrow’s Theorem begins by rationalizing the social choice correspondence by
a social welfare function and then showing that this social welfare function
satisfies all of Arrow’s original axioms, which is impossible. Because Duggan’s
agenda domain is not closed under finite unions, Hansson’s Theorem does
not apply, so ACA does not guarantee that the social choice correspondence
can be rationalized. Thus, a different proof strategy is required to establish
Theorem 31. Duggan’s proof of this theorem is an ingenious adaptation of the
proof strategy described in Section 2 for the social welfare function version
of Arrow’s Theorem. Duggan’s proof is too long to reproduce here, so we
limit ourselves to a discussion of its main features.
Let C be a social choice correspondence satisfying Duggan’s domain as-
sumptions and all of the Arrow axioms except ND. For any subset Y of X, let
ch(Y ) denote the convex hull of Y . Although no pair of distinct alternatives
is an admissible agenda, the convex hull of any pair is. It is these sets that
Duggan used to make binary comparisons. Note that any admissible prefer-
ence is single-peaked on ch({x, y}). Duggan defined his decisiveness relations
for {x, y} in terms of the social choice from ch({x, y}) when the individual
preference peaks are at the endpoints of this line segment. Specifically, for
any ordered pair (x, y) ∈ X2, (i) G ⊆ N is almost decisive for the ordered
pair (x, y) if C(ch({x, y}),R) = {x} when B(ch({x, y}), Ri) = {x} for all
i ∈ G and B(ch({x, y}), Ri) = {y} for all i ∈ G and (ii) G is decisive for the
ordered pair (x, y) if C(ch({x, y}),R) = {x} when B(ch({x, y}), Ri) = {x}
for all i ∈ G. By IIF, if a group is (almost) decisive for (x, y), then it cannot
be (almost) decisive for (y, x).
A group G ⊆ N is proper if ∅ = G = N . For any x, y, z ∈ X that are not
colinear, Duggan has shown that if a proper group G is almost decisive for
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(x, y), then it is also almost decisive for (y, z). This is done by investigating
the relationship between the social choice from ch({x, y, z}) and the choices
from the edges of ch({x, y, z}) when the Pareto set of ch({x, y, z}) is con-
tained in ch({x, y}). A similar argument then shows that G is also almost
decisive for (w, z) when x, z, and w are not colinear. Because X is at least
two dimensional, these two results imply that if a proper group G is almost
decisive for some pair of distinct alternatives, then it is almost decisive for
all pairs. Once this has been established, it is not too difficult to show that
G is decisive for all pairs of alternatives.
The preceding argument shows that G has the power to determine the
social choice on line segments when the members of G all agree that one
end of the line segment is the best feasible alternative. The next step in the
argument shows that G also has the power to determine the social choice on
any feasible agenda A if the members of G agree about what is best in A.
Duggan called a group G for which C(A,R) = {x} whenever B(A,Ri) = {x}
for all i ∈ G an oligarchy. A dictator is a one-person oligarchy. By WP, N
is an oligarchy. The rest of the proof is devoted to showing that the smallest
oligarchy contains only one person. Hence, C is dictatorial.
As previously noted, Duggan’s proof strategy requires that the line seg-
ment joining any two distinct alternatives in X is an admissible agenda. It
is an open question whether Arrow’s axioms are consistent for the preference
domain Sn when the agenda domain is the set of all compact convex subsets
of X that have nonempty interiors.
17. Independence of Pareto Irrelevant Alternatives
The example (Example 27) Donaldson and Weymark (1988) used to establish
the consistency of Arrow’s axioms in their possibility theorem for production
economies (Theorem 29) has the property that whose preference is used to
determine the choice set depends on properties of the preference profile in
an arbitrarily small neighbourhood of the origin. With monotone preferences
and a full-dimensioned agenda, none of these alternatives are Pareto optimal.
Donaldson and Weymark have suggested that preferences for Pareto dom-
inated alternatives should be irrelevant when determining what to choose
from an agenda, a property they call Independence of Pareto Irrelevant Al-
ternatives. In this section, we review the theorems Donaldson and Weymark
(1988) and Duggan (1996) have established using this independence axiom.
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With Independence of Pareto Irrelevant Alternatives, each choice set only
depends on the restriction of the preference profile to the Pareto set. There
are two versions of this axiom, one based on weak Pareto optimality and one
based on strong Pareto optimality.
Independence of Weakly Pareto Irrelevant Alternatives (WPIIA). For all A ∈
A and all R1,R2 ∈ D, if Pw(A,R1) = Pw(A,R2) and R1 and R2 coincide
on this common Pareto set, then C(A,R1) = C(A,R2).
Independence of Strongly Pareto Irrelevant Alternatives (SPIIA). For all A ∈
A and all R1,R2 ∈ D, if Ps(A,R1) = Ps(A,R2) and R1 and R2 coincide on
this common Pareto set, then C(A,R1) = C(A,R2).
Note that, in general, the second axiom is more demanding than the first.
Both of these axioms imply IIF on any domain for which the Pareto sets are
always nonempty.
When the agenda domain consists of the nonempty finite subsets of X,
because, for any admissible preference profile and any admissible agenda,
each Pareto set is also feasible, ACA, IIF, and WP (resp. SP) imply WPIIA
(resp. SPIIA).109 As a consequence, regardless of the preference domain, with
an unrestricted finite feasible set agenda domain, the implications of IIF and
WPIIA are the same when combined with Arrow’s other axioms. This is not
the case in production economies, as Example 27 demonstrates.
17.1. Nonconvex agendas
For the public goods economy considered in Theorem 29, Donaldson and
Weymark (1988) have shown that replacing IIF with WPIIA results in an
impossibility theorem if the agenda domain is enlarged to the set of all com-
pact and comprehensive subsets of X.
Complete Compact Comprehensive Agenda Domain. A ∈ A if and only if A
is a compact comprehensive subset of X.
Note that this agenda domain includes sets with an empty interior.
Recall that for any x, y ∈ Rm+ , their corner set x↓ ∪ y↓ is obtained by
taking the union of the comprehensive sets of x and y. Because agendas
109The finiteness assumption ensures that the Pareto sets are nonempty.
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have not been assumed to be convex, the corner set generated by any pair
of alternatives is an admissible agenda. It is these agendas that permit
Donaldson and Weymark to make binary comparisons.
Theorem 32 is Donaldson and Weymark’s public goods impossibility the-
orem.
Theorem 32. If X = Rm+ with m ≥ 2, there is no social choice correspon-
dence with a complete compact comprehensive agenda domain and a classical
public goods preference domain that satisfies ACA, WPIIA, WP, and ND.
Proof. On the contrary, suppose that there exists a social correspondence
C : A×D → X that satisfies all the assumptions of the theorem. The agenda
domain is closed under finite unions, so by Hansson’s Theorem (Theorem 18),
C can be rationalized by a social welfare function F : D → R.
Consider any x, y ∈ X and any R ∈ D. By the continuity and monotonic-
ity of preferences and the compactness of x↓∪y↓, the Pareto set Pw(x↓∪y↓,R)
is a nonempty subset of {x, y}. Hence, WP implies that C(x↓ ∪ y↓,R) ⊆
{x, y}. It follows from this observation that F is uniquely determined from
the choices out of corner sets as follows: for all x, y ∈ X and all R ∈ D,
xF (R)y ↔ x ∈ C(x↓ ∪ y↓,R).
If R1 and R2 coincide on {x, y}, then Pw(x↓ ∪ y↓,R1) = Pw(x↓ ∪ y↓,R2).
Hence, by WPIIA, C(x↓ ∪ y↓,R1) = C(x↓ ∪ y↓,R2). Because F rationalizes
C, F (R1) and F (R2) therefore coincide on {x, y}; i.e., F satisfies IIA.
If xPiy for all i ∈ N , then x is the unique Pareto optimal alternative in
x↓ ∪ y↓. Thus, C(x↓ ∪ y↓,R) = {x}, from which it follows that F satisfies
WP.
Suppose that d ∈ N is a dictator for F . Because C is nondictatorial, there
exists an A ∈ A, x, y ∈ A, and an R ∈ D such that xPdy, but y ∈ C(A,R).
By ACA, y ∈ C(x↓ ∪ y↓,R).110 Because F rationalizes C, d is a dictator for
F , and xPdy, we must have C(x↓ ∪ y↓,R) = {x}, a contradiction. Hence, F
satisfies ND.
We have shown that F satisfies all of the assumptions of the Kalai–Muller–
Satterthwaite Theorem (Theorem 5), which is impossible.
This proof strategy is similar to the one used to prove the choice-theoretic
version of Arrow’s Theorem. The proof begins by assuming that all of the
110Even if A has a nonempty interior, x↓ ∪ y↓ need not, which is why the agenda domain
is not restricted to sets with nonempty interiors.
104
axioms can be satisfied. Using Hansson’s Theorem, ACA implies that the
social choice correspondence is rationalized by a social welfare function. The
choices from corner sets are used to uniquely identify this function, whereas
the choice from pairs of alternatives were used to do this in the proof of
Arrow’s Theorem. This social welfare function is then shown to satisfy all of
the Arrow social welfare function axioms. Finally, a social welfare function
impossibility theorem is used to show that this is impossible. Here, it is
the Kalai–Muller–Satterthwaite Theorem, not Arrow’s original impossibility
theorem that establishes the contradiction.
Donaldson and Weymark (1988) have established the following private
goods analogue of Theorem 32.
Theorem 33. If X = Rmn+ with m ≥ 2, there is no social choice correspon-
dence with a complete compact comprehensive agenda domain and a classical
private goods preference domain that satisfies ACA, SPIIA, SP, and ND.
Because classical private goods preferences are only strictly monotonic in
own consumption, for a profile R, one cannot, in general, infer that the weak
Pareto set for a corner set x↓ ∪y↓ is contained in {x, y}. However, the strong
Pareto set is. Thus, by strengthening WP to SP and using SPIIA instead of
WPIIA, the argument used to prove Theorem 32 shows that a social choice
correspondence satisfying the assumptions of Theorem 33 can be rationalized
by a social welfare function satisfying the Arrow axioms, which is impossible
by Theorem 16 on effective social welfare functions.
17.2. Convex agendas
Nonconvex agendas play two roles in the proof of Theorem 32. First, if
only convex agendas are feasible, it would not be possible to use Hansson’s
Theorem to show that the social choice correspondence is rationalizable.
Second, corner sets are needed to isolate pairs of alternatives, and so make
binary comparisons. As a consequence, Donaldson and Weymark’s proof
strategy is ill-suited to deal with convex agendas.
Donaldson and Weymark (1988) and Duggan (1996) have investigated the
consistency of the axioms in Theorem 32 in convex production economies.
Donaldson and Weymark have shown that these axioms (with ND strength-
ened to ANON) are consistent when there are only two public goods, whereas
Duggan has shown that they are not consistent when there are more than
two goods. Their agenda domains are restricted to include only convex sets,
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as would be the case if all firms’ technologies are convex. Preferences are
required to be strictly convex, not merely convex.111
Complete Compact Comprehensive Convex Agenda Domain. A ∈ A if and
only if A is a compact, comprehensive, convex subset of X.
Strictly Convex Classical Public Goods Preference Domain. D is the set of all
profiles of continuous, strictly monotonic, strictly convex preference orderings
on X.
In Donaldson and Weymark’s possibility theorem, ND is strengthened to
ANON.
Theorem 34. If X = R2+, there exist social choice correspondences with a
complete compact comprehensive convex agenda domain and a strictly convex
classical public goods preference domain that satisfies ACA, WPIIA, WP,
and ANON.
With these domain restrictions, on the upper boundary of any agenda,
everyone has a single-peaked preference. This observation was used by Don-
aldson and Weymark to construct the following example satisfying all of the
assumptions of Theorem 34.
Example 29. Consider a two-good public goods economy with X = R2+
that satisfies the domain restrictions of Theorem 34. The social choice cor-
respondence C : A × D → X is defined by setting, for all A ∈ A and all
R ∈ D, C(A,R) = {x ∈ A | x1 = maxi∈N B1(A,Ri)}, where B1(A,Ri) is the
first component of the unique alternative that maximizes Ri on A. On the
upper boundary of A, everyone has single-peaked preferences. The rightmost
of the individual peaks is the social choice. In other words, one of the class
of generalized median social choice functions introduced by Moulin (1980)
and discussed in Section 3 is used to determine each choice set.
The construction of C for the case of three individuals is illustrated in
Figure 13. Person one’s best choices in the agendas A1 and A2 are a and b,
respectively. Person two’s best choices in the agendas A1 and A2 are c and d,
respectively. Person three’s best choice in both agendas is e. For this profile
of preferences, the social choice out of both A1 and A2 is e.
111Alternatively, in Donaldson and Weymark’s theorem, preferences need only be as-
sumed to be convex if the agendas are assumed to be strictly convex.
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It is easy to verify that C satisfies WPIIA, WP, and ANON. For a given
profile, suppose that the agenda shrinks from, say, A2 to A1, but the original
choice remains feasible. Anyone whose peak is still feasible has the same
peak on A1 as on A2. Because the rightmost of the original peaks remains
feasible, the convexity of preferences ensures that nobody’s peak moves to
the right of the original choice, as illustrated in Figure 13. Hence, ACA is
satisfied.
Le Breton (1997) has observed that the social choice correspondence in
this example can be rationalized by a social welfare function. Using the
Hausdorff metric [see Munkres (1975)] to measure the distance between sets,
for a given profile R ∈ D, for any sequence of agendas A1, A2, . . . in A
for which Ak → A ∈ A and Pw(Ak,R) → Pw(A,R), it can be shown that
C(Ak,R) → C(A,R). It follows from a theorem of Peters and Wakker (1991)
that when this Pareto continuity condition is satisfied on the agenda domain
of Example 29, C is rationalized by a social welfare function. Peters and
Wakker’s rationalizability theorem does not generalize to more goods.112
Duggan (1996) has shown that Arrow’s axioms are inconsistent on a com-
plete compact comprehensive convex agenda domain and a strictly convex
classical public goods preference domain when there are three or more goods.
Thus, the restriction to two goods in Theorem 34 is essential.
Theorem 35. If X = Rm+ with m ≥ 3, there does not exist a social choice
correspondence with a complete compact comprehensive convex agenda do-
main and a strictly convex classical public goods preference domain that sat-
isfies ACA, WPIIA, WP, and ND.
Before proving Theorem 35, it is useful to provide an overview of Duggan’s
proof strategy. First, Duggan’s spatial impossibility theorem (Theorem 31)
is used to show that there is a dictator for the subdomain of agendas whose
upper boundaries all lie in the same hyperplane,. A connection argument is
then used to show that the same person is dictator on agendas whose upper
boundaries are contained in different hyperplanes. Finally, ACA is used to
show that this individual is a dictator on agendas whose upper boundaries
are not contained in a hyperplane.
112Peters and Wakker’s theorem is for single-valued choice correspondences. With single-
valuedness, as they show, if the agenda domain is closed under intersections, ACA is a
necessary and sufficient condition for a choice correspondence to be rationalized by a
binary relation (which need not be an ordering) on A.
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Proof of Theorem 35. Let C : A×D → X be a social choice correspondence
satisfying all of the assumptions of the theorem. For any x ∈ Rm+ and any
p ∈ Rm++, let Hx(p) denote the restriction to Rm+ of the hyperplane containing
x that is normal to p. For any compact convex subset A of Hx(p), let A↓ =
∪x∈Ax↓ . A↓ is an admissible agenda and its upper boundary is A. Note that
any admissible preference R is spatial when restricted to Hx(p) and that R
has a unique maximum on A↓ . Person d ∈ N is a dictator for Hx(p) if
C(A↓ ,R) = B(A↓ , Rd) for all compact convex A ⊆ Hx(p) and all R ∈ D.
Consider any x ∈ Rm+\{0m} and any p ∈ Rm++. Let A∗ and D∗ denote the
restrictions of the agenda and preference domains to Hx(p). A∗ is a complete
compact convex agenda domain and D∗ is an unrestricted spatial preference
domain. A social choice correspondence C∗ : A∗×D∗ → Hx(p) can be defined
by setting C∗(A,R∗) = C(A↓ ,R) for all A ∈ A∗ and all R ∈ D, where R∗ is
the restriction of R to Hx(p). Because the Pareto set Pw(A↓ ,R) is contained
in A when A ⊆ Hx(p), WP and WPIIA ensure that C∗ is well-defined. It is
easy to verify that C∗ satisfies ACA, IIF, and WP. Hence, by Theorem 31,
C∗ is dictatorial, which implies that there is a dictator d for C on Hx(p).
Consider any x, y ∈ Rm+\{0m} and any p, q ∈ Rm++. Simple geometry
confirms that it is possible to find a z ∈ Rm+\{0m} and an r ∈ Rm++ such
that Hz(r) intersects both Hx(p) and Hy(q). Further, Hz(r) ∩ Hx(p) and
Hz(r)∩Hy(q) are at least one-dimensional. There must be a dictator on each
of these three sets and the overlap between Hx(p) and Hz(r) and between
Hz(r) andHy(q) implies that the same person is the dictator in all three cases.
Hence, d is a dictator on Hw(s) for all w ∈ Rm+\{0m} and all s ∈ Rm++.113
Now consider any A ∈ A with A = {0m} and any R ∈ D. Let x be the
unique maximum of Rd on A. Because A is compact, convex, and compre-
hensive and Rd is continuous, strictly monotonic, and convex, there exists a
p ∈ Rm++ such that Hx(p) is a separating hyperplane for A and the upper con-
tour set of Rd at x. Because d has strictly convex preferences and is a dictator
for Hx(p), C(Hx(p)↓ ,R) = {x}. ACA then implies that C(A,R) = {x}. Be-
cause the choice is trivial when A = {0m}, d is therefore a dictator for C.
WPIIA and SPIIA have not been investigated in private goods economies
when only convex agendas are admissible.
113Note that it has now been established that the axioms are inconsistent on a complete
linear agenda domain and a strictly convex classical public goods preference domain.
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Except when there are only two public goods and all agendas are convex,
the theorems in this section are all negative. Duggan (1996) and Le Breton
(1997) have argued that these results illustrate the undue restrictiveness of
WPIIA and SPIIA and they should not be used to conclude that it is impos-
sible to construct satisfactory social choice correspondences for production
economies. Le Breton used the following example to make his point.
Example 30. Consider a public goods economy with X = Rm+ and m ≥ 2.
As in Example 28, suppose that there is a complete linear agenda domain. If
everyone is given an equal share of the economy’s wealth w and given access
to the linear technology defined by p, an individual with preference R would
choose B(Y (p, w/n), R). Le Breton has suggested that fairness requires the
social choice correspondence to guarantee that no individual is ever worse off
than if he or she had an equal right to w. That is, with the agenda Y (p, w)
and profile R, the choice set should be contained in ∩i∈NU(p, w,Ri), where
U(p, w,Ri) = {x ∈ Y (p, w) | xRB(Y (p, w/n), Ri)}.
Suppose that D is a strictly convex classical public goods preferences do-
main. Define the social choice correspondence C by setting C(Y (p, w),R) =
B(∩i=1U(p, w,Ri), R1) for all (p, w) ∈ Rm+1++ and all R ∈ D. That is, person
one’s preferences are maximized subject to the constraint that none of the
other individuals is worse off than they would be with an equal claim on
the resources. C satisfies all of the Arrow axioms and the fairness condition
described above, but it does not satisfy WPIIA.
18. Concluding remarks
In this survey, we have considered the consistency of Arrow’s axioms when
his unrestricted domain assumptions are replaced by domain conditions that
incorporate the restrictions on agendas and preferences encountered in eco-
nomic environments. For social welfare functions, we have seen that eco-
nomic domain restrictions do not provide a satisfactory way of avoiding Ar-
rovian social choice impossibilities, except when the set of alternatives is
one-dimensional and preferences are single-peaked. In contrast, for social
choice correspondences, a number of economic domains have been identified
for which the Arrow axioms are consistent.
With a social welfare function, a domain restriction only specifies what
profiles of individual preferences are admissible. A unifying theme of Part
I is that if a preference domain is Arrow-inconsistent, then this can gener-
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ally be established using some version of the local approach introduced by
Kalai, Muller, and Satterthwaite (1979). This methodology has been used
by Kalai, Muller, and Satterthwaite (1979), Bordes and Le Breton (1989;
1990b), and Redekop (1991; 1993a; 1993c; 1996) to identify sufficient condi-
tions for a preference domain to be Arrow-inconsistent. The exact form of
these conditions depends on whether the model being considered has public
or private goods (or both). We have illustrated the power of this approach
by showing how it can be used to prove that a number of domains of in-
terest are saturating, which is Kalai, Muller, and Satterthwaite’s sufficient
condition for Arrow-inconsistency for public alternatives. The difficulty of
determining whether a particular domain is saturating or not depends on the
domain being considered, but the general principles being applied do not.
The local approach involves identifying free pairs and free triples and
showing how the free pairs can be connected to each other using a chain
of overlapping free triples. Even when not every pair of free pairs can be
connected, we have shown that the application of the local approach can
sometimes be used to infer a great deal about the structure of an Arrovian
social welfare function, as is the case in our ordinal probability example
(Example 15). Our discussion of exchange economies in Section 10.2 shows
that it is even possible to adapt the local approach to show the Arrow-
inconsistency of a specific domain in which free triples fail to exist. Thus, the
local approach can be viewed as being the fundamental tool for determining
whether a preference domain is Arrow-inconsistent.114
The critical assumption that permits the application of the local approach
is Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. Mayston (1980) has noted that
this axiom precludes considering individual marginal rates of substitution
(when they are well-defined) in deciding how to socially rank a pair of al-
ternatives, as it is not possible to calculate marginal rates of substitution
without considering other “irrelevant” alternatives. In economic models, it
therefore seems appropriate to consider weaker formulations of Arrow’s inde-
pendence condition, formulations that permit marginal rates of substitution
at an alternative x or the indifference surface containing x to be relevant fea-
114An alternative to the local approach has been proposed by Saari (1991) to investi-
gate the consistency of axioms for aggregation problems, including preference aggregation
problems of the kind considered in Part I. Saari’s approach utilizes a discrete version of
a calculus argument to identify restrictions on the domain and range of his aggregation
function that imply that the aggregation function only depends on one argument. For
social welfare functions, this restriction corresponds to the existence of a dictator.
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tures of x. With the exception of some early work by Inada (1964; 1971) and
Pazner (1979), it is only recently that alternative independence conditions
have been investigated for economic domains. See, for example, Fleurbaey
and Maniquet (1996) and Fleurbaey, Suzumura, and Tadenuma (2002a).
Although lengthy, our discussion in Part I is not comprehensive. The
results discussed in Part I have been extended in the following directions.
There is a large literature that examines the implications for Arrow’s
Theorem of weakening the assumption that social preferences are orderings
and/or weakening (or dispensing with) the Pareto principle. On an unre-
stricted domain, the results obtained from this line of enquiry are rather
negative. See Campbell and Kelly (2002). Similar negative results have
been obtained for economic domains by, for example, Border (1983), Bordes
and Le Breton (1989; 1990a; 1990b), Campbell (1989b; 1990a; 1990b; 1992b;
1992d; 1992e; 1996), and Nagahisa (1991).115
In Arrow’s Theorem, it is assumed that there is a finite number of indi-
viduals. In many applications, such as overlapping generations economies,
the society is infinite. With an unrestricted preference domain and an infi-
nite society, social welfare functions exist that satisfy all of Arrow’s axioms
(although these functions have other unattractive features). Infinite soci-
eties with restricted preference domains have been considered by Campbell
(1989a; 1989b; 1990b; 1992a; 1992b; 1992d) and Redekop (1995; 1996).
We have only considered alternatives that are either purely public or
purely private. The mixed case in which alternatives have both public and
private components has been considered by Bordes and Le Breton (1990b)
and Redekop (1995; 1996).
A social welfare functional aggregates a profile of utility functions into a
social preference. The use of a social welfare functional allows for information
about interpersonal utility comparisons, when available, to play a role in
determining the social ordering of the alternatives. Social welfare functionals
on economic domains have been studied by Bordes, Hammond, and Le Breton
(1997) and Weymark (1998).
The social choice correspondence framework permits us to consider re-
strictions on the set of feasible agendas, not just on the set of admissible
preference profiles. Unlike with the local approach used to analyze social
welfare functions, no single methodology has been identified that can be
used to determine the consistency of Arrow’s choice-theoretic axioms in a
115Many of these restricted domain theorems require social preferences to be continuous.
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wide variety of economic environments. However, a lesson that does emerge
from the results we have surveyed in Part II is that the consistency of the
Arrow axioms depends very much on how restrictive Independence of Infea-
sible Alternatives and Arrow’s Choice Axiom are, and this depends on the
structure of the agenda and preference domains. In some environments, one
of these axioms is vacuous. For example, Independence of Infeasible Alter-
natives is vacuous for the economies with analytic preference domains and
compact agenda domains considered in Section 15 and Arrow’s Choice Ax-
iom is vacuous in the exchange economies considered in Section 16.1. In such
cases, it is very easy to construct social choice correspondences that satisfy
all of the other Arrow axioms. Even when none of the axioms is vacuous,
we have seen that possibility theorems emerge when the preference and/or
agenda domains are sufficiently restricted.
Arrovian social choice theory on economic domains has a close affinity to
the rapidly growing literature on the axiomatic analysis of resource alloca-
tion.116 As is the case with the literature discussed in Part II, the research on
axiomatic models of resource allocation investigates the implications of a set
of axioms when both individual preferences and the set of feasible agendas are
assumed to satisfy the kinds of restrictions found in microeconomic models.
However, it departs from the research discussed here in its choice of axioms
and, in some cases, on the kinds of economic problems being considered.
Many of the axioms advocated by practitioners of this approach to analyzing
resource allocation problems are motivated by fairness considerations, incen-
tive issues, or by the belief that the choices for different population sizes
should be consistent with each other. For the most part, this literature has
developed independently of the research we have surveyed and has typically
not included all of the Arrow axioms in the set of axioms being investigated.
Of the four Arrow axioms for social choice correspondences, Arrow’s
Choice Axiom is the most controversial. We know from the work of Ar-
row (1959) and Hansson (1968) that, for some agenda domains, this axiom
is equivalent to requiring the social choice correspondence to be rationaliz-
able by a social welfare function. This is not true in general. When viewed
as a constraint on the consistency of the choices made in different agen-
das, Arrow’s Choice Axiom is a compelling normative property of a choice
correspondence. It is interesting to note that, when combined with Strong
Pareto, a version of the resource monotonicity axiom used in the literature
116See Moulin and Thomson (1997) for an introduction to this literature.
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on the axiomatic analysis of resource allocation implies a “welfarist” version
of Arrow’s Choice Axiom for social choice functions. Applied to abstract
agenda domains, Resource Monotonicity requires that, for any fixed profile
of preferences, nobody should be harmed by an expansion of the feasible
set.117 For the social choice function C, consider a profile R and two agen-
das A and B with A ⊂ B for which C(B,R) ∈ A. Resource Monotonicity
implies that C(B,R)RiC(A,R) for all i ∈ N . From Strong Pareto and the
assumption that C(B,R) ∈ A, it then follows that C(B,R)IiC(A,R) for all
i ∈ N . Arrow’s Choice Axiom is somewhat more demanding, requiring that
C(B,R) = C(A,R). This argument provides indirect support for requir-
ing choices from different agendas to satisfy a choice consistency condition
similar to the one used by Arrow. However, Resource Monotonicity is a de-
manding axiom that often conflicts with other appealing normative criteria.
For example, for domains of exchange economies like those studied in Section
16.1, Moulin and Thomson (1988) have shown that any social choice function
satisfying Resource Monotonicity and Weak Pareto must violate some very
weak fairness axioms.
Our discussion of the theorems of Gibbard, Hylland, and Weymark (1987),
Le Breton and Weymark (2002), and Donaldson and Weymark (1988) in Sec-
tions 13.3, 15, and 16.2, respectively, demonstrates that when investigating
the consistency of the Arrovian axioms on restricted domains, it matters a
great deal whether one is dealing with a social welfare function or a social
choice correspondence. Preference domains that result in an impossibility
theorem using a social welfare function may well yield a possibility theorem
using a social choice correspondence when combined with an appropriate
agenda domain.118 It is standard practice in general equilibrium theory and
in welfare economics to place a priori restrictions on both preferences and
the set of feasible alternatives. For example, assumptions are often made on
117This property was introduced in the context of models in which the expansion of the
feasible set was achieved by an increase in the economy’s resource endowment.
118Marchant (2000) has suggested that this comparison is somewhat unfair because we
are not comparing comparable objects. In particular, he argued that it would be more
appropriate to make this comparison if the independence assumption for social welfare
functions was restricted to apply only to a restricted set of agendas, as is the case with
the independence assumption for social choice correspondences. Marchant’s argument is
consistent with our view that agenda domain restrictions can play an important role in
the development of Arrovian possibility theorems. See also the discussion in Fleurbaey,
Suzumura, and Tadenuma (2002b) of the relative strength of independence axioms in the
social welfare function and social choice correspondence frameworks.
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production technologies and on endowments to ensure that the set of feasible
alternatives is compact, comprehensive, and convex. The literature surveyed
here suggests that pursuing a similar strategy in Arrovian social choice theory
can be quite promising.
Much has been learned about the compatibility of Arrow’s axioms in
different economic environments. In our review of this literature, we have
identified several open questions. Thus, in spite of the substantial progress
that has be made, much more remains to be discovered about Arrovian social
choice theory on economic domains.
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